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Considerations on the Economic Impact of the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
 on South Africa 
 
By Mathew Gomes Menezes 
 
Mega-events are associated with significant positive implications such as enhanced 
international exposure of the host, improved infrastructure, increased tourist numbers, 
higher employment levels and tax revenues, greater feelings of patriotism among host 
region residents and integration of the host into the international community. Supporters 
of events have claimed that the occasions stimulate prominent economic gains for the 
host region. The economic and tourism growth that occurred in Barcelona following the 
1992 Olympic Games is erroneously cited by proponents of hosting as an example of the 
potential benefits that an event can derive on the host. Those Games were not the sole 
driver of growth in the region.  
 
An analysis of previous mega-events, demonstrated that net benefits were not a necessary 
consequence of hosting. Comparison of pre-event estimates of the economic impact and 
their actual effects are universally divergent. The observation was validated by the 
consensus academic opinion that economic impact studies systematically overstate the 
benefits of hosting, and underestimate the costs. Further, different forward-looking 
studies of the same event, calculate vastly different predictions. The tools for calculating 
the economic impact, specifically Input-Output Analysis and Computable General 
Equilibrium, do not provide useful predictions given their dependence on the inaccurate 
data. With 2010 cost data having continually increased since 2003, determining the 
appropriate inputs to an I-O or CGE is problematic. It was identified that the weight 
given to the multiplier effect was also a factor in the amplification of the expected 
benefits. Given the poor data sets available as inputs to I-O and CGE models, the study 
concentrated on conducting a comprehensive Cost-Benefit Analysis of the determinants 
of the economic impact of the 2010 World Cup based on the premise that the 
identification of the relative costs and benefits of staging the event was regarded as a 
greater contribution to the body of knowledge on the topic.  
 
It can be expected that there will not be significant short-term economic gains; this study 
predicted a net cost of R8.4bn, which is marginally offset by short-term net intangible 
benefits. The short-term economic consequences of the 2010 World Cup are expected to 
be overshadowed by the long-term effects on revenues within the tourism industry. The 
image implication of hosting 2010 is the most salient factor in considering the economic 
impact of 2010, as an alteration in the national image can have long-term effects on FDI 
and tourism. It is however not a certainty that the international exposure that South Africa 
receives will be beneficial, in the instance that the World Cup is characterised by poor 
organisational measures or crime. The net impact of hosting is expected to be a function 
of the long-term benefits, which can be expected to exceed the short-terms costs, and 
derive a cumulative net benefit from staging 2010. The World Cup is however unlikely to 
stimulate the economic growth rate above levels that would have occurred had the event 
not been held in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
That the 2010 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup is set 
to take place in South Africa in 2010 is a significant achievement for Africa, as the 
internationally accepted global game will have its showpiece event hosted on the 
continent. South Africa has won the honour to be at the focus of the world‟s attention for 
a month during June and July of 2010. The economic implications associated with 
hosting the event, which is only superseded by the Olympic Games in terms of prestige 
and logistical complexity, are unclear due to a range of factors. The preparations for the 
World Cup have been characterised by a great deal of rhetoric regarding the potential 
benefits of hosting. According to the CEO of the 2010 Local Organising Committee 
(LOC), Danny Jordaan: “the 2010 World Cup will continue to benefit South Africans 
after the tournament is over” (Herald, 2006: 4). LOC Chairman Irvin Khoza held that 
South Africa will not get another marketing opportunity like the World Cup for another 
100 years and that it was a “chance to present South Africa as a dynamic and exciting 
place to visit” (International Marketing Council,1 2009). During the then South African 
President Thabo Mbeki‟s (2006) State of the Nation address, it was claimed that the 
World Cup “will make an important contribution to our effort to accelerate our progress 
towards the achievement of the goal of a better life for our people.., (and) will give 
additional impetus to our struggle to achieve Africa‟s Renaissance.” Given such 
impressive proclamations, it is necessary to analyse their legitimacy for the sake of 
transparency in the allocation of government funds. Thus, the economic merits of 2010 as 
a public policy need to be assessed. 
 
1.1.  Economic, Political and Social Arguments for Hosting Mega-Events 
 
In general terms, events “are spatial–temporal phenomenon, and each is unique because 
of interactions among the setting, people, and management systems” (Getz, 2008: 404). 
Mega-events can be defined as “major, short-term sporting festivals of worldwide status 
that are held on a regular basis” (Cornelissen, 2004: 47). They are major hallmark events 
                                                          
1
 The International Marketing Council (IMC) created and operate the „Brand South Africa‟ Campaign. 
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that “are transitory, bring short-term international participation and attention and can 
have long-term consequences for the host city (or country)” (Chalkley and Essex, 1998: 
187). Another definition offered by Roche (2000: 1) is that: “(they) are large scale 
cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, 
mass popular appeal and international significance.” Cornelissen (2004:47) divided 
mega-events into 3 distinct orders, based on their size, scope and appeal. First-order 
events are international occasions that have the widest reach in terms of prestige, 
attendance and publicity. Second-order events are also of an international nature, but they 
lack the scale of first-order events. Finally, third-order events only involve the 
participation of several countries and are thus less significant on a global scale. The FIFA 
World Cup and the Olympic Games are the only events regarded as first-order mega-
events. The second-order includes the Rugby and Cricket World Cups, while examples of 
third-order events are the African Cup of Nations and the Asian Games. 
 
The opportunity to host the World Cup is highly sought after by nations and 
governments. A region‟s decision to host a mega-event is founded in the economic 
benefits that it is expected to derive (Baade and Matheson, 2004b: 334). Mega-events are 
“seen as leading to increased economic activity and creating new jobs through the net 
increase in demand for goods and services that they are assumed to generate” (Dwyer et 
al., 2005: 351). De Groote (2005: 10) agreed that mega-events are associated with 
stimulating economic growth beyond that which would have occurred without the event, 
due to increased tourist revenues and higher employment levels. Since the World Cup is 
known as a first-order mega-event, organisers and prospective hosts envisage “images of 
vast numbers of alien spendthrifts descending on the lucky host” (Baade and Matheson, 
2003: 3). Characterised by the “commercial trinity of sponsors, advertisers, and 
television, football has demonstrated itself to be the ultimate global commodity” (Horne 
and Manzenreiter, 2004: 196), of which the World Cup is the most highly valued aspect. 
 
The appreciably smaller international event, that of the 2003 ICC Cricket World Cup, 
which was hosted in South Africa was estimated to have generated “at least 1.2 billion 
rand for the South African economy” (Hassen in Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1088). 
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Thus, it is evident that a nation could stand to receive a significant autonomous injection 
of economic resources from staging a successful Cup. Those cities or countries that bid to 
host an international event have a common objective, whether it is the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, the Ryder Cup of Golf or the FIFA World Cup. They are 
looking to advertise their nation and to reap the economic benefits that are associated 
with both the event itself and long-term advantages of an improved international 
perception of the country or city that a successful hosting of the event is thought to 
ensure. 
 
Kurtzman (2005: 61 – 62) listed the various advantages that being host of an 
international event can have on a city. They include: high media coverage, short-term 
employment, taxation benefits, infrastructural developments, direct spending, 
internationalisation of the city and its business patterns and a long-term growth in 
tourism. These are all reasons that motivate a country or a city to attempt to host an 
international event. “It is predicted that the positive spin-offs (of the World Cup) will 
benefit tourism, hospitality and construction industries, as well as a decrease in 
unemployment and crime rates in South Africa. Perhaps the most important and 
immeasurable social benefits are the furthering of national identity and race relations 
within the country” (Goliger, 2005: 3). The possible consequences of the event that are 
posited here instil a belief that hosting the World Cup can considerably aid South 
Africa‟s development both socially and economically. If the speculations prove accurate, 
the net benefit of the event will be considerable. With the variety of potential positive 
effects of holding the event, the government and populace might justifiably be 
enthusiastic about the prospective benefits of staging the 2010 World Cup. 
 
Irrespective of the potential economic merits of hosting an event, there are other reasons 
why a nation would want to do so. The motivations relate to the effects on the 
international reputation of the host and the generation of national unity. The tournament 
is an international forum for advertising South Africa as a prospective holiday 
destination, investment opportunity and a progressive, developing nation. Being a host 
for such an event “can render a favourable image in the international tourism and 
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business marketplace” (Swart, 2005: 39). Baade and Matheson (2004a: 1085) agreed that 
these events “put the country (or city) on the map” and provide significant international 
exposure to the host. Events can also be seen as occasions that serve to showcase the 
economic, political and cultural power of the host country or as a signal that a country 
has arrived as a major figure on the international scene. The World Cup attracts a global 
audience, and as such it is also an opportunity for national corporations to advertise their 
own brand, good or service to foreigners who will follow the tournament world-wide, as 
well as to the hundreds of thousands of tourists who will be travelling in the country 
during the event. 
 
South Africa is currently faced with a problem that frequently confronts many nations 
that feel that they are being marginalised in the international community because of either 
a lack of or unfavourable publicity. Therefore, they endeavour to put their nation on the 
international stage, by hosting an international event. The Economist (2004: 28) 
addressed this issue with specific reference to the European Football Championships held 
in Portugal in 2004. These occasions were cited as “international coming out parties for 
small countries that fret about being on the geographic, political and economic fringes,” 
which is especially applicable to the South African 2010 context. 
 
The hosting of a mega-event can be seen as a political tool to further the agenda of a 
ruling party or government. The World Cup can be used to communicate messages to the 
South African public “and the wider international community, partly with the purpose of 
shaping a new South African society, and partly with the aim of bolstering the so-called 
African Renaissance” (Cornelissen and Swart, 2006: 109). It is of further political 
significance that South Africa has been chosen as the first African nation to host the 
FIFA World Cup. This achievement contributes towards the idea that South Africa is a 
leader on the continent, in that South Africa was deemed the African nation most capable 
of successfully hosting the event. The 2010 World Cup is a “great occasion for the South 
African government to showcase what they have achieved since democracy” (Bohlmann, 
2006: 7), and affirm its position as a leader on the continent. 
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The Economist (2004: 28) further claimed that “the economic arguments for hosting big 
sporting tournaments are largely spurious. The real reason for Portugal taking Euro 2004 
(was) that sporting success seems to make people feel marvellously good.” Watching a 
national team that is playing at home against larger, richer and traditionally better 
footballing nations, and winning, will do a great deal towards national unity. This is what 
occurred in Portugal in 2004, and “what need is there for an economic boom if an entire 
country can experience even one moment of unadulterated joy?” (Economist, 2004: 28). 
Maennig and Porsche (2008) cited the “feel-good effect” as one of the most prominent 
reasons for hosting a mega-event. Dohmen et al. (2006: 9) claimed that the economic 
benefits of hosting are found in the populace‟s perception that the event will lead to good 
economic conditions, so if the public perceives that the World Cup will contribute to 
growth, then it should do so.  
 
South Africa previously experienced adulation whilst hosting a mega-event. The 
successes of the South African rugby team during the 1995 Rugby World Cup held in 
South Africa aided the development of national unity (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 
1095). The tournament was “hailed as a triumph of reconciliation and nation-building” 
(Eaton, 2002: 45). More than 10 years later, South Africa is still characterized by social, 
political and racial schisms; mega-events can be used as instruments for national 
reconciliation (Cornelissen and Swart, 2006: 109). Hargreaves (2000: 12) maintained that 
sporting events have the ability to foster nationalism, in that they act “as a point of 
coherence for national movements, to the extent that it is central to their culture.” 
Cornelissen (2004: 44) argued that mega-events can be “used to foster, advance or 
legitimize identities.” Sport can create an area of common cultural ground whereby the 
citizens of a nation can relate to one another; it allows members of society to engage 
when ordinarily they might not do so. The hosting of the World Cup in 2010 may in some 
respect aid in resolving these social problems, as the 1995 event is purported to have 
done. 
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1.2.  The Barcelona Effect 
 
The Olympic Games, the only other mega-event comparable to the FIFA World Cup, 
that was held in Barcelona, Spain, in 1992 is an event that saw the host experience 
significant economic, social and political benefits post the Games. As a result organisers 
of events around the world often cite the effect the Games had on Barcelona as a 
foundation for their bidding to host an event and in doing so, replicate Barcelona‟s 
successes. The Economist (2004: 28) referred to the “Barcelona Effect,” as a foundation 
of any regions‟ enthusiasm to host a mega-event, and argued that the long-term benefits 
of the 1992 Olympic Games for Barcelona were unquestionable. The Catalan capital was 
showcased during the Games and gained an international reputation as a cosmopolitan 
and modern city. It was transformed from provincial back-water, living in the shadow of 
Madrid, into “one of Europe‟s most fashionable places for conferences and holidays” 
(Economist, 2004: 28). For example, the number of foreign visitors to Barcelona every 
year doubled between 1986 and 2000 (Brunet, 2004: 9). The benefits that Barcelona 
earned cause leaders in developing countries to imagine hordes of foreign tourists 
descending upon their nation or city and injecting vast amounts of money into the local 
economy (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1085).  
 
Calvita and Ferrar (2004: 47) argue that Barcelona managed to achieve the 
transformation of the city in only ten years, what would have ordinarily taken far longer 
but for the hosting of the Games. The bid process began in 1981, and due to skilled 
political leadership, vast economic resources and the co-operation instigated by a 
common goal, the benefits of the Olympics were felt long after the event had finished. 
This is especially impressive as Barcelona was left to ruin after 20 years of porciolismo¸ 
which is the Spanish term for the abandonment of the city by administrators under the 
General Franco dictatorship (Calvita and Ferrar, 2004: 60). The Catalonia region was 
especially neglected as it fought on the Republican side, directly against the rule of 
General Franco during the Spanish Civil War (Hargreaves, 2000: 1). Therefore, in 
staging the 1992 Games, Barcelona focused on investment in infrastructure that was both 
of a very high quality and was most extensive throughout the city. Employment was 
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generated through the production and operation of the infrastructure (Brunet, 2005: 10). 
Investment projects included the construction of inner and outer city highways, an 
expansion of drainage and sewage systems (Calvita and Ferrar, 2004: 60), the 
development of telecommunications systems and two railway lines, and projects for the 
rejuvenation of run-down coastal areas, including a new marina and waterfront facilities 
(Chalkley and Essex, 1998: 210). Perhaps the success of Barcelona lay in the agenda of 
those political leaders who sought the “the homogenization of the city… the creation of a 
balanced and integrated Barcelona, without segregation, with social and territorial 
equality for all its citizens” (Calvita and Ferrar, 2004: 60). The Barcelona Model for 
urban transformation rendered the city benefits that have been sustained over the long-
term. The model achieved widespread approval and has been replicated on an 
international scale (Balibrea, 2004: 205). The dedication to infrastructural development 
was founded in the determination to achieve social change. In addition to the strong 
social element in the transformation of Barcelona, there was an equally significant 
cultural agenda. A prominent objective of the Games and the urban renewal was to 
promote the importance and relevance of the Catalan identity within the context of Spain 
(Chalkley and Essex, 1998: 198). It is important to note that the transformation of 
Barcelona was the result of a larger operation, the General Metropolitan Plan, which 
began in 1976 (Calvita and Ferrar, 2004: 48). Marshall (2004:14) cited a six-sphere 
approach that was used in the regeneration of Barcelona, of which the Olympic Games 
were one aspect; other projects included the renovation of the „Old City‟ and the „Plan 
2000.‟ Therefore, the claim that the Games singularly caused the long-term growth in 
tourism in Barcelona is disputable. 
 
The Barcelona model for the organisation of mega-events must be applied concurrently 
with a program of urban transformation (Brunet, 2004: 12). Only full application of the 
model will allow for the host of an event to succeed to the extent that Barcelona did, the 
event will not singularly cause the required economic benefit. In addition to this, great 
emphasis was placed on exercising financial control over the Olympics, since the central 
Spanish government was concerned about the national budgetary constraints (Marshall, 
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2004: 17). Fiscal prudence was necessary for the long-term benefits to be felt and 
enjoyed, and not undermined by high levels of public debt.  
 
The initial economic impact of Barcelona winning the right to host the Games was 
impressive: unemployment dropped from 18.4% to 9.6%, between 1986 and 1992; nearly 
half the level in the rest of Spain at the time. Of the rise in employment, 88.7% was 
reportedly due to job creation by the Olympics (Brunet, 2005: 8). Before the Games were 
held in Barcelona, tourism accounted for between 1 and 2 percent of the city‟s GDP; by 
2005 tourism contributed towards 12% of GDP (ETOA, 2005: 11). The legacy of the 
Olympics was to ensure the city‟s strategic position within Europe, as well as the creation 
of new “public and private capital and permanent employment generated by the Olympic 
investments” (Bohlmann, 2006: 10). In addition, by 2004 both the housing market and 
the construction industry had seen steady yearly growth since 1992. During the same 
period, apart from 1993, Barcelona experienced new growth records every year, on all 
economic indicators such as employment, investment, income and attractiveness (Brunet, 
2005: 8). The failure in achieving year-on-year growth in 1993 was attributed to the 
global slowdown, however, Calvita and Ferrar (2004: 60) revealed that Barcelona was 
not as adversely affected by the slowdown in comparison to other European centres.  
 
The trends described here show a distinct improvement in the economic landscape in 
Barcelona both before and after the Games. Unfortunately though, the „Barcelona Effect‟ 
is not a necessary consequence of being a host for a mega-event. The reputation of 
Atlanta was damaged following the 1996 Olympic Games that were staged there. Brunet 
(2004: 10) acknowledged that Barcelona was more of an exception than a rule. No other 
Olympic host city has come close to achieving the level of investment in infrastructure as 
a result of being a host as Barcelona did. The Seoul Olympics yielded the next best 
results, and it achieved only half the investment of Barcelona. Further, in spite of the so-
called „Barcelona Effect,‟ it is difficult to pin-point the Olympics as the primary cause of 
growth in the region. Long-term tourism growth in Barcelona since the 1992 “Games has 
been outstripped by other comparable European cities, such as Prague and Dublin” (Sure 
Travel, 2005). The growth in tourism in these emerging European capitals cannot be 
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attributed to their hosting of major international events, as they have not done so. Rather, 
they are simply the centres of nations that have previously been on the geographical, 
cultural and political periphery of Europe, and have become significant players in these 
fields as a result of their economic development. While Prague and Dublin have seen 
similar growth in tourism in comparison to Barcelona, the tourism growth is appreciably 
below that achieved by Venice and Lisbon during the same period. Tourism growth can 
be measured by the number of nights of accommodation provided to foreign visitors. 
Figure 1 shows the growth trend in Barcelona in comparison to other European cities. 
The graph plots percentage change in the number of nights of accommodation demanded 
by foreign visitors, year on year against the index year of 1992. While growth in 
Barcelona grew steadily between 1990 and 1992, it fell away after the games, and then 
rose again in 1994. Conversely, Venice had constant growth from 1991 to 1994. While 
Lisbon followed a similar trend to Barcelona, the Spanish city lagged in terms of growth 
rates. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Growth in nights of accommodation demanded by foreign visitors. 
Source: European Tour Operators Association (2005: 12). 
 
So, in Barcelona “(t)he extent to which this growth is due to the Olympic Games is by no 
means certain” (ETOA, 2005: 12). It could therefore be the case that all the cities share a 
common set of circumstances that transformed their status as tourist destinations, and 
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Barcelona also would have experienced this change irrespective of its performance as 
host of the 1992 Olympic Games.  
 
In light of this new understanding of the forces at work in the Barcelona during the 1980s 
and 1990s it seems naïve to state that the Olympics of 1992 single handedly transformed 
the city, or that any mega-event might ever achieve such a feat. Hence, the validity and 
even existence of the so-called „Barcelona Effect‟ is called into question. From such an 
observation it is prudent to note that “(c)laims that sports mega-events provide a 
substantial boost to the economy of the host city, region, and country have been strongly 
criticized by most independent scholars” (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1088). Horne and 
Manzenreiter (2004: 187) agree that “virtually all case studies of the economic impact of 
either sport facilities or sport events have indicated that they are not the growth engines 
they purport to be.” The belief is founded in the notion that despite the potential benefits 
that are linked to mega-events, “they can also place excessive fiscal, management and 
social burdens on a country” (Cornelissen and Swart, 2006: 121).  
 
The potential benefits of playing host to a mega-event, at first analysis, appear to be 
positive, the most prominent of which are the implications of enhanced economic activity 
in the host region. In addition, there are the positive political and social consequences that 
accompany the event. While the prospects of hosting an international event seem most 
appealing, it is not a certainty that South Africa will benefit economically. Given the 
significant financial costs of 2010, it is required that the event derives at least equivalent 
economic gains. The foundations for this uncertainty will be assessed by analysis of the 
effects of previous mega-events, other studies of the economic impact of 2010 and 
theoretical considerations for conducting economic impact studies. The observations 
form the basis for the two primary objectives of the research: 
1. To quantitatively and qualitatively describe the potential economic impact 
of staging 2010, and analyse the determinants of the economic impact, 
within short and long-term time horizons. 
2. To examine the merits of conducting forward-looking economic impact 
studies. 
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CHAPTER 2: PREVIOUS MEGA-EVENTS 
 
2.1. Economic Impacts of other Mega-Events around the World 
 
While the most recent FIFA World Cup was held in Germany in 2006, the problem in 
using the effects of that event as a gauge for the prospective effects of the 2010 World 
Cup lies in the vast differences in terms of the size and scope of the respective economies 
of South Africa and Germany. Germany was the world‟s 3rd largest economy with a 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $3320bn in 2007, while South Africa ranked 30
th
, and 
had a GDP of $283bn in the same year (International Monetary Fund, 2008). 
Nonetheless, Germany 2006 is probably the best proxy for assessing the impact of the 
2010 World Cup, in that the global exposure that South Africa will endure is most closely 
correlated with that which Germany experienced. Ahlert (2005) used a sport-economic 
simulation model called SPORT, which is based on econometric input-output tables for 
the German economy to estimate the economic impact of the event. It was determined 
that German GDP would increase by approximately €1.75bn as a result of the Cup, which 
only amounts to 0.05% of 2007 GDP. Further, it was predicted that 1.1 million foreign 
tourists would visit Germany for the Cup, spending a total of €909m. Notably, Ahlert 
(2005) predicted extended direct benefits from the event, with yearly contributions to the 
GDP resulting from the Cup, lasting until 2010. A German Chamber of Commerce report 
forecast that the World Cup would directly contribute €10bn towards GDP (Davis, 2006). 
Finally, the German Football Association's application to host the World Cup was 
supplemented by a study that estimated a net economic benefit of €2.5bn (Brenke and 
Wagner, 2006: 25). The range of estimates of the net economic impact of the event 
emphasise the difficulty in determining the monetary value of the event before it has 
actually occurred.   
 
While Maennig (2007: 1) held that the “economic success of the World Cup begins with 
the financial success of the organizing committee, which was able to achieve a surplus of 
€155 million,” the profit-making ability of the organising committee is not the salient 
issue in an analysis of the net national economic impact. In assessing the consequences of 
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an event, a distinction needs to be made between the financial profits and the economic 
impact that the event has; where the latter refers to an increased level of economic 
activity that raises GDP to a level that would otherwise not have been achieved without 
the event. In terms of the former, it is possible that an event could earn a net profit, but 
could well have negative economic impacts for the economy as a whole that serve to 
outweigh those profits (Kurtzman, 2005: 49). 
 
The 2006 World Cup attracted 2 million foreign visitors, almost double the predicted 
number. In a survey of 1300 tourists by the German Tourism Association during the 
event, 91% said that they would recommend Germany as a tourist destination (Davis, 
2006). That appears to be a positive indicator and suggests that the event was an 
economic success, and would have contributed significantly towards GDP. However, the 
economic implications of the Cup were restricted to short-term effects; retailing, tourism 
and employment improved, however “they were not sufficient to have had any overall 
economic significance” (Maennig, 2007: 16). Davis (2006) reported that the Munich-
based German Institute for Economic Research found that the event only contributed 
0.25% of German growth for the year, which could be attributed partly to the lower than 
anticipated spending by the tourists who visited Germany. Collectively only €500m was 
spent, which was far less than predicted (Florek and Breitbrath, 2007: 80), a situation that 
was entirely unforeseen. Brenke and Wagner (2006:31) predicted that the World Cup 
would not cause any noticeable macro-economic effects, arguing that the €1bn invested 
in infrastructure was not substantial enough to stimulate the economy. However, the 
importance of Germany presenting itself in a more positive light was emphasised; as a 
result of the Cup, the national image of Germany was much improved, measured by the 
„Anholt Nation Brands Index‟ (NBI), which evaluates a nation‟s brand image. Following 
the Cup, the perception that Germany was “hard and cold (and) not a nation much 
associated with warmth, hospitality, beauty, culture, or fun,” was improved. Germany 
moved into second place on the NBI ranking list, while it had previously been in 5th 
position (Allmers and Maennig, 2008: 12). In this regard, the German World Cup 
appeared to be a success, despite the somewhat insignificant economic consequences.  
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The 2002 FIFA World Cup was jointly held in Japan and South Korea. While, as with 
Germany, these two nations economies are very different to South Africa‟s, a brief 
analysis of the event is useful for comparative purposes, in that it was the first World Cup 
to be held in Asia, as 2010 will be the first Cup held in Africa. The common factor 
between the two events is that the host nations are regarded as being on the periphery of 
the traditional footballing world (Horne, 2004: 1235). Before the 2002 event, economic 
impact studies showed significant benefits for both host nations. Szymanski (2002: 1) 
reported two predictions that were developed in Japan and Korea in the years leading up 
the Cup. The Korean Development Institute forecast that the net effect of the total 
investment for the Cup of $2.6bn would be in the region of $8.8bn. In Japan, the Dentsu 
Institute estimated that the World Cup would generate approximately $11bn, with a 
prospective long-term benefit of $26bn, increasing GDP by 0.6%. By contrast, the Dai-
Ichi Life Research Institute estimated that the World Cup would increase Japanese GDP 
by 0.3% (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 193). Szymanski (2002: 6) contrasted the 
predictions of net economic impact with his own calculations which estimated net 
economic gains of $4.85bn and $8.89bn for Korea and Japan respectively.  
 
Despite the pre-event estimations, Japan‟s post-World Cup economic growth in 2002 was 
0.1% lower than in 2001 (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 193). Clearly the pre-Cup 
estimates in Japan proved to be inaccurate as the event was followed by economic 
decline, as opposed to boom as the World Cup was hoped to instigate. Korea endured 
similar results. Kim et al. (2006: 93-94) observed that the benefits generated as a result of 
the Cup were more societal and cultural as opposed to economic; since the event was 
jointly hosted, it was posited that the economic impact was split between the two 
countries, and as such neither felt a significant effect from the event. The lack of 
economic benefits was not necessarily a disappointment for the Korean government, as 
their primary objective for hosting the Cup was not founded on economic grounds; 
“Korean Deputy Prime Minister Jin Nyum told journalists before the competition started 
that the World Cup was about „the brand-making of Korea‟, rather than making money 
directly” (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 193). Hence, for Korea, economic gains were 
not a necessary condition for regarding the overall occasion as being a success. Despite 
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the bureaucratic stance, a survey by Kim et al. (2006: 93) found that the lower than 
expected economic benefits were a large disappointment for local residents. The Korean 
National Tourism Organisation found that the World Cup had only added $713m of value 
to the economy (Kim and Morrison, 2005: 233), even less than the effect of the 1988 
Seoul Olympics which was said to have generated $1.3bn (Lee and Taylor, 2005: 596). 
Thus, it is evident that the economic effects of hosting the first World Cup in Asia were 
far lower than was predicted, with the benefits coming largely in the form of increased 
global exposure for the host, and an opportunity to improve the international perception 
of the nation. 
 
Since the only other first-order mega-event is the Olympic Games, an analysis of the 
economic impacts of the 2000 Sydney Olympics and the 1996 Atlanta Olympics will aid 
in understanding the economic implications for South Africa in hosting the 2010 World 
Cup. 
 
Before the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, Michael Payne, the IOC Director of Marketing, 
noted that “Australia (was) the first Olympic host nation to take full advantage of the 
Games to vigorously pursue tourism for the benefit of the whole country” (Haynes, 2001: 
8). As such, the Games are a good example of a host nation for a mega-event that sought 
to use the opportunity to cultivate long-term benefits, which are most difficult to quantify 
fully. Similar to the preparation for the Barcelona Olympics, Sydney pursued “event-led 
urban regeneration with a strong prominence given to its sustainability credentials” 
(Chalkley and Essex, 2004: 8). The Olympics were used as a forum to uplift degenerated 
areas, with a strong emphasis placed on environmental responsibility.  
 
Crowe and Madden (1998: 23) applied a Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE) 
called Monash Multiregional Model Forecasting (MMRF) to simulate the benefits of the 
Games on the Australian economy. The impact on real GDP was estimated at A$6.1bn, to 
be allocated over a 12 year period between 1994 and 2005. The majority of these benefits 
were to be felt in New South Wales (NSW), the state where Sydney is located. It would 
amount to an average yearly contribution of 0.36% to the state‟s GDP. A study conducted 
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by KPMG, which accompanied Sydney‟s bid to host the Games, used an Input-Output 
Analysis that predicted the event would add A$7bn to Australian GDP between 1991 and 
2004 (Crowe and Madden: 1998: 1). NSW Treasury (1997: 13) also applied the MMRF 
and assumed that the benefits would span the same 12 year period as the Crowe and 
Madden study, and found that the expected economic benefit of the Games would be 
A$6.3bn. Finally, employing the MMRF, accounting firm Arthur Andersen, in 
collaboration with the Centre for Regional Economic Analysis at the University of 
Tasmania, calculated a net economic impact of the Games of A$6.5bn (URS Finance and 
Economics, 2004: 5-2). These pre-Games estimates developed by different entities were 
largely consistent with one another, a characteristic not evident in the analysis of either of 
the football World Cups discussed earlier, in that the estimates calculated were rather 
diverse, and all predictions of actual impact were proved inaccurate. It is interesting to 
note that despite the three studies using the same model, different results were derived, 
which can be attributed to the use of alternate exogenous inputs. 
 
The data that was developed after the Sydney Games appeared to back up pre-event 
predictions. Szymanski‟s (2002: 9) research showed that while the economic impact of 
the Sydney Olympics may have been small, the publicity value was high and was the 
most significant implication of hosting the event.
 
The Australian Tourist Commission 
(ATC) speculated that the Games contributed to the accelerated development of Brand 
Australia by 10 years. The shift of attention could be quantified by the increased activity 
on the ATC‟s website, australia.com, with visits up 700% on figures for the same period 
in 1999 (Haynes, 2001: 9). Brand Australia was launched in 1995; two years after 
Sydney was awarded the Games, it identified the need to broaden the Australian image 
by promoting the holiday experience and more than just the typical Australian themes 
and image. The ATC attempted to use the exposure from the Olympics to offer the 
international community an insight into the Australian way of life (Brown et al, 2002: 
176-177). The efforts saw rewards for the improved Australian tourism industry, with an 
increase of 25% in the number of international passengers passing through Sydney 
Airport between 2000 and 2008 (Tootelian and Varshney, 2008: 3). While the figures 
may be seen as indicative of tourism growth, they are not supported by the observation of 
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the Australian Tourism Export Council which noted that the “Olympics had few long-
term positive impacts beyond 2000 on the growth of Australian tourism. The impacts 
were short-term and were contained within a relatively tight geographic region ... As soon 
as the Olympics finished, we started to see a fall away in inbound activity. Australia went 
into three years of negative (tourism) growth” from 2001 to 2003 (European Tour 
Operators Association, 2005: 15). With reference to Figure 2 it is interesting to note that 
the increased international visitors to Australia leading up to the Games, is mirrored 
almost identically by the growth in tourist numbers to New Zealand over the same period. 
Hence the role of the Olympics in generating interest in Sydney and thus a desire to travel 
there before the Games is dubious. Then, following the Sydney Games, visitors to 
Australia started declining, while those travelling to New Zealand continued to rise. 
Therefore, the efficacy of the Olympics in terms of generating increased tourism is 
doubtful. 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage change in international tourist arrivals to Australia and New 
Zealand (base year = 2000). 
Source: European Tour Operators Association (2005: 16). 
 
In terms of the economic gains of the Games, Madden (2002) in an ex post study found 
that economic activity would be 0.3% higher in NSW over the twelve year period 
between 1994 to 2005 as a direct result of the Games. This figure is a 0.06% departure 
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from the pre-Games estimate as calculated by Madden and Crowe (1998). However, it 
was concluded that there was little effect on the other Australian states, and the broader 
national economy, as the benefits were felt predominately in the Sydney area.  
 
The Atlanta Olympic Games of 1996 looked to emulate the successes of Los Angeles‟ 
hosting of the 1984 Games. Humphries and Plummer (1992: 3) forecast that the 
combined impact on output of the event would be an increase of $5.1bn. The figure was 
arrived at through the use of the United States Department of Commerce‟s Regional 
Input-Output Modelling System. It was also predicted that “(t)he long-term impact of 
media coverage (would) positively affect tourism, conventions, businesses' location and 
expansion decisions, and foreign direct investment” (Humphries and Plummer, 1992: 4).  
 
After the Atlanta Olympic Games, the event was reported to have generated a net 
economic impact of $5bn. The Olympics “made Atlanta a household name around the 
world” (Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, 2006: 1). The Games were further said to have 
transformed downtown Atlanta, and instigated residential and infrastructure development 
that made attracting commercial development much easier. The claims were seen 
tangibly by the increase in international companies that were based there, which from 
1996 to 2006 rose by 30% to 1700 companies (Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, 2006: 2). 
However, the figures were in contrast to the observation by Baade and Matheson (2003: 
26) that growth in Atlanta coincided with the fluctuation in the business cycle, when 
Atlanta emerged from the United States‟ recession of early 90‟s, and simultaneously 
prepared to host the 1996 Games. Baade and Matheson (2003: 26) emphasised that the 
Olympics was incorrectly credited with economic growth, and specifically job creation 
that should have been attributed to other circumstances. Horne and Whitson (2006: 85) 
identified such errors as a common problem in analysis of mega-events; it is “difficult to 
isolate the impacts of the mega-event on the fortunes and stature of a city from those of 
other economic triggers or from larger cycles of growth and recession.”  
 
In agreement with Baade and Matheson (2003: 26), the reliability of the net benefit figure 
published by the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce (2006: 2) should be called into question. 
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The impact that was posited closely resembles the figure used pre-Games to estimate the 
benefits, however there was no particular study referenced in making the claim. It is 
possible that the pre-event prediction was simply assumed to be accurate, and then used it 
as a post-Games given.
2
 In terms of the Games increasing tourist numbers to Atlanta, the 
effects of the Olympics on tourism were limited to the year of the Games (Horne and 
Whitson, 2006: 77). The lack of tourist growth could be partly due to the tainted image of 
Atlanta post the event, which was the result of political controversy involved in the 
bidding process where there were allegations of bribery (Baade and Matheson, 2003: 1). 
The image problems were amplified by the inadequacy of the city‟s infrastructural 
network; “traffic congestion, administrative problems, security breaches and over-
commercialisation meant that the city did not receive favourable media coverage” 
(Chalkley and Essex, 2004: 9).  
 
Given the negative image implications of the Games and the ambiguous economic 
impact, the net effect on Atlanta is uncertain. Assuming that the predicted net economic 
gain of $5bn was accurate, the damage done to the city‟s image could have been negated. 
Alternatively, the poor image implications of the Games may well overwhelm the 
purported economic advantages. It is thus possible that playing host to a mega-event 
could well be characterised by negative externalities that have the potential to 
overshadow the positive effects. Determining the overall impact in this scenario is thus 
extremely difficult granted the inability to quantify the economic effects of a change in 
international image. The occurrence of an event adversely affecting the host‟s image was 
not an experience endured by the other hosts of mega-events discussed so far. Hence, 
there was no necessity to weigh the economic and image effects against each other as 
they were not competing forces in ascertaining the cumulative impact of the event. An 
analysis of the other events is thus more straightforward. 
 
Another notable difference in the Atlanta case study, as opposed to the others addressed 
is that the actual net economic impact of the Games was alleged to be equivalent to the 
pre-event predictions. The result is surprising in the context of the other pre and post-
                                                          
2
 In addition, no evidence could be found to corroborate the impact that is suggested to have occurred. 
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event comparisons as previously discussed. Baade and Matheson (2004: 346b) pointed 
out that the majority of event organizers who speculate regarding the potential economic 
impact of a mega-event have their predictions proved to be incorrect by researchers who 
examine the economic data for cities after the completion of the event. Since ex ante 
models on the economic impact of mega-events do not provide credible estimates, ex post 
models should be utilised to determine the benefits of the event in comparison with what 
event organizers had promised. Thus the net impact of the event could be and invariably 
will be significantly different from what is speculated pre-event. It should also be noted 
that studies which aim to predict economic benefits are far more abundant than those 
which calculate actual post-event effects. It appears as though researchers or their 
sponsors are distinctly disinclined to produce studies that may conflict with their earlier 
efforts.  
 
Kasimati (2003: 442) found, through analysis of economic impact studies of five Summer 
Olympic Games, that “ex ante models and forecasts were not confirmed by ex post 
analyses.” Owen (2006: 234) agreed that ex post studies “have not found evidence of 
positive economic impacts from mega-sporting events even remotely approaching the 
estimates in economic impact studies,” and “(t)hat there is likely to be such a gap is now 
fairly predictable” (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 200). Since, competition to host 
events is intense, supporters “frequently ignore the negative impacts and glorify the 
expected benefits (Gursoy and Kendall, 2006: 608) with the production of inaccurate ex 
ante studies. Teigland (1999: 316) cited “(e)xpert prostitution” as an important reason to 
explain why reality  and economic impact studies have been divergent; the use of 
“(m)ethodological tricks” to achieve the desired forward-looking predictions is common 
(Andreff, 2006: 17). As such, it is advisable that the “public should be aware of 
economists bearing reports showing great benefits from mega-events” (Matheson, 2004: 
8). In the instance that the estimations are inadvertently false through incorrect 
calculations, and are not just created at the whims of organisers, then it is the result of the 
unreliable method and inaccurate data that are employed to determine the prospective 
impact. Sterken (2006: 376) agreed that “(l)ocal organisers tend to produce optimistic ex-
ante forecasts... Ex-post analyses, measuring observed changes in factors such as (local) 
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income and attributing these changes to the impact of hosting a sporting event are, on 
average, more modest.”  
 
So, while the economic benefits from hosting an event may not achieve the levels of what 
predicted, there is still the opportunity to use the event as a platform to alter the perceived 
international image and reputation of the host. Ideally the event will result in an improved 
image of the host, but the potential exists that the event may be detrimental to the host‟s 
image as it appears was the case in Atlanta. “Mega-events may also damage the image of 
the host community or make it acquire a poor reputation as a result of inadequate 
facilities or improper practices” (Kim et al, 2006: 89). Hence, “using a sports tournament 
to make a statement about your country is neither risk- nor cost free” (Economist, 2004: 
28).  
 
The hope of hosting a successful mega-event and related opportunities that are expected 
to be created via international publicity and recognition can cause potential host 
communities to ignore the negative impacts that might occur (Bohlmann, 2006: 7). Such 
was the case for the Montreal Olympics of 1976; “the evidence is overwhelming that 
hosting the Olympics was an economic disaster, with negative effects on the city‟s ability 
to fund social services and infrastructure that lasted for more than twenty years” (Horne 
and Whitson, 2006: 86-87). The example demonstrates the potential downside of hosting 
a mega-event, and while it is worth acknowledging this occurrence, it does appear to be 
an exception to the rule. The financial burden of the Games was amplified by the then 
deteriorating Canadian economy, an international recession and high levels of inflation 
(Essex and Chalkley, 2004: 7). In addition, the economics of mega-events were very 
different in 1976, for example the television rights for the 1976 Games were sold for 
$30m, but by the 2000 Games in Sydney, they were bought for $1bn (Horne, 2005: 83). 
Hence, the relevance of the situation to the 2010 South African context is limited. 
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Table 1. Summary of effects of previous mega-events. 
Mega-Event Host 
Predicted 
Economic 
Impact (bn) 
Range of 
Estimates as a 
% of Lower 
Estimate 
Actual 
Economic 
Impact 
Image 
Effect on 
the Host 
Germany FIFA  
World Cup 2006 
€1.75 - 10 470 
Positive - 
Lower than 
predicted 
Positive 
Japan & South Korea 
FIFA World Cup 2002 
US$13.3 -  
19.8 
49 
Positive - 
Lower than 
predicted 
Ambiguous 
Sydney Olympics 2000 A$6.1 - 7 15 
Positive - 
Lower than 
predicted 
Ambiguous 
Atlanta Olympics 1996 US$5.1 n/a Ambiguous Negative 
Montreal Olympics 
1976 
n/a n/a Negative n/a 
Source: Based on conclusions drawn in the preceding discussion.  
The analysis of previous mega-events emphasises the following crucial points: 
 Forward-looking predictions are sensitive to the decision of which model 
to use and also to the magnitudes of the exogenous inputs.  
 It cannot be expected that the pre-event estimates will materialise; they 
may be quite divergent. 
 Positive image effects for the host are not an inherent consequence of 
staging an event. 
 
The two World Cups and two Olympic Games discussed were chosen as a cross section 
of first-order mega-events. While the net economic impacts that were generated were not 
significant in terms of the national economy, the economic effects were nonetheless still 
positive. The reasoning behind the earlier statement: “(c)laims that sports mega-events 
provide a substantial boost to the economy of the host city, region, and country have been 
strongly criticized by most independent scholars,” (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1088) is 
now clearly supported, especially since predictions and reality are regularly disparate.  
Szymanski (2002) is one such scholar who doubts the economic benefits of mega-events; 
his thoughts were succinctly relayed by Horne and Manzenreiter (2004: 192): 
“Szymanski (2002) has observed through comparison with long-time averages, the cyclical norms 
and equivalent figures for similar economies at the same stage of the business cycle suggest there 
22 
 
is no statistically significant positive macroeconomic impact on GDP for World Cup hosts. The 
sports economist in fact concludes that countries should stop inventing economic benefits from 
sporting events, and simply treat them as expenses, or investments, in national promotion.” 
 
Cornelissen (2004: 48) noted that “mega-events seldom bring the economic returns they 
are expected to, with costs often far outweighing revenue.” Coates and Humphreys 
(2003: 13) agree that the “evidence of positive economic benefits from mega sporting 
events should be considered weak at best.” 
 
However, it is not necessarily the case that this apparent void of beneficial and tangible 
economic impacts related to events in general, will be mirrored in South Africa. The 
experience of developing nations hosting a mega-event may differ widely from that of a 
developed nation (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1091). The scale of the investment and 
foreign spending involved in a mega-event may not be significant enough to stimulate 
economic growth in a developed country, as their economy is too large to feel any impact 
from such exogenous injections. In the instance of a developing country, with a smaller 
economy, a mega-event may well have the capacity to induce a noticeable economic 
impact in the smaller environment. To illustrate the point, take a rudimentary example of 
a R10 000 investment into a firm which has assets of R100 000, it will be of greater 
assistance in developing the growth of the company than it would be if it was made into a 
firm with R1 000 000 in assets. Further, while mega-events are not reputed to derive 
significant economic benefits, this could be because the actual economic gains are minor 
in the context of the economy of the host. Thus, the economic impact of previous mega-
events around the world cannot be used in isolation as a gauge of the prospective impact 
of the 2010 World Cup. 
 
Since South Africa‟s re-inception into global sport, at the end of Apartheid, it has hosted 
two traditional sporting mega-events, the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the 2003 Cricket 
World Cup. The hosting of cricket‟s Indian Premier League (IPL) in South Africa in 
2009 can also provide a valuable insight into an analysis of 2010. The IPL is a relatively 
new phenomenon, and while not usually used as an example of a mega-event, does meet 
the criteria for being categorised as such; the IPL has large-scale popular appeal, is 
internationally significant and can confer benefits on the host. The three events 
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mentioned are not South Africa‟s only practice at playing host for international sporting 
events, for example, the 1996 African Cup of Nations as well as golf‟s 2003 President‟s 
Cup took place in South Africa. The cricket and rugby occasions are second-order mega-
events and thus come closest to replicating the shock to the economy that the 2010 World 
Cup may deliver. Thus an analysis of the impact, economic or otherwise, of the two Cups 
on South Africa, and what can be learnt with regards to the FIFA World Cup in 2010 is 
relevant.  
 
2.2. Cricket World Cup 2003 
 
An initial similarity between the 2003 event and 2010 lies in the desire that the 
International Cricket Council had to spread and globalise the game, as FIFA has 
endeavoured to achieve by giving South Africa the World Cup. The Cricket World Cup 
of 2003 was the first occasion that the tournament was held in Africa. The bid to host the 
Cup “was driven by a keen desire to promote South Africa‟s status as an African country, 
and ... there was a marked attempt by the South African government to use bid and event 
campaigns to shore up wider foreign policy goals with respect to the African continent” 
(Cornelissen and Swart, 2006: 116). Van der Merwe (2006: 72) agreed that in co-hosting 
the event with Zimbabwe and Kenya, South Africa affirmed its “African identity, whilst 
also being consistent with a pattern of foreign policy initiatives.... The event was tied into 
President Mbeki‟s vision to rejuvenate the African continent socially and economically 
through the African Renaissance.” Therefore, the political objectives were clear, and 
appeared to supersede any economic requirements of hosting. However, the event was 
somewhat marred by political controversy as the English team refused to play their 
games in Zimbabwe. The anticipated benefits for the African image were thus not fully 
realised (Cornelissen, 2004: 50). The inability of South Africa to resolve the conflict may 
have undermined the country‟s image as leader on the continent. Further, in terms of 
intangible benefits, the hosting of the 2003 Cricket World Cup is not associated with the 
stimulating nation building, or contributing to national unity, qualities which hosting 
mega-events are generally thought to provide. 
 
24 
 
From an economic stand point, the Cricket World Cup of 2003 was purported to have 
“generated at least 1.2 billion rands for the South African economy” (Hassen in Baade 
and Matheson, 2004a: 1088). In 2004, according to the then Deputy Minister of Sport and 
Recreation, Gert Oosthuizen, the cumulative impact on economic activity was R2bn, with 
R1.1bn due to foreign spending by the approximate 18 500 foreigners who visited the 
country during the tournament. It was further speculated that every eight foreigners 
created one permanent job in South Africa (South African Parliament, 2004). In addition, 
Goliger (2005: 2) claimed that the event “generated €250 million in terms of economic 
activity.” These affirmations are not clear and explicit in what is actually being said about 
the net economic impact of the Cup, thus interpretation is problematic. €250m of 
government spending on infrastructure related to the Cup is an increase in economic 
activity, however, in the instance of zero receipts for the event this is purely a cost and 
does not contribute to economic growth. Nonetheless, supporters of hosting the 2010 
World Cup would use such figures and vague proclamations as a means of rallying 
support for their cause. Unfortunately, there are several shortcomings of using the effects 
of the Cricket World Cup as a metric for the prospective implications of 2010.  
  
The problem in using the Cricket World Cup as a model for the success of the FIFA 
World Cup is twofold.  First, it is classed as a second-order, and not a first-order mega-
event. The 2003 event lacked the prestige, international publicity and scope in 
comparison to 2010. Hence, the exogenous shock to the South African economy of 2010 
is expected to be more significant and wide-reaching.  For example, television audience 
for the two events are vastly different; the 2003 World Cup was broadcast in 200 
countries with some 2 billion viewers (Mail and Guardian, 2007a).  Whereas, in 2010 it is 
predicted that there will be a global, cumulative television audience of 40 billion people 
for the duration of the tournament (Financial Mail, 2006a: 25). Second, the capital outlay 
for the Cricket World Cup was a fraction of what is expected to be spent on the Soccer 
World Cup.  Of the 12 stadia used for 2003 tournament, (SA Web, 2003) a few 
underwent only minor renovations while no were stadia were built. In contrast, an 
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estimated R8.4bn will be spent on stadia for the 2010 event (Financial Mail, 2006a: 25).
3
 
However, the difference in expenditure will also be offset by other factors, such as 
different numbers of tourists for the Cups. It was estimated before the event that 25 000 
foreigners would visit South Africa for the Cricket (Cornelissen, 2004: 49), while 2010 
expects to attract 350 000 foreign tourists to the country (Bob and Swart, 2007: 377).
4
 
Despite the far lower number of visitors for the Cricket World Cup, it was considered to 
have “contributed meaningfully towards the dramatic improvement in foreign tourism” 
(South African Reserve Bank, 2003: 22).  
 
Thus, it has become evident that the Cricket World Cup cannot be used as a proxy for the 
economic impact of the FIFA World Cup.  In summary, the cost of stadia alone is some 
seven times the overall estimated net impact of the entire Cricket World Cup, 
approximately only 7% of the number of tourists expected in 2010, visited South Africa 
for the Cricket World Cup and it had a global viewership of one twentieth the size. In 
addition, the event had nowhere near the depth of investments in the infrastructural 
developments as is necessary to for 2010. However, the opportunities to make a profit 
from the FIFA event are thought to be far greater than the cricket, given the scale and 
scope of the football event. What this analysis does show is that in terms of the physical 
staging of the 2003 Cricket World Cup, irrespective of the differences between the two 
events, South Africa is capable of successfully hosting a mega-event. 
 
2.3. Indian Premier League 2009 
 
On the 24
th
 of March 2009 it was announced by Cricket South Africa‟s CEO, Gerald 
Majola, and Lalit Modi, Chairman and Commissioner of the Indian Premier League 
(IPL), that the 2009 edition of the cricket tournament would be held in South Africa 
(Sunday Times, 2009a). The statement was made just over three weeks before the 
                                                          
3
 This is one estimation of the costs involved in hosting 2010; there are many different figures available. 
The reasons for the disparity will be discussed later; however this is an example of what the final cost of 
the 2010 World Cup might be, in order to illustrate the differences between the Cricket and Football World 
Cups. 
4
 Similarly, there are a variety of estimates regarding the number of tourists that are expected to visit during 
2010. 
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tournament was set to begin, thus preparations for the event were made over a very brief 
period.  Speaking at the opening ceremony of the IPL the then President of South Africa, 
Kgalema Motlanthe, stated that the tournament was expected to generated approximately 
R1bn for the national economy (South African Press Association, 2009a). Cricket South 
Africa expected that 10 000 foreigners would visit the country during the event 
(Supersport, 2009). The IPL‟s Modi was confident of the positive economic impact of the 
event; he reported that 22 000 hotel rooms were booked with Southern Sun Hotels alone, 
10 000 domestic flight bookings were made and that “millions of rands were expected to 
be spent on tickets, food and beverages, transport and merchandise” (South African Press 
Association, 2009b). It was also speculated that the IPL would create R100m in tax 
revenues, an estimate based on the tax revenue that the 2008 IPL generated in India 
(Fin24, 2009b). However, some are sceptical of the national benefit of hosting the IPL, 
Financial Mail (2009: 27) sarcastically commented that the figure of R1bn is a “popular 
number: not only was this a prediction for the IPL but also for the expected benefits of 
the Lions Tour
5.” In addition, the proclaimed figures of R100m in addition tax revenues 
and 10 000 visitors as a result of the IPL are very round, clean numbers that may call into 
question their accuracy and reliability.  
 
Perhaps the most significant implication of the IPL was the competency with which the 
event was held on such short notice. IPL Chief Operating Officer Sunder Raman stated 
that South Africa‟s performance in hosting spoke “volumes of the infrastructure available 
and the readiness of the country to host any tournament of any scale" (Supersport, 2009). 
The IPL improved the international perception of South Africa‟s capacity to host mega-
events. Thus the IPL was considered a success in terms of both South Africa‟s 
performance in hosting the event and the economic impact derived from it. The lessons 
learnt from South Africa‟s staging of the IPL are similar to that of the 2003 Cricket 
World Cup; it displays the country‟s ability to stage a large scale international event, 
however, fails in providing any predictive insight in determining the economic impact of 
2010. The IPL required virtually zero investment in infrastructure and stadia, as all the 
                                                          
5
 Refers to the tour by rugby team, the British and Irish Lions, to South Africa during June and July of 
2009. 
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necessary systems were in place. Even if the event did require such investments, they 
would have been neglected given the short preparation period. Thus the economic 
benefits from the IPL did not have to cover any fixed or capital investments before it 
could be considered to have derived a positive net economic impact. It only had to 
account for variable costs, which is a marked distinction with the 2010 World Cup.  
 
2.4. Rugby World Cup 1995 
 
The Rugby World Cup suffers from similar shortcomings to the Cricket World Cup in 
terms of its applicability as a forecasting tool for 2010, in that it had a far smaller capital 
outlay and it is also only a second-order mega-event. There were only an estimated 
20 000 foreign visitors to South Africa for the event (Arendse, 2009). Further, the total 
television audience for the Cup was only 2.7 billion, far less than the estimated 
viewership for 2010 (Stewart, 2006: 176). The 1995 Rugby World Cup, which was won 
by the South African rugby team, is however more applicable in terms of the abstract, 
intangible benefits that an event can confer on a nation. The benefits relate to mega-
events‟ capacity to generate national unity and enhance international reputations. The 
World Cup “represented an opportunity for the country to announce its re-emergence as a 
full member of not only the world‟s sporting community but its political community” 
(Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1095) following the end of Apartheid.  
 
More tangible consequences of the Cup were identified by Cornelissen (2004: 44-45) 
who claimed that the country‟s tourism sector was boosted by the 1995 Rugby World 
Cup, after tourism numbers initially started increasing after 1994. “International tourist 
arrivals in South Africa had risen by 6.3 per cent between 1995 and 2000, well above the 
international average during this period.” However, the observation does not seem 
surprising in the slightest as South Africa would not have been a popular tourist 
destination in 1992 prior to the end of Apartheid, and then up until 1994 the political 
instability and violence would have deterred tourists. Thus, it makes logical sense that 
tourist numbers would start increasing around 1995 as only then would South Africa have 
been regarded as a viable place to holiday, having survived a year of the new democracy. 
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So, the role of the World Cup in singularly stimulating the change in tourist figures is 
certainly doubtful. 
 
“(M)any governments use mega-events to fulfil larger political aims, such as 
consolidating national legitimacy or as a means of nation-building” (Cornelissen, 2004: 
51). Cornelissen and Swart (2006: 112) agreed that “the Rugby World Cup seemingly 
united the highly divided and racialised society.” Grundlingh (1998: 66) agreed that 
South Africans appeared to discover a sense of common unity as a result of the World 
Cup. Nauright (1998: 157) quoted the then South African Minister of Sport, Steve 
Tshwete, who declared that the young South African democracy had “witnessed the 
ability of sport to act as a catalyst to bring people together, share excitement and build a 
nation.” “The 1995 image of Nelson Mandela, wearing the number 7 jersey of South 
African captain François Pienaar as he lifted the Webb Ellis Trophy, would have 
undoubtedly contributed to the development of national unity in a country that had been 
divided for so long” (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1095). The image was an international 
advert for post-Apartheid South Africa. The success saw South Africa decide to try and 
replicate the outcome by bidding to host other events such as the Olympic Games in Cape 
Town in 2004 and the 2006 FIFA World Cup. While both bids were unsuccessful, South 
Africa was aggressively pursuing “an event-centred development strategy” (Black, 2007: 
264). The 2010 World Cup is thus an opportunity to implement the policy. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In evaluating the merits of hosting the World Cup it is appropriate to look at the event as 
a government project, made possible with state funding. In that sense the World Cup can 
be seen as public expenditure and an operation that was chosen at the expense of other 
potential projects or investments. It needs to be determined if the World Cup as a public 
project is in the public interest.  Three potential methods for determining the economic 
and intangible impacts of an event will be assessed for their merits as a tool for analysing 
the implications of the 2010 World Cup. The Cost-Benefit Analysis, Input-Output 
Analysis and the Computable General Equilibrium Approach are each addressed below. 
 
3.1. The Cost-Benefit Analysis Model 
 
A Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is an appropriate means for dissecting the issue, as it is 
“an analytical tool used to evaluate the relative merits of public projects financed by the 
state” (Black et al., 2005: 104). In its most simple form, a CBA is “calculation of the 
inputs into and outputs from a project and then subtraction of the first from the second” 
(Bellas and Zerbe, 2006: 1).  
 
A CBA is essentially equivalent to “systematic thinking about decision making” (Gillroy 
and Wade, 1992: 153). In this sense it is simply a “framework for organizing thoughts, 
for listing all pros and cons, and for placing a value on each consideration” (Gramlich, 
1981: 4). Thus the framework for conducting a CBA is not generic, as every public 
policy will be accompanied by different project-specific costs and benefits. It is the 
responsibility of the researcher to critically analyse and dissect the proposed project in 
order to identify and then quantify those related costs and outcomes. The model is usually 
confined in application to public sector projects as the advantages and disadvantages are 
defined in terms of social gains and losses, and as such the CBA “purports to be a way of 
deciding what society prefers” (Dasgupta and Pearce, 1974: 19). Crompton (2006: 75) 
succinctly summarised the conundrum faced by policy makers; “for an investment of 
public money to be justified, it must meet the criterion of highest and best use. That is, it 
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should yield a return to residents that is at least equal to that which could be obtained 
from other ventures in which the government entity could invest,” and it can be expected 
that the project which derives the greatest total return should be that which society 
prefers.  
 
Central to the process of selection of public policy is the notion of Pareto Optimality, 
which is a means to determine whether a public project is a justifiable expenditure. A 
change in the economy is said to be a Pareto improvement when “at least one person is 
made better off as a result of the change and no person is made worse off” (Bellas and 
Zerbe, 2006: 12). Essentially, the Pareto rule states “that if everyone prefers x to y, x is a 
socially acceptable policy” (Dasgupta and Pearce, 1974: 54). It is however an extremely 
stringent requirement, as rarely will a policy change result in there being no losers and 
then very few policies could be legitimately pursued. A more practical alternative to 
Pareto Optimality is the Kaldor-Hicks principle, which states that “situation A is 
preferred to situation B if the gainers could compensate the losers and still be better off” 
(Gramlich, 1981: 43). The principle does not require that the gainers actually do 
compensate the losers, but it is sufficient that they have the capability to do so. A policy 
that meets this requirement is regarded as warranted. Hence, the principle advocates the 
selection of the project which produces the greatest net benefit to society; it does not 
however deal with the distributive implications of the chosen policy.  
 
Therefore, the goal of a CBA is to determine how to achieve the “maximization of utility 
subject to whatever constraints the economic and political environment imposes” 
(Marglin, 1967: 15). The maximisation of social utility is a crucial element in public 
policy analysis, as policies that do not achieve it are not regarded as being in the best 
interest of the population. With regards to sporting events, even “a properly conducted 
economic impact study does not provide a sensible argument for the government to 
support a project. Only the comparison of costs and benefits in a cost-benefit analysis 
does,” (Kesenne, 2005: 134) as it accounts for utility gains and losses. The more 
pragmatic application of an economic impact study does not make allowances for the 
importance of the maximisation of social utility, which significantly cannot be solely 
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defined in terms of economic effects. Oldenboom (2006: 55-56) elaborated that an 
economic impact analysis in itself does not provide enough information for public sector 
decision making as public costs are not included. A CBA however, is not restricted to 
financial valuations, it is possible to include intangible factors as well. 
 
The intangible effects can be regarded as externalities to the project. The distinction 
needs to be made between private and social effects of a transaction.  An externality 
occurs where one individual voluntarily takes part in a transaction and another individual 
“benefits from (that) activity or good that he does not purchase, then he is enhancing his 
welfare or quality of life in a way that is not recorded in a market transaction” (Siegfried 
and Zimbalist, 2006: 421). An externality can be further defined as an event when 
“economic activity in the form of production or consumption affects the production or 
utility levels of other producers and consumers, and the effect is unpriced” (Dasgupta and 
Pearce, 1974: 118). An externality can assume a positive or negative value, the value of 
which can often not be calculated as it may have widespread social implications. Projects 
that induce positive externalities become more valuable as a result by increasing net 
social utility such that the private benefit is less than the public benefit, and likewise 
those projects that cause negative externalities increase the public cost above the private 
cost. Often externalities have an effect on the environment, the valuation of which is very 
difficult (Bellas and Zerbe, 2006: 10-11). An example of an environmental negative 
externality is the pollution that a factory emits. It raises the social cost of operating the 
factory above the private costs borne by those who run it.  
 
With specific reference to the hosting of sporting events, Barget and Gouguet (2007: 168) 
identified various potential externalities that may materialise. The positive effects were 
improved social cohesion in the area through strengthened social identity and integration, 
enhanced public image and development of basic facilities, which would aid future 
growth. In terms of negative externalities, deterioration in the quality of life and the 
environment because of construction of major facilities, and loss of social cohesion due 
to hooliganism were cited as possibilities. Kesenne (2005: 142) cited further externalities 
such as increased long-term effects on foreign direct investment, higher sports 
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participation rates, greater health and improved labour productivity. But, “because these 
benefits are hard to estimate or to quantify, or rather arbitrarily, they are often left out” of 
a net economic impact analysis. Within a traditional CBA framework, externalities are 
not explicitly included as values and are not accounted for in the final cost-benefit 
summation. Therefore, a project may be rejected on the basis of a CBA, when actually it 
should be approved for implementation based on the potential intangible benefits 
associated with the project, and vice versa. It would be a policy failure to incorrectly 
reject a cumulatively beneficial project. Therefore in application to the 2010 context, it is 
“necessary to try to internalize these external effects and determine the total economic 
value of the sporting event, which would measure the real net social utility created” 
(Barget and Gouguet, 2007: 166).  
 
It is thus essential to include the externalities in the decision making process. When they 
cannot be given a monetary value the rational way to deal with the factors is not to 
abandon attempts to measure them all together, but rather to “quantify what can be 
quantified, … rank unquantifiable factors, and then to make a decision” (Gramlich, 1981: 
4). It is appropriate to order the intangibles in terms of the degree to which they are 
expected to complement or reduce net societal utility. Thus, given the values of the 
tangible consequences, and being aware of the intangibles and their relative value, the 
onus falls onto political leaders who have the task of weighing the quantifiable against 
the unquantifiable and choosing whether or not to approve a project (Bellas and Zerbe, 
2006: 1-2). It is therefore not a mechanical process whereby estimated inputs give a 
definitive answer to the question of if a project should be pursued; there is a certain 
degree of analytical reasoning. Hence, when market values are not available for valuing 
the respective outputs of a project, the analysis may be less reliable and more a function 
of opinion. The CBA method has been criticised on those grounds because it requires the 
effects of a project to be expressed in monetary terms (Miller and Patassini, 2006: 1). 
That the intangibles are not monetised is a shortcoming of all analyses that make an effort 
to value projects that have such effects. An economic impact study makes no 
considerations for intangibles; however, within the CBA framework there is a capacity 
for incorporation in the final analysis. The CBA serves as an aid to the overall decision 
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making process as it informs policy makers of all the factors involved and not only 
economic considerations; crucially it highlights those implications of a project which 
might not be immediately evident given a study based on purely economic grounds. 
 
Bellas and Zerbe (2006: 3-5) outline their advised approach for conducting a CBA 
through the following steps: 
1. Clarify the issue at hand; identify for whom the study is being done, and 
whose costs and benefits should be included. 
2. Identify the alternatives; other similar projects that could also derive 
public benefits need to be acknowledged. 
3. Set out the assumptions; they may refer to market conditions, quantities, 
durations and other specifications necessary for determining inputs. 
4. List the impacts of the project; quantify the impacts where possible, 
otherwise simply list the factors that cannot be quantified. 
5. Assign values to the impacts; attach monetary values to impacts where 
appropriate. 
6. Deal with unquantified impacts; those factors that were not given 
monetary values need consideration. One approach would be to calculate 
how large these factors would have to be in order to reverse the CBA 
results. As such, the analysis progresses beyond acceptance of quantitative 
calculations. 
7. Discount future values to obtain present values; be careful to select 
appropriate interest rates to use as discount rates.  
8. Identify and account for uncertainty; the analysis needs to recognise the 
existence of the risk of the project in terms the actual costs and benefits 
differing from expectations. The application of a sensitivity analysis, 
which calculates the value of the project under different scenarios and 
gives a range of results within which the actual net impact is likely to fall. 
9. Compare the costs and the benefits; having calculated the figures under a 
variety of circumstances in the sensitivity analysis, compare the costs and 
benefits under each scenario. 
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10. Decide on a conclusion; having compared the costs and the benefits in step 
9, include the unquantified aspects from step 4 and choose whether or not 
to proceed with the project, or not. 
 
The essence of the decision to use a CBA lies in the observation that if an event shows a 
positive net economic impact, the study fails to realise that there is a “fundamental 
difference between the economic impact of a sports event ... and its net benefit” 
(Kesenne, 2005: 134).  As the total impact incorporates intangible factors, such as 
international exposure and nation building, that cannot be quantified in economic terms, 
and thus requires a considerable qualitative judgment. The net economic impact analysis 
should be incorporated into the CBA to enhance the understanding of the underlying 
finances of the project. In conducting the CBA, having identified all the costs, they can 
be compared against all of the benefits, and it can be assessed as to whether the decision 
to host the World Cup was founded on legitimate grounds in the maximisation of social 
utility. 
 
3.2. Input-Output Analysis 
 
An Input-Output (I-O) analysis has traditionally been used to determine the economic 
impact of a change in or enactment of a government policy. The effect of an event in an 
I-O analysis is calculated by determining the attendance, and then surveying a section of 
the attendance to determine an average amount of expenditure per individual at an event 
and in the region.  This means that direct spending is determined by “simply summing all 
receipts associated with the event” (Baade and Matheson, 2004b: 345), revealing total 
expenditure, which will be treated with the multiplier to give the net effect of the event 
on the economy (Matheson, 2004: 3). The I-O Analysis assumes that all inputs are freely 
available in the economy and that the use of resources in one sector of the economy does 
not reduce economic activity elsewhere (Dwyer et al., 2006: 60). 
 
The essential problem with the I-O analysis is that it derives its multiplier from input-
output tables that are based on the normal state of the economy.  But, during a mega-
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event, the economy is at anything but its normal state, it is characterised by higher prices, 
decreased unemployment, higher levels of consumption and increased general output. It 
therefore requires a different multiplier that accommodates these irregularities 
(Matheson, 2004: 7-8).  Studies by Dwyer et al. (2006), Kurtzman (2005), and Siegfried 
and Zimbalist (2000) cited the multipliers used in calculating forward-looking predictions 
as causing the disparities between estimates and actual impacts. An “I-O analysis 
therefore incorporates a systematic and serious upward bias if used to estimate impacts in 
broad region‟s or national economies. I-O techniques account for the positive impacts of 
an event on economic activity, but they ignore the equally real negative impacts” (Dwyer 
et al., 2006: 59). It can often be the case that the negative aspects diminish the effects of 
the positive impacts to such an extent that the actual net impact of events on economic 
activity is appreciably lower than initially estimated 
 
Baade and Matheson further (2004a: 1090) maintained that the inaccuracies in the 
estimation of the benefits of staging large events can be attributed to the shortcomings of 
an I-O analysis, as opposed to the more accurate Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE). The framework for conducting a CGE is regarded as preferable as it makes 
allowances for feedback effects that dampen the extent to which the multiplier induces 
further rounds of spending after an initial expenditure (Dwyer et al., 2006: 59).  
 
3.3. Computable General Equilibrium Models 
 
An I-O Analysis‟ unrealistic assumptions are addressed in CGE models. CGEs are 
designed for comparative-static simulations where the data is not in series but rather 
compiled from a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). A SAM describes the economy at a 
given time, and explains the impact of a change in one variable, on the rest of the 
economy (Bohlmann and Van Heerden, 2005: 5). A SAM is a square matrix where each 
sector of the economy has an account, represented by a row and a column. Income for the 
sector appears along its row and its expenditures, along its column. As such, expenditure 
by a sector corresponds to an income for another sector, and the movement from sector to 
sector has implications for total economic activity (Lofgren et al., 2002: 5). Thus, the 
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cumulative effects of World Cup related spending can be modelled; the difficulty in 
determining the net economic impact lies in calculating the correct size of the 
autonomous injections. 
 
CGE models simulate the impact of the exogenous shock to the economy and allow for 
the “development of new relative prices which leads to a new equilibrium with different 
levels of production, income and consumption” (Magabu, 2002: 3). Further, it 
acknowledges the reality of resource constraints, the existence of other markets, and the 
feedback effects. CGE analysis provides an appreciably more accurate estimate of the 
economic implications of hosting events, through applications of appropriate multipliers 
(Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000: 106). 
 
The practical implications of the biases inherent in the I-O method are evident in the 
study by Dwyer et al. (2006: 61) which calculated the economic impact of the Australian 
Grand Prix measured in terms of both an I-O Analysis and a CGE model. The results can 
be summarised as follows: I-O modelling, when compared to CGE modelling, projected a 
greater impact on real output in both the host state and Australia as a whole. The 
projected increase in employment using the CGE model was less than I-O estimates. In 
the I-O model, increases in employment in the rest of Australia were expected, while the 
CGE model predicted relatively large job losses in the rest of Australia. Further, the CGE 
model projected reduced output and employment in various industries in the event‟s host 
state, including industries that were regarded as being associated with tourism. In 
contrast, the I-O modelling of the special events projected either a net increase or zero 
change in real output and employment in all industries. 
 
While a study based on a CGE model is more expensive to perform and is a technically 
more demanding method as a greater level of expertise is required to develop the model, 
it theoretically offers greater accuracy of the prediction. The “principal advantage of 
using CGE models in policy analysis is that it permits taking into account interactions 
throughout the economy” (Magabu, 2002: 3). The CGE method is therefore seen as a 
preferable alternative to an I-O Analysis because in calculating the net economic impact 
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of an event it employs more appropriate multipliers that account for the inter-connected 
relationships that exist between factors in the economy. The relationships that act to 
reduce the multiplier effect are addressed in the following section.  
 
3.4. Theoretical Considerations for Conducting Economic Impact Studies 
 
Syzmanski (2002: 2) stated that the economic impact of an event is “not simply the direct 
effect created by investments prior to the event or consumer spending during the event, 
but also the indirect effects caused by the stimulus to the economic activities of others 
induced by the direct effects.” There may therefore be significant outflows from the 
multiplier cycle (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1090). Application of only a marginally 
inflated multiplier can significantly distort the net effect of an initial expenditure. 
Therefore, special care needs to be taken when determining the appropriate multiplier to 
be applied. Kurtzman (2005: 47) asserted that often the multiplier is “an inflated 
multiplier due to the lack of calculation that includes all factors of leakage.” Such a 
failing would result in an exaggerated net impact and would lead to poor selection of 
public policies. Five factors which act to reduce the multiplier effect have been identified, 
and their existence needs to be incorporated into a study which seeks to calculate the 
economic impact of an event. 
 
3.4.1.  Displaced Spending  
 
Displaced spending occurs in two forms: government expenditure and consumer 
expenditure, both of which can significantly stunt the prospective economic impact of an 
event. Displaced spending is expenditure on or at an event that would have been used for 
other goods and services in the country or city had the event not taken place. Government 
and individuals thus substitute away from regular spending towards spending on the 
event. Thus, there is an inflated estimate of what the total value of spending will be as a 
consequence of the event (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1091). Such spending patterns do 
not serve to amplify national GDP, they merely result in shifts in sectoral expenditure. 
Coates and Humphreys (2003: 13) observed that there is “compelling evidence that these 
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events simply re-distribute spending to different parts of the urban economy.” The 
occurrence is the result of resource constraints in an economy. While there is an 
increased economic output caused directly by the event, the net benefit is diminished by 
the consequent declines in output from other sectors, as the event consumes the inputs 
that would ordinarily be used in other sectors. Syzmanski (2002: 3) maintained that for 
the multiplier effect to be fully realised, the resources used in the government expenditure 
must be a part of spare capacity, that is labour and capital that are involved in the project 
must be presently unused; hence, having diverted resources from alternative activities to 
the project, “whatever multiplier effects exist on the positive side must be 
counterbalanced against negative multiplier effects due to diverted expenditures no 
longer providing income to some individuals whose own spending is thus curtailed.” 
Thus, for the net effect to be positive, the replacement project must have a greater net 
worth that the initial project which has been forgone. 
 
In terms of expenditure by individuals during the event, only spending by foreign visitors 
is likely to have any expansionary effect on output. Expenditure by domestic individuals 
at an event will not have the same effects as spending by foreigners as “their spending on 
the event will be to a large extent diverted from other activities that they would otherwise 
have undertaken in the region” (Syzmanski, 2002: 4). Crompton (2006: 70) explicitly 
stated that expenditures “by those who reside in the community do not contribute to an 
event‟s economic impact because these expenditures represent a recycling of money that 
already existed there. There is no new economic growth.” Again, there will be a shift 
only in sectoral output, and little real effect on the economy. The reason for ignoring 
expenditure by locals makes intuitive sense, because had the event not taken place in the 
region, an individual‟s disposable income would have been spent elsewhere in the 
economy, and the effect on the economy would be the same. Hence, economic impact 
should be defined as “the net economic change in the incomes of host residents that 
results from spending attributed to tourists” (Crompton, 2006: 86). 
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3.4.2.  The Labour and Capital Markets 
 
An I-O analysis assumes a free supply of inputs to an event, which means whatever input 
is needed, will be readily available in the economy, which is the key flaw in I-O analyses 
(Dwyer et al., 2005: 353). The problem is most applicable to highly skilled employment 
that will be taken either from other sectors or the workers imported from abroad. Labour 
might not be readily available in the host region as it takes time to develop specialised 
skills (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1090). Crompton (2006: 74) agreed that higher 
employment figures can be misleading as they imply that all new jobs are filled by 
residents from within the region, which might not necessarily be the case. Foreign 
employees repatriate their income and weaken the influence of the multiplier on the 
economy. Therefore, in terms of the labour market, it is dubious as to whether hosting an 
event will actually bring about a rise in employment. Bohlmann (2006: 23-24) noted 
however, that foreign professionals will impart their knowledge to those domestic 
individuals with whom they interact, and in doing so the nation‟s human capital will be 
developed.  
 
An event results in an increased demand for labour, leading to an increase in the wage 
rate, which in turn reduces the willingness to employ, thus employment will not 
necessarily increase (Baade and Matheson, 2003: 20). Crompton (2004: 74) posited that 
in response to an event, local businesses are unlikely to hire additional full-time 
employees to meet higher demand as the extra business is transitory. The number of 
labour hours will probably increase, however existing employees would be required to 
work overtime.  
 
3.4.3.  Foreign Exchange 
 
The hosting of a mega-event may also have effects on the Foreign Exchange market.  In 
the instance of drawing many foreign tourists, and if the nation has a floating exchange 
rate, an increase in demand for the local currency by visitors could affect the real rate, 
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and hence the currency will appreciate.  The situation will negatively impact on both the 
exporting capacity of a nation, as well as the import-competing industries because 
imported goods will be relatively cheaper. Consumers will substitute away from locally 
produced goods. I-O analysis only accounts for injected expenditure and is thus incapable 
of estimating exchange-rate movements (Dwyer et al., 2006: 61).   
 
3.4.4.  Inflation 
 
The nature of events is such that very intense and localised shocks are provided to the 
economy. Events cause stark increases in demand, but briefly, possibly only for a few 
days. The rise in demand is focused within a specific area, and only applies to specific 
goods and services, such as accommodation, transport, restaurants and vendors. These 
types of intense and highly specific shocks have different impacts in comparison to those 
that are of a comparable magnitude and are more widespread throughout the economy 
(Dwyer et al., 2006: 64). If there is a strong increase in demand, but capacity in the 
economy constrains the corresponding and necessary increase in supply, it follows that 
suppliers will raise prices, and the overall impact of the stimulus will be inflationary 
(Szymanski, 2002: 3). The prevalence of sticky prices after the event needs to be 
accounted for (Kasimati, 2003: 438).  
 
3.4.5.  Tourism  
 
Another foundation for the over-estimation of benefits relates to the crowding out effect 
that the influx of tourists to an event will have on other regular tourists who would 
ordinarily visit the host area. Such „regulars‟ would be put off their visit, by the prospect 
of all the other tourists who will be there (Baade and Matheson, 2004a; Crompton, 2006; 
Humphreys and Prokopowicz, 2007; Preuss, 2002). Seaman (2007: 2) suggested that up 
to 100% crowding out may occur due to the “potential inability of a local economy to 
significantly expand its output in response to alleged massive injections of visitor 
spending demands.” Hence, supply constraints are also applicable in the analysis of 
tourism. A study by the European Tour Operators Association (ETOA) echoed the belief 
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that “(t)he presence of the Olympics deters regular tourists: they perceive that the city 
will be full, disrupted, congested and over-priced” (Sure Travel, 2005). The same can be 
applied to all major events. An example can be found in data collected during the 2002 
FIFA World Cup held in Japan and South Korea.  The number of European visitors to 
South Korea was higher than normal; however the increase was offset by a similar sized 
decrease in the usual tourists and business travellers that visit the country from 
neighbouring Japan who decided not to travel on the grounds that they wanted to avoid 
the World Cup hassles. “The total number of foreign visitors to South Korea throughout 
the tournament was estimated at 460 000, a figure identical to the number of foreign 
visitors during the same period in the previous year” (Golovina, 2002, in Baade and 
Matheson, 2004a: 1091).  Similarly, “482 000 foreign visitors entered Japan between 31 
May and 30 June 2002, this marked an increase of only 30 000 people over the same 
period for the previous year” (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004:197). 
 
In addition, local residents may choose to leave the area until the event is over for the 
same reasons that regular tourists are deterred.  Hence, the displacement effects amount 
to losses in income, which must be considered when determining the possible economic 
impact of an event (Dwyer et al., 2006: 63).   
 
Further, visitors to a nation for an event may not be considerable consumers of traditional 
sightseeing opportunities; they will not be drawn to museums, historical attractions, 
nature sites and other traditional destinations that tourists in a nation would generally 
visit, “their behaviour is akin to business men attending a convention” (ETOA, 2005: 9). 
Kurtzman (2005: 49) maintained that a sport tourist is one “whose travel… is primarily 
motivated by sport,” and that events do not turn sports fans into regular recreational 
tourists. So, while there may indeed be an influx of tourists it is not necessarily the case 
that the tourist sites will benefit as much from the event as would be expected. The effect 
is augmented by the phenomenon that ordinary tourists who would ordinarily frequent 
the sites are not travelling in the region because of the event. Hence, event tourists 
spending patterns and their likely activities need to be modelled (Getz, 2008: 405). 
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Crompton (2006: 73) placed a further, more stringent constraint on whether expenditure 
by foreign visitors should be accounted as contributing to economic impact; spending by 
foreigners should not count towards the impact of the event, if the visitors had been 
planning to visit the region for some time but changed the timing of their trip so that it 
would coincide with the event. Their spending should not be counted as it was always 
going to occur irrespective of whether the event had taken place or not.  
 
3.4.6.  Summary 
 
Within the theoretical framework for the estimation of the net economic impact of mega-
events, it has become evident that there are factors, although not immediately apparent, 
which work to significantly diminish the economic effect that the event will have on the 
host region. The factor that acts to reduce the multiplier effect will have varying degrees 
of relevance to the 2010 context. In assessing the economic impact of the World Cup it is 
necessary to determine whether the reductions will actually occur given the economic 
environment that prevails in South Africa, and to assess if it is possible to take 
preventative actions to reduce the extent to which the leakages from the domestic 
economy dampens the net financial impact of the event. 
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CHAPTER 4: OTHER STUDIES ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 2010 
 
Three studies that have endeavoured to predict the economic impact of the 2010 World 
Cup on South Africa merit analysis. Studies by Bohlmann and van Heerden (2008), 
Magubu and Mohamed (2008), and accounting and auditing firm Grant Thornton (2003, 
2007, 2008) will be assessed in terms of their shortcomings, successes and applicability 
to the process of determining the total effect of hosting the event on South Africa. 
 
4.1. Bohlmann and van Heerden 
 
Bohlmann and van Heerden‟s (2008: 386) study based on a 32-sector CGE model, 
UPGEM, was developed by the University of Pretoria and the Centre of Policy Studies, 
and designed for comparative static simulations. Specific economic outcomes of different 
scenarios that were thought to transpire as a result of the event were modelled. The 
changes in the economic variables as a result of the occurrence of each scenario were 
then applied in the model to assess the net effect on different industries and the economy 
as a whole. The specific effect of each scenario could be identified as it was assumed that 
other scenarios did not occur concurrently. Finally, the scenarios were simulated 
simultaneously to determine the overall effect on the economy. 
 
 Scenario 1 involved a simulation where capital stock of transport and 
construction industries were each increased by 2%, and capital stock in 
communication and hotel industries were each increased by 1%.  
 With demand held constant, the simulations resulted in a small 
increase in real GDP growth (0.15%), increased employment, higher 
price of labour, lower prices, higher exports as a result of improved 
real exchange rate and improved competitiveness in international 
trade. By industry, the greatest effects were seen in transport services, 
hotels and communications.  
44 
 
 Scenario 2 related to changed productivity as a result of investment in certain 
industries, with technical changes in the transport, construction and 
communication industries contributing to 5%, 2% and 2% improvements in 
productivity respectively.  
 The results under Scenario 2 were very similar to Scenario 1; however 
there was a larger increase in real GDP growth (0.33%).  
 Scenario 3 referred to the effect of the marginal increase in tourism. The analysis 
took into account the crowding out effect. 
 Tourism was found to have no effect on GDP growth or employment.  
 Scenario 4 was used to simulate the effect of increased demand for capital 
expenditures during the World Cup. 
 It was found that the real GDP would increase by 0.61%, while 
employment, consumer prices and price of labour all rose by more 
than 1%. However, exports were found to decrease by 3.03%. 
 Scenario 5 incorporated all the effects that are assumed in the previous scenarios 
and also included the means that government decided to use in funding the event. 
There were two alternatives for funding considered: 
 0.5% increase in taxes to fund the event would result in a 0.69% 
increase in real GDP, with a 0.72% increase in employment and 1.21% 
rise in consumer prices. It was assumed that future investment, GDP 
growth and taxes would finance the costs not covered by the initial 
increase in taxes. 
 As opposed to the 0.5% increase in taxes, it was assumed that the 
majority of the expense for the event would be financed via higher 
taxes immediately. Such a policy was found to almost totally 
undermine the positive economic benefits of the World Cup. It 
resulted in only a 0.08% change in real GDP, a decrease of 0.35% in 
employment and a 1.24% increase in consumer prices.  
 Under both funding alternatives greatest benefits of hosting the World 
Cup were seen to be enjoyed by the construction, transport services, 
hotels and communications industries. 
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Bohlmann and van Heerden (2008: 393) made the disclaimer that the time period over 
which the economic impact analysis was conducted was very short and did not allow for 
the economic effects of any long lasting benefits from the event such as increased foreign 
direct investment.  In summarising the expectations regarding the economic impact of the 
World Cup, Bohlmann and van Heerden (2008: 393) stated that “it is hard to imagine that 
there will be any significant impact on GDP in the short term. Similarly, employment 
might increase in the short term... but remain unchanged in the longer term as demand for 
labour decreases again.” For any large increases in employment it was maintained that for 
GDP growth to occur there needed to be large sums of foreign investment to increase 
domestic economic activity. 
 
On a purely short-term economic basis the study by Bohlmann and van Heerden (2008) is 
sound, as it used a CGE model in calculating the economic impact, a method preferred by 
scholars due to its greater accuracy. However, in pursuit of greater applicability of the 
results, the study might have included a sensitivity analysis to determine a range within 
which the economic impact was expected to fall, as opposed to a specific figure of 0.69% 
of GDP under the first funding option. For example, Scenario 1 could have been 
simulated under the specified assumptions, and then simulated under better than and 
worse than expected circumstances, such as a 1.5% increase in capital stock under the 
worse than expected case and at a 2.5% increase in the better than expected situation. 
Application of the process, although making the study more computationally demanding, 
would have added to the value of the study in that there would be less reliance on the 
accuracy of the assumptions in deriving the predicted net impact. A further criticism is 
that the proportion of the event that would be financed with taxes under the second 
funding option was not expressly disclosed, but only the ambiguous statement that “the 
majority of the expenditure would be financed through higher taxes” (Bohlmann and van 
Heerden, 2008: 393) was made. Such a disclosure would have enhanced the 
understanding of the results. 
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4.2. Mabugu and Mohamed  
 
Mabugu and Mohamed (2008: 5) sought to calculate the economic impact of the 2010 
World Cup with the use of a SAM multiplier model, “with the specific focus being on 
macroeconomic, sectoral, factor and household impacts.” The critical assumption was 
made that in hosting the event, the increased spending will neither require a tax increase 
nor raise the budget deficit. It was purported that the event would be financed by a      
R30bn budget surplus from fiscal year 2006/2007. As such, a disclaimer was included, 
which stated that the study‟s results should be regarded as the “upper limits of the 
possible benefits that should be anticipated” (Mabugu and Mohamed, 2008: 5). The 
results of the simulation were based on the estimated cost of the event, which was set at 
an investment of R17.4bn. World Cup related expenditure patterns were applied as 
exogenous injections into the relevant sectors of the economy (Mabugu and Mohamed, 
2008: 17). 
 
The study found that the World Cup could be expected to have a direct “impact on GDP 
of R163 million...The rise in GDP is driven largely by rising consumption” (Mabugu and 
Mohamed, 2008: 18). It was explained that the increase in consumption would be due to 
higher real household incomes. Increased imports were predicted to rise by 1.14%, which 
would lead to a balance of trade deficit as the exchange rate would not depreciate and 
may actually appreciate. Mabugu and Mohamed (2008: 18) observed that the multipliers 
for the different sectors are all fairly low due to the open nature of the South African 
economy and hence higher leakages exist which act to diminish the effect. The analysis 
of the impact on sectors of the economy determined, similarly to Bohlmann and van 
Heerden (2008) that the largest changes would occur in the construction, transport and 
communications, but also in the manufacturing industry.  
 
Mabugu and Mohamed (2008: 20) explained that the demographic groups of the South 
African population which would benefit the most from the event were blacks, followed 
by coloureds and whites, with Indians expected to reap the least gains because of their 
lower participation in the sectors that received the most positive stimulus by government. 
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It was also found that the World Cup would be regressive in terms of distribution of 
wealth, as high income households would experience greater gains than low income 
households. While all households were expected to experience gains, black middle 
income households were seen to have the most to gain from 2010, with a predicted 1.02% 
increase in income (Mabugu and Mohamed, 2008: 20). 
 
In conclusion Mabugu and Mohamed (2008: 23) warned that due to the structural nature 
of the tournament, it will “undoubtedly benefit those South African cities and provinces 
that intend to host the event disproportionately more than their non-hosting compatriots.” 
It was suggested that government should introduce mechanisms that would ensure a more 
equitable distribution of benefits. There was however no specific proposal to explain how 
a program for re-distribution might be implemented. Such a policy seems highly unlikely 
and infeasible. It was also acknowledged that SAM models were useful in providing only 
“ball-park estimates” and that “significant limitations, such as linearity, absence of 
behavioural considerations, absence of markets and prices, and lack of formal 
constraints” impaired the reliability and accuracy of their results (Mabugu and Mohamed 
(2008: 23).  
 
4.3. Grant Thornton 
 
Grant Thornton (2003: 1) was commissioned by the LOC to conduct an economic impact 
assessment for the 2010 World Cup. That the study did not specify the method employed 
to calculate the net economic impact, doubt is cast upon the reliability of the results. The 
study as a whole was presented in the form of a Cost-Benefit Analysis, with both tangible 
and intangible costs and benefits incorporated. 
 
The study was based around the key belief that the “gross benefit of an event is the 
wealth created in the country as a result of the event” (Grant Thornton, 2003: 1). The 
cumulative benefits were expected to be a function of the spending in four assumed 
categories, and formed the foundation for calculation of the economic impact of 2010: 
 Spending at the event by domestic and foreign spectators. 
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 Spending on a trip by domestic and international teams, VIP‟s, sponsors 
and media. 
 Other spending on sponsorships, merchandising and concessions. 
 Capital expenditure on stadia and infrastructure (Grant Thornton, 2003: 1). 
From the assumptions, the following estimates of value were derived: 
 
Table 2. Costs and Benefits of 2010 World Cup according to Grant Thornton (2003) 
 Source of Revenue Estimated Value (Rbn) 
Benefits 
Ticket Revenue 4.6 
Additional Tax Revenue 7.2 
Direct Expenditure on the Event 12.7 
Costs Tangible Costs to Government 2.3 
 Net Contribution to GDP 21.3 
Source: Grant Thornton (2003) 
 
The figures initially appear impressive and a reasonable justification for being host in 
2010, since the net contribution to GDP is R21.3bn. The net impact was derived through 
application of “appropriate income and employment multipliers and taxation rates” 
(Grant Thornton, 2003: 2). The study concluded that: 
“It is clear ... that the staging of the Soccer World Cup in South Africa in 2010 will create 
significant direct and indirect economic benefits for the country‟s economy, with minimal 
tangible and intangible costs” (Grant Thornton, 2003: 4). 
However, through a careful analysis of the assumptions employed, it can be concluded 
that the assessment was fundamentally flawed, and hence the figure that was derived is 
not a reliable reflection of the probable net economic impact. Bohlmann and van Heerden 
(2008: 386) remarked that they were sceptical of the estimate, having noted that the 
“finding (was) based on questionable income and employment multipliers, which were 
probably overoptimistic.” The inappropriate assumptions, in combination with the 
„overoptimistic‟ multipliers serve to amplify the presumed economic impact. As 
previously noted, some scholars have observed that inaccurate methods of determining 
economic impact are employed by protagonists of events in order to convince a sceptical 
public (Andreff, 2006; Baade and Matheson, 2004a; Crompton, 2006; Kesenne, 2005; 
Sterken, 2006). Syzmanski (2002: 2) warned that the “multiplier concept is extremely 
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powerful, and can be used to produce very large predicted effects from initial injections. 
But it is an easily abused concept.” That the results of the study were used in the Bid 
Committee‟s official application to FIFA to be the host 2010, it is possible that such 
activities may have been engaged in. 
 
Assumptions 1 and 2 refer to spending by domestic and foreign entities as contributing to 
the net expenditure on the event, and from that multipliers were used to determine the 
contribution to GDP. However, it is incorrect to use revenue spent on the event by 
domestic individuals in the analysis of GDP, as affirmed in a study of the net impact of 
the 2006 World Cup Soccer in Germany, where it was concluded that “(i)t is not 
appropriate to consider the expenditure of domestic spectators during the football world 
championships … since other consumption expenditure is expected to be reduced 
accordingly” (Ahlert, 2005: 21). Domestic expenditure on the event should not be seen as 
contributing to GDP because it is simply a substitution of expenditure away from normal 
expenditure patterns that individuals would ordinarily follow, towards expenditure related 
to the event. In the calculations made, the estimates of spending on events were 
considered on a gross basis, and not as a net measure (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 
1090). The method neglects displaced spending. In terms of ticket sales, it was estimated 
by Grant Thornton (2003: 2) that 67% of the tickets purchased for the World Cup fixtures 
would be bought by South Africans, which amplifies the unreliability of the estimated 
impact on GDP. Such expenditure does not serve to amplify national GDP; it just adds to 
the gross profit of the event, and not towards a net economic benefit for South Africa.
6
 
The over-estimation can be resolved by including only expenditure that is made by 
tourists, and foreigners in the country; their spending will genuinely contribute to a 
higher GDP in that these will be autonomous injections into the economy that in normal 
circumstances, without the World Cup, would not occur. The same cannot be said for 
expenditure by South African individuals. 
 
                                                          
6
 No indication of the size of the multiplier used in the study was given. Therefore, it must be assumed that 
expenditure in one sector will have a similar multiplier effect to expenditure in a different sector. Hence, it 
must be assumed that the same multiplier was applied by Grant Thornton to all sectors of the economy. 
50 
 
In terms of the 3
rd
 assumption, it should be approached with scepticism as the actual 
effect that merchandising and sponsorship relating to the World Cup will have on the 
South African economy will be minimal. While the volume of transactions involved in 
the two sectors will be significant, the benefits accrued to South Africans will be limited.  
The same restriction on domestic expenditure actually contributing to GDP applies. At 
the 2006 World Cup in Germany, FIFA (2006: 47) explicitly stated that “all marketing 
rights are owned solely and without restrictions by FIFA and that FIFA can exploit the 
marketing rights without restriction.” FIFA retains a tight grip on any of its property 
rights related to the World Cup and as such restrict domestic producers‟ capacity to 
benefit from the event through merchandising. In Germany, Coca-Cola, American beer 
and McDonald‟s were available at the games while German products were systematically 
“locked out” (Hall, 2006: 61). Similar restrictive constraints prevail to govern 
sponsorship and the provision of concessions for the 2010 World Cup. A more 
comprehensive analysis will be conducted in the Chapter 5; however, assuming that 
merchandising, sponsorship and concessions will give additional contributions to South 
African GDP is erroneous.  
 
In the final assumption made by Grant Thornton (2003: 1) the emphasis was placed on 
capital expenditure for the World Cup as adding to GDP. The proposition is in the same 
mould as the analysis so far; government spending on the event is just a sectoral shift of 
expenditure and does not positively contribute to GDP. Government thus substitutes 
away from regular spending towards expenditure on the event.  So, there is an inflated 
estimate of the total value of spending consequent of the event (Baade and Matheson, 
2004a: 1091). The assumption does however lead onto the issue of how much being host 
to the World Cup will actually cost South Africa. The study assumed that tangible costs 
cost to government would be R2.3bn, which consisted of R1.8bn on stadia and R500m 
being spent on infrastructural developments (Grant Thornton, 2003: 2-3). While a full 
discussion of the costs involved for 2010 is contained in the next chapter, the estimate 
used here is remarkably low, even at 2003 price levels, considering that the initial budget 
for the Green Point Stadium in Cape Town alone was R2.5bn (Business Day, 2007; 1). A 
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patently incorrect assumption that is a crucial input into a study would render the result 
invalid.  
 
Grant Thornton (2003: 3) did however include a comprehensive list of the intangible 
benefits and costs that were expected to accrue to South Africa as a result of hosting the 
event. The costs included increases in petty crime, occurrence of possible soccer related 
violence, negative impact on traffic flows, displacement of normal tourism and the 
negative impact on residents living close to the stadia. The listed costs are largely 
legitimate; however, stating that the displacement of tourists is an intangible cost is not 
correct. There are very real, quantifiable consequences of such an effect, which should be 
incorporated into the economic impact assessment, as was done by Bohlmann and van 
Heerden (2008), yet another shortcoming of the Grant Thornton analysis. In terms of 
intangible benefits, the study cited increased interest in and a raised profile of South 
Africa, marketing opportunities, improved confidence and pride of the local population, 
increased tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI). It is important to recognise that 
the positive image implications of the event and the associated improvements in tourism 
and foreign investment are not automatic and mechanical consequences. They depend on 
the successful hosting of the event and that the image fostered of South Africa in the 
international community is a positive one. Therefore, it should not be assumed that the 
intangible benefits will definitely occur. It is possible that these potential benefits may 
become costs if the image impact is negative for South Africa, and hence reducing 
tourism and FDI. The analysis of intangibles is by no means definitive, issues such as 
human trafficking, prostitution and the spread of diseases should also be addressed. 
Without any discussion on the respective values of intangibles, it was blindly assumed in 
the Grant Thornton (2003: 4) study that the intangible benefits will exceed the intangible 
costs. 
 
Grant Thornton (2003) seemed to ignore distinction between the tournament itself 
earning a profit, and the net economic benefit for South Africa, in that it analyses solely 
the aggregate expenditure on the event, which then through the application of multipliers 
determines the net benefit. In 2007, after a re-assessment of their initial study Grant 
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Thornton posited that GDP would rise by at least R51.1bn as a result of the World Cup 
(South Africa.info, 2007a). Then, in 2008 Grant Thornton made a further re-assessment 
and declared that the World Cup‟s net economic effect would be a R55.7bn contribution 
to GDP (South Africa.info, 2008a), with 415 000 new jobs and R19.3bn in tax income 
expected to be generated (Financial Mail Campus, 2009: 6). That the revised net 
estimates are significantly larger than the initial calculation, in spite of increasing costs, 
calls into question the accuracy of the results.  
 
Due to the many methodological flaws and variety of inappropriate assumptions, the 
legitimacy of the 2003 study is strongly undermined, yielding the results unreliable, and 
would not be an suitable point of reference for the prospective economic impact of 2010. 
Further, that this study was conducted in 2003 reduces its relevance in 2009. While the 
estimates that may have been accurate at publication, they are now far from appropriate. 
 
4.4. Comparison of Studies 
 
In order to compare the results calculated by Bohlmann and van Heerden (2008) to those 
by Grant Thornton (2003 and 2008), and Mabugu and Mohamed (2008) it is necessary to 
interpret the rand figures that were generated as percentages of GDP. The South African 
GDP for 2008 at current market prices was estimated at R2 283.8bn (South African 
Reserve Bank, 2009a). Treated with a conservative GDP growth rate of 0.5% in 2009 and 
3% for 2010, an approximate GDP for 2010 is R2 364.01bn.
7
 For the results of Grant 
Thornton (2008), the World Cup would serve to increase GDP in the country by 2.4% if 
the impact of the event is R55.7.
8
 Similarly, under the more conservative estimate of the 
net impact being R21.3bn (Grant Thornton, 2003), the contribution would be in the 
region of 0.91%.
9
 The figure of R163m as calculated by Mabugu and Mohamed (2008) 
equates to 0.0069% of projected GDP in 2010.
10
 
 
                                                          
7
 2283.8(1.005)(1.03) = 2364.01 
8
 [2364.01/(2364.01 – 55.7) – 1] x 100 = 2.4% 
9
 [2364.01/(2364.01 – 21.3) – 1] x 100 = 0.91% 
10
 [2364.01/(2364.01 – 0.163) – 1] x 100 = 0.0069% 
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Table 3. Estimate percentage increase in GDP as a result of the 2010 World Cup. 
Study Conservative Liberal 
Mabugu and Mohamed (2008) n/a 0.0069 
Bohlmann & van Heerden (2008) 0.08 0.69 
Grant Thornton (2003 & 2008) 0.91 2.4 
 
Both the studies by Bohlmann and van Heerden (2008), and Mabugu and Mohamed 
(2008) unfortunately offered only very superficial and brief analyses of the effects of the 
event that are not explicitly economic. Therefore, neither supplies a definitive conclusion 
as to the merits of hosting the World Cup. The shortcoming cannot be regarded as a 
criticism of either study as it is apparent that addressing intangible factors associated with 
the event were not objectives. Mabugu and Mohamed (2008: 23) admitted that a more 
comprehensive analysis would require that other “social and environmental costs 
associated with the event would also need to be studied and quantified.” In terms of the 
predicted effects on economic variables such as exports, consumption and prices the 
results derived in both studies are qualitatively similar, however the respective 
magnitudes of the predicted net economic impact and changes in economic variables are 
significantly divergent.  
 
Grant Thornton (2003) did not address the effects on other economic variables, and 
derived a final net economic impact assessment that differed greatly from the other 
studies. The conservative estimate of the impact on GDP calculated by Grant Thornton 
(2003) is greater than the most ambitious estimate by Bohlmann and van Heerden (2008) 
and far higher than that by Mabugu and Mohamed (2008). The method employed, the 
CGE, and the attention to detail presented by Bohlmann and van Heerden (2008) make it 
the most reliable and valuable input into an analysis of the total impact of the World Cup 
on South Africa, that would include both tangible and intangible benefits. 
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CHAPTER 5: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR 2010 FIFA WORLD CUP 
 
Chapter 5 endeavours to conduct a Cost-Benefit Analysis for the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
based on the general approach outlined in Chapter 3, with adjustments to the process 
founded on the unique characteristics of mega-events. According to Dwyer et al. (2005: 
357) when considering hosting an event a “cost-benefit analysis of it should be 
undertaken in order to assess all the costs and benefits, and the impact on the broader 
economy.” The steps outlined by Bellas and Zerbe (2006: 3-5) will be used as a broad 
guide for the ensuing CBA. The relevant steps will be followed where applicable. The 
flexibility of the CBA process makes it the preferable means for dissecting 2010 as a 
public policy.  I-O Analysis and CGE Models can both only be used to estimate the 
purely economic impact of an event. Neither method can provide a definitive answer as 
to whether hosting an event can be regarded as a prudent public policy as both ignore 
intangible effects. The option of CGE or I-O based study was however largely rejected on 
the grounds of their invariable inaccuracy as detailed in Chapter 2. Such a study would 
therefore add little to the understanding of the economic impact of the event. This study 
will therefore focus on an analysis of the determinants of the economic impact of 2010. 
 
The analysis is conducted within the context of the theoretical background, and with 
reference to the likely effects of the World Cup as understood in terms of the impacts of 
previous mega-events. The analysis includes the reductions in the multiplier effect, as 
well as other factors contributing to either the total costs or benefits of staging. The issue 
of displaced spending is not addressed directly as it is a common theme that arises 
regularly in discussion of the other factors. Thus, the objective is to critically analyse 
each factor, and make an assumption regarding its probable role in determining the final 
net economic and/or intangible impact of 2010. Where feasible, the factors will be 
quantified. Alternatively, qualitative conclusions will be drawn on the basis of the 
substance of each factor and the line of reasoning developed. Finally, the cumulative 
costs and benefits will be weighed against each other in order to ascertain the probable 
net impact of 2010.  
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5.1. Merchandising, Sponsorship and Concessions  
 
FIFA relies on the staging of the World Cup to generate enough profit in order to sustain 
the operations of the organisation during the years between the events. As a result of the 
2006 World Cup staged in Germany the organisation “earned a profit of some €1.4 
billion” (Du Plessis and Maennig, 2007: 3). In order to make a profit via the event, FIFA 
retains very strict controls over all merchandising, sponsorship and concessions. The 
restrictions for the 2010 World Cup are governed by the basic principle that: “No third 
party, which has not been authorised by FIFA, may...do anything which gives rise to any 
association between such third parties and the Competition” (FIFA, 2008: 4). FIFA has 
maintained that stringent enforcement of marketing rules is necessary as the World Cup 
is a privately funded event that needs the contribution from sponsors to ensure that it can 
be staged. Sponsors would not be willing to agree to sponsorship deals if they could not 
be assured of exclusive rights to associate with the World Cup and use the event‟s 
Official Marks (FIFA, 2007a: 3). While FIFA cannot claim ownership of the game of 
football, it does own the World Cup as an event and as such has full rights to govern the 
event as it deems appropriate. There is thus no onus on FIFA to ensure that the World 
Cup confers a net economic benefit on the host. The host nation must adhere to FIFA‟s 
rules and regulations which are set such that the economic benefits associated with the 
event are conferred to FIFA. The rules that control merchandising, sponsorship and 
concessions systematically undermine the opportunities for South African individuals and 
firms to make a profit from direct association with the tournament.  
 
The profit making activities for FIFA start during the bidding process by prospective 
hosts. Du Plessis and Maennig (2007: 2-3) argued that FIFA are able to maximise profits 
from the event in the same way that a monopolist does when facing a group of bidders in 
a competitive auction; FIFA and the host actually “sign a contract that regulates the flow 
of benefits associated with the tournament.” In the case of the 2010 World Cup, FIFA 
and the South African Football Association (SAFA) agreed to honour the terms that are 
set out in the Organising Association Agreement. The document outlines a variety of 
conditions which South Africa must accept, should the nation decide to host the World 
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Cup (Government Gazette, 2006: 2). Since many nations actively pursue the event, the 
eventual host can suffer from the “winner‟s curse” whereby the winning bidder in a 
competitive auction over pays for the product in demand (Chang and Moore, 2008: 257), 
in that the profit making capacity of the event has been ceded to the sport‟s governing 
body.  
 
The 2010 FIFA World Cup Special Measures Act was “designed to give effect to the 
guarantees that government has given to FIFA in terms of venues, access control, 
logistical support, ambush marketing and how FIFA‟s corporate partners would operate 
in South Africa” (Matarirano, 2007). The Bill generally relates to the South African 
government‟s responsibilities and duties in hosting the event. FIFA (2008: 6) maintained 
that it is the host nation‟s responsibility to ensure that no third party “develops, uses, 
registers, adopts, or creates, any mark, logo or symbol which refers to the Competition or 
any phase of the Competition.” Therefore, in order to defend FIFA‟s property rights for 
2010, in addition to the general laws applicable and the Bill, the protection of the World 
Cup‟s Official Marks are supplemented by specific statutory provisions enacted for the 
event: 
 The Trade Practices Act (Section 9d) 
 Merchandise Marks Act number 17 of 1941 (amended Section 15) 
 Merchandise Marks Act number 17 of 1941 (amended Section 15a) 
The legislation collectively governs the use of „FIFA‟s Official Marks;‟ where the term 
refers to: the Official Mascot, Official Logo, Official Poster, The FIFA World Cup 
Trophy, the Fifa.com logo and the trademarked Terms. The extreme lengths to which 
FIFA goes to preserve its property rights is evident in list of Terms: 
 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa 
 2010 FIFA World Cup 
 FIFA World Cup 
 World Cup 
 2010 World Cup 
 World Cup 2010 
 South Africa 2010 
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 SA 2010 
 ZA 2010 
 2010 South Africa 
 Football World Cup 
 Soccer World Cup 
 Or any derivations or combinations thereof. 
No corporate or commercial association with any of the above Terms is allowed, nor are 
any “confusingly similar variations and modifications” permissible (FIFA, 2007a: 6). The 
purpose of these constraints is to ensure that businesses and businesspersons cannot 
intentionally deceive the public into believing that their products are legitimately 
associated with FIFA and the event and therefore seek to undermine any entity‟s ability 
to “ambush FIFA‟s event for their own financial gain” (Matarirano, 2007).   
 
As a consequence of FIFA‟s rules and regulations, it is clear that there will be very few 
opportunities for domestic producers in the clothing and apparel industry to capitalise 
upon the World Cup. It may have been expected that the massive merchandising 
campaign which accompanies the World Cup would benefit domestic producers and 
retailers as they would be awarded tenders to produce official merchandise for the event. 
Sales of shirts, flags, scarves, caps, replica jerseys and other soccer related paraphernalia 
would be expected to generate extra profits for the industry, however FIFA is in a 
licensing agreement with the firm Global Brands, which is responsible for co-ordinating 
its global merchandising operations (FIFA, 2007b). Global Brands sub-contracted the 
production of merchandising goods at the lowest cost to producers in China who have 
been favoured for production of World Cup related merchandise (Weekend Post, 2006: 
6). For example, Global Brands agreed a deal with Cape Town based firm Captivity 
Headwear to distribute official 2010 FIFA World Cup licensed caps, hats, beanies, and 
other headwear products. The products however will be manufactured by Mainland 
Holdings Headwear from Hong Kong (Global License, 2007). On sale of the merchandise 
the majority of profits made on the transaction will then be repatriated out of South 
Africa, and will reduce economic activity domestically as opposed to increasing it, had 
production occurred locally. Crompton (2006: 75) argued that if “the goods were 
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manufactured outside the community, their cost immediately leaks out of the local 
economy” and should not be considered to be new money that is injected into the 
economy. Edgars Consolidated Stores was awarded the rights to operate the official 
tournament stores, which will be located within 160 branches of Edgars throughout the 
country (FIFA, 2007b). Again, while Edgars will benefit from the rights, the vast 
majority of gains from merchandising for the event will accrue to foreign manufacturers.  
 
There are however marketing opportunities for South Africa‟s largest corporations, those 
which can afford to become official sponsors. FIFA are expected to earn US$3.1bn in 
corporate sponsorship and broadcasting rights from the World Cup in 2010 (South 
Africa.info, 2006a). The majority of sponsorship which the organisation receives comes 
from international corporations. FIFA partners are entities which receive “the most 
comprehensive package of global advertising, promotional and marketing rights in 
relation to FIFA... (and) are entitled to the highest available level of commercial 
association with FIFA” (FIFA, 2008: 18). They are the top level of sponsors and include 
Adidas, Coca-Cola, Emirates Airlines, Hyundai-Kia Motors, Sony, and Visa, which each 
paid approximately $300m for an 8 year contract (Financial Mail, 2006a: 24). World Cup 
Sponsors are the second tier sponsors and receive “the second most comprehensive 
package of global advertising, promotional and marketing rights in relation to the FIFA 
World Cups and the FIFA Confederations Cups” (FIFA, 2008: 18). The six 2010 
sponsors, are Budweiser, Castrol, Continental, McDonalds, MTN and Satyam (FIFA, 
2009a). In terms of official sponsorship by South African corporations, only 
telecommunications firm MTN secured a position as a FIFA World Cup Sponsor. It is 
however a significant achievement as it is the first African corporation to be a FIFA 
World Cup Sponsor, having paid $65m to the Swiss-based organisation for the rights 
(MTN, 2007). MTN will receive significant international publicity for their brand.  
 
The National Supporters are third-level sponsors for the World Cup. It was initially 
expected that there would be 6 South African corporate sponsors (South Africa.info, 
2006a). However, by late 2009 only 5 corporations had agreed terms with FIFA, which is 
possibly due to the high cost of obtaining National Supporters status. First National Bank, 
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Telkom, BP, Prasa and Neo Africa have been given status as National Supporters (FIFA, 
2009a), which is “any entity which is granted a package of advertising, promotional and 
marketing rights in relation to any single football competition organized by, or under the 
auspices of FIFA, such rights to be exercisable only in the host territory of the relevant 
competition” (FIFA, 2008: 19). First National Bank (2006) secured its sponsorship 
position at a cost of $30m while Telkom paid $36m to FIFA for their sponsorship deal 
(South Africa.info, 2007c). While each corporation will receive international exposure, 
their payments to FIFA will actually constitute a leak from the South African economy 
and a decline in GDP. Assuming an average sponsorship cost of $30m by the National 
Supporters, in addition to the $65m paid by MTN, the total paid by the six sponsoring 
firms to FIFA is around $215m, equivalent to around R1.6bn.
11
 Had similar expenditures 
been made for sponsorship to domestic organisations by FNB and Telkom, the funds 
would have been re-circulated throughout the economy, and which would have enhanced 
economic activity domestically, in contrast to the Grant Thornton (2003: 1) assumption 
that sponsorship investment by domestic companies would lead to greater domestic GDP.  
 
While it can be expected that the advertising within the stadia for the World Cup will 
only feature the brands of the official sponsors, it has transpired that the monopoly on 
advertising will extend beyond the confines of the stadia during 2010. In Germany in 
2006, all advertising within a one kilometre radius of the stadia and along all major 
access roads, was restricted to official FIFA sponsor enterprises, with all profits 
channelled to FIFA (Du Plessis and Maennig, 2007: 3). The restrictions will be extended 
in 2010, as companies that are not official FIFA sponsors may not advertise on billboards 
on „protocol routes‟ for 15 days before the World Cup, during it, and from 5 days 
afterwards. The „protocol routes‟ refer to all roads between airports, team hotels and 
stadia (Times, 2009e). 
 
With regards the provision of concessions at World Cup fixtures, South African 
companies that could not secure direct sponsorship deals with FIFA can have no 
affiliation with the event whatsoever (Financial Mail, 2006a: 24). The supply of alcoholic 
                                                          
11
 Using a Rand-US Dollar exchange rate of R7.5 per $; $215 x 7.5 = R1 612.5m  
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beverages is a good example of how only official FIFA sponsors will benefit from the 
sale of concessions in the stadia during World Cup fixtures. Given that as a part South 
Africa‟s bid to host the World Cup, the Organising Committee agreed that it would 
introduce legislation that would remove any obstacles that may hinder implementation of 
FIFA‟s rules and regulations (Matarirano, 2007), the Bill had to make special provisions 
for the supply of liquor by FIFA‟s commercial affiliates who have the exclusive rights 
for: 
 marketing of liquor at a stadium or venue; 
 distribution of liquor at a stadium or venue; 
 consumption of liquor at a stadium or venue; and 
 advertisement of liquor during the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa 
(Government Gazette, 2006: 4-5). 
 
That Budweiser is a FIFA World Cup Sponsor, only beer produced by the corporation 
will be on sale at stadiums and venues during the World Cup fixtures (South Africa.info, 
2005). Budweiser has a complete “monopoly over the marketing, distribution, 
consumption and advertisement of liquor at all the stadia and media in association with 
FIFA” (Matarirano, 2007). Further, in Germany for the 2006 FIFA World Cup, host cities 
were required to set up closed-in fan parks for spectators to watch the fixtures, where the 
same advertising conditions and restrictions on the supply of concessions were enforced 
(Du Plessis and Maennig, 2007: 3). The “situation led to substantial protests from 
German companies particularly as the bid for the Cup was partly justified by the 
supposed economic benefits it would bring to Germany and host cities” (Hall, 2006: 61). 
Again, it can be expected that similar circumstances will prevail in 2010. Thus, in spite of 
the claims by boosters of the event that the Cup would stimulate the growth of various 
industries, it is still a FIFA sanctioned event and therefore has to adhere to the 
fundamental restrictions that are imposed. Significantly, the revenue that is generated 
from these sales will be repatriated. Expenditure by domestic individuals on concessions 
that are provided by international corporations will result in a leak of resources from the 
domestic economy. The leak from the domestic economy should significant as at the 
2006 World Cup, Budweiser sold some 3.5m litres of beer (Arendse, 2009).  
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In an effort to quantify the leak of resources due to merchandising and concessions, 
assumptions need to be made regarding World Cup spectators spending while attending 
fixtures; that is, the spending by South Africans. Given that there are approximately 3.7m 
tickets available for World Cup fixtures
12
 and that Grant Thornton (2003) predicted that 
67% of tickets will be sold to domestic spectators, 2.45m tickets should be bought by 
South Africans. Further, assume that each spectator spends R75 on concessions, and that 
one out of every two spectator spends R150 on World Cup merchandising, the total 
expenditure by South African‟s at fixtures alone is in the region of R550m, as is evident 
in the table below. The loss of resources from the domestic economy is understated here, 
as the scenario does not account for merchandising purchases by South Africans who do 
not attend specific fixtures. 
 
Table 4. Total Spending by domestic spectators at World Cup fixtures. 
 
Spending per 
Spectator (R) 
Total Spending by South African 
Spectators (Rm) 
Concessions 75 183.8 
Merchandising 150 367.7 
Total 225 551.5 
 
Briefly, another example of the domestic firms being sidelined during 2010 relates to the 
use of London-based „Match Event Services‟ as FIFA‟s official accommodation provider. 
According to the Sunday Times (2009b), Match will book around 55 000 hotel rooms 
around South Africa during the World Cup. Local hotels and guesthouses need to be 
accredited with Match in order to „officially‟ sell accommodation to 2010 guests. The 
foreign firm is then expected to add a 30% mark up, and sell the rooms to foreigners. 
Match purchases rooms at 2007 prices with a 16% increase for inflation (Sunday Times, 
2009b). Critically, it prevents locals from charging higher prices themselves, hence 
additional profit from staging the tournament will enjoyed by the foreign firm.  
 
                                                          
12
 See Appendix A for calculations. 
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Therefore, as has become quite apparent, the opportunities for South African firms to 
derive economic benefits from merchandising, sponsorship and concessions are minimal, 
and those that are available are primarily restricted to the nation‟s largest corporations. 
Only six South African corporations will receive significant international exposure during 
the event through their sponsorship agreements with FIFA.  
 
5.2. Labour and Capital Markets 
 
As was explained in Chapter 3, the host nation or city for an international event may not 
realise the maximum benefits in labour and capital markets as a result of feedback 
effects. The effects occur in the form of higher wages due to increased demand, an 
increased domestic use of foreign resources and the occurrence of transitory and not 
structural employment increases. The host should however also experience positive 
effects in labour and capital markets due to the event, such as an increase in the demand 
for short-term labour and the transfer of human capital.  
 
A concern for developing nations that seek to host mega-events relates to the possibility 
that the requisite technical expertise may not be readily available domestically. If such a 
scenario materialises, resources and labour will have to be taken either from other sectors 
in the economy or will be imported from abroad (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1090). 
Neither option will contribute towards economic growth domestically. If labour is 
diverted from other national projects, the net effect will be ambiguous, depending on 
which operation yields greater profitability. Should it be required that organisers 
outsource certain functions to foreign individuals and companies who can perform highly 
specialized roles in the production of the World Cup, then the net economic impact of the 
event will be diminished. Foreign employees will repatriate their income, which 
constitutes a leak of resources from the domestic economy. It is therefore necessary to 
account for the use of foreign labour when conducting an economic impact study for 
2010. For the organisers of an international event, use of foreign resources should be 
minimised wherever possible. However, the decision to favour local producers and 
service providers does come at a premium to foreign alternatives.  
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As a developing nation South Africa apparently does not have all of the requisite 
expertise to host the World Cup; “the head of the National Treasury's 2010 unit, Malcolm 
Simpson, said there was also concern over the shortage of skills needed to implement key 
infrastructure projects in the country, including the stadium projects” (South Africa.info, 
2007b). Simpson went on the point out that since there are only 6 firms that dominate the 
South African construction sector, it would be necessary to allow foreign firms to tender 
for the construction of stadia and infrastructure as costs could be brought down.   
 
The Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban is characterised by the use of foreign firms in its 
construction. eThekwini municipal manager Mike Sutcliffe declared that the winning 
tender had come from the Ibhola Lethu consortium which “had a strong black 
empowerment contingent as well as a German connection” (South Africa.info, 2006b) in 
the two lead consultants, structural engineering firm Schlaich, Bergermann & Partners, 
and architectural and engineering firm von Gerken, Marg and Partners International 
(eThekwini Online, 2006). Even though the tender was awarded to a locally based 
consortium, that there is a heavy foreign contingent means that there will be significant 
outflow of resources from the domestic economy. Had the South African government 
paid local firms to perform the services, the payments would induce further rounds of 
spending in the domestic economy. Schlaich, Bergermann & Partners (2009) are also 
partners in the consortiums that are developing Soccer City in Johannesburg, the Green 
Point Stadium in Cape Town and the Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium in Port Elizabeth. 
Thus it is evident that South Africa‟s lack of some essential skills could detrimentally 
reduce the positive economic consequence of the event. Significantly, failure to recognise 
the presence of the foreign labour can distort the results of studies which seek to calculate 
the economic implications of the event.  
 
In addition to the construction projects, the international television feed has been 
outsourced to Host Broadcasting Services (HBS) in partnership with local South African 
firms. HBS have the exclusive FIFA rights to produce both the radio and television feeds 
internationally. HBS will also develop the International Broadcast Centre (IBC), the hub 
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out of which broadcasters and journalists from around the world will be operating 
throughout the event (Financial Mail, 2006a: 27). According to HBS (2009a), the 
broadcast of the event “is implemented by HBS' own team of experts; alternatively 
through short-term joint ventures with other service providers.” HBS guarantee that they 
have the “resources and experience to deliver „best ever‟ host coverage, in terms of 
quality, versatility and reliability.” The South African operations of the Swiss-based HBS 
would benefit local production companies that have the opportunity to work alongside 
them as locals will be exposed to HBS‟ knowledge and ability. HBS undertook to recruit 
and train 400 interns to assist with the production of the World Cup and the 2009 
Confederations Cup (Sowetan, 2009a). HBS stated that the interns will gain experience in 
and exposure to “pre-broadcasting, event management, sports production and post-
production” (Volksblad, 2008). The human capital gains made here would be used 
elsewhere in the industry, and contribute to greater efficiency and technical know-how. 
HBS performed the same functional role at the previous two World Cups in Germany and 
Japan-South Korea (HBS, 2009b). Therefore, whether South Africa has the capacity to 
perform HBS‟ role at 2010 is irrelevant; another case of the tight control which FIFA 
maintains over the event. 
 
A policy that is employed by FIFA and the LOC in order to keep costs of staging the 
event down is the use of 15 000 volunteers to facilitate the efficient running of the Cup 
(FIFA, 2009b). Nonetheless, volunteer training is estimated to cost R25m (Financial Mail 
Campus, 2009: 6). Hence, the amount of new employment that is expected to occur 
during the event will be less than might initially be predicted as much labour related to 
the event is actually uncompensated. Volunteers will perform a wide variety of functions, 
such as providing assistance for tasks such as accreditation, marketing, media services, 
welcoming and ushering spectators. Multilingual volunteers will be required to perform 
translator functions. In addition, logistical and administrative matters including 
transportation, information technology and telecommunications will be facilitated by 
volunteers (SAPA, 2009d). While these individuals will be a highly visible reminder of 
the South African public‟s active contribution to the tournament, their presence should 
not be associated with the World Cup generating employment in the country. The 
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volunteers will however add to their skill sets and gain valuable experience in the sector 
in which they offer their services. 
 
In terms of additional compensated employment during the tournament, labour 
opportunities will be short-term in nature and exist largely only while the event is taking 
place. As the issue of crime is of particular concern for organisers and patrons of the 
competition, measures have been planned by the LOC to minimise the risk faced by 
visitors to South Africa. As such an extra 41 000 policemen will be on duty around the 
country during the event (Times, 2008). Of these, 10 000 will be police reservists, while 
the remainder will be operational police officers (South Africa.info, 2008b). Therefore, 
Crompton‟s (2004: 74) argument that the hours of labour will increase, but the actual 
employment figures are unlikely to improve during the event appears justified. The 
hypothesis makes practical sense; it is inefficient to train additional police officers in 
order to satisfy increased demand that will initially only last for one month during the 
event. Should the World Cup stimulate long-term increased tourism, then further training 
of police officers may be warranted. While there will be greater numbers of policemen on 
duty during the Cup, the majority do not constitute increases in employment numbers. 
However, the additional compensation that they receive will be circulated throughout the 
domestic economy, and is a positive outcome of South Africa hosting the event.  
 
The World Cup will also have positive effects on the development of human capital 
within the South Africa Police Services (SAPS), as they received guidance from the 
United States of America‟s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on how to deal with 
money laundering and terrorism that could accompany the event (South Africa.info, 
2007d). Further, French police services have trained the SAPS in methods of crowd 
control, having gained experience in the field during the 1998 World Cup that the nation 
hosted (South Africa.info, 2009). An estimated total of R1.3bn will be spent on safety 
and security measures and preparations for 2010 (Financial Mail Campus, 2009: 6), 
which is an increase from the 2006 projection of R666m (Mabugu and Mohamed, 2008: 
7).  
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The method used by the SAPS to cope with the increased demand for services during the 
tournament is one that will likely be replicated by other businesses who are cautious 
about investing too heavily in an event that lasts only one month. The observation 
suggests that it should not be expected that significant increases in employment will 
occur during the event. However, to posit ideas about the labour requirements of the 
nation‟s small and medium sized businesses would be pure speculation. For example, the 
decision by a curio shop owner to extend business hours during the World Cup and the 
choice to employ additional labour or not is specific to the situation faced by the owner. 
The decision is, amongst other factors, a function of the skills required to perform the 
tasks. Employers who require unskilled labour that does not require intensive training 
will be more inclined to hire additional labour, augmenting temporary employment in the 
region. The more skilled the labour, the more likely that current employees will simply 
work longer hours as needed. Therefore, the cumulative effect on the labour market is not 
easily quantified. The problem is compounded by the expectation that South Africa will 
endure an influx of migrant workers from neighbouring countries during 2010 (SAPA, 
2009g), who may take up employment opportunities that would ordinarily go to locals. 
 
The LOC “has estimated that the World Cup will create 415,000 jobs in South Africa” 
(SAPA, 2009g). With five new stadiums being built for 2010, the construction industry is 
thought to be a prominent source of increased employment as the various projects would 
increase demand for labour. Dwyer et al. (2006) and, Baade and Matheson (2003) 
predicted that the increased demand for labour would raise the wage rate and as such, 
little or no increase in employment would arise due to a mega-event. In July of 2009 
construction workers at World Cup stadia was halted as a consequence of pay disputes 
between construction workers and employers. Some 70 000 workers went on strike for 
one week demanding a 13% pay increase. The National Union of Mine Workers (which 
represents construction workers) and employers agreed on a 12% rise, and the strike 
abated. The strike was not specific to World Cup venues; it spread to other infrastructural 
developments, such as the Coega Project, King Shaka International Airport and the 
Gautrain (SAPA, 2009e). It was not the first strike to occur on the 2010 stadia; in 
November 2007 a similar situation transpired (Cape Argus, 2007b). As labour becomes 
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more expensive, employers substitute away from labour to capital which has become 
cheaper relative to labour (Bohlmann and van Heerden, 2008: 391), which is detrimental 
to construction workers who are predominantly temporary employees (Sowetan, 2009b) 
and are only paid on a basis of the hours worked (SAPA, 2009f). Demand for temporary 
labour is therefore elastic even in the short-term, and employers are free to move between 
different allocations of labour and capital.  
 
Given the factors which affect the demand for labour, the number of workers employed 
on projects directly related to 2010 is largely insignificant in the national context. For 
example, two of the largest projects, the construction of Soccer City and the Green Point 
Stadium only employ approximately 1600 (Mail and Guardian, 2007b) and 1200 workers 
respectively (Cape Argus, 2007b). If each one of the five new stadia employed 1600 
workers, and the five being re-developed half that number, the total employed on 
construction would approximate 12 000. The assumptions used in calculating the figure 
are quite liberal; since only 400 workers were employed for the upgrades performed at 
the Free State Stadium in Bloemfontein (BuaNews, 2008). During the first quarter of 
2009, there were 1 126 000 people employed in the construction industry, which is the 6
th
 
largest sector by employment in South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2009a: VI). 
Therefore, construction directly related to the World Cup only contributes towards 
approximately 1% of employment in the industry. The Financial Mail Campus (2009: 7) 
claimed that 20 000 workers were employed for construction of the stadia, which still 
only equates to 1.8% of the total industry employment. Other construction projects that 
have been tenuously linked to the World Cup, such as the Gautrain have not been 
included, as such infrastructural developments would have been undertaken regardless of 
whether South Africa had hosted the World Cup or not. The issue of investment in 
infrastructure will be addressed in further depth during the chapter. Even with the 
optimistic assumptions used here, it is evident that the World Cup is not the generator of 
employment opportunities that some purport it to be. While minimal increases in labour 
force participation will be experienced during, and in the build up to the World Cup, the 
effects will be principally limited to re-distribution of wealth as opposed to increasing 
GDP. The issue of displaced spending is again relevant. Expenditure on government 
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sponsored construction projects related to the Cup is simply a shift in expenditure, and 
does not serve to enhance GDP in the short-run. It is important to note that government 
spending on the World Cup means that another opportunity has been forgone, so where 
labour has been created for the event, other labour opportunities have been eliminated.  
 
Even though the situations described only provide short-term labour, it should not be seen 
as a failing of the event, rather it is what would be expected of an occasion of this nature. 
That the event increased employment at all is beneficial, even if it is only short-term, 
expectations of immediate increases in long-term employment are not justified. Criticism 
for failing to significantly aid employment levels should fall upon government officials 
who chose to pursue the World Cup as a public policy, since other projects may have had 
the capacity for greater increases in employment and economic growth. The value of 
2010 as a public policy will be addressed at the end of the chapter.  
 
It is appropriate to focus on the structural and not the transient effects of the event; the 
transient being the short-term labour, and the structural referring to the long-term impact 
on labour and capital markets. The most prominent labour and capital market effects of 
World Cup will not occur in the build up to or during the event, but rather as a result of 
the event‟s efficacy in stimulating FDI and tourism in the country, above levels that 
would have ordinarily occurred had the event not taken place. A greater focus will be 
given to the relationships between 2010 and growth in FDI and tourism later in the 
chapter. Hence, short-term economic impact studies cannot encapsulate the most 
important implications of the event on labour and capital markets.  
 
5.3. Sustainability of Stadia 
 
Studies of the economic impact of mega-events are characterised by discussion of the 
sustainability of the stadia that have been developed expressly for the occasion (Ap and 
Zhou, 2009; Bass and Pillay, 2008; Bohlmann and van Heerden, 2008; Gursoy and 
Kendall, 2006). Investment in facilities specific to the mega-event being prepared for, 
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often result in the development of „white elephant13‟ stadia that thrive during the event, 
but afterwards prove too large and impractical for regular usage. The issue is of particular 
relevance for members of the public who are concerned that facilities will “end up 
costing considerably more than they are worth to maintain as happened most notoriously 
in Montreal in 1976, but also in Atlanta, Sydney and Athens (Olympic Games)” (Horne, 
2007: 91). Cornelissen et al. (2008: 66) observed that “without careful strategic planning, 
major infrastructure developments may become „white elephants‟ after the hosting of the 
event.” Existence of such burdens will undermine the positive legacy of an event. 
Therefore in developing facilities for mega-events there needs to be a significant focus on 
determining what the purpose of facilities will be after the event. The issue is especially 
relevant to the 2010 World Cup context. For example, the Nelson Mandela Stadium in 
Port Elizabeth will be required to generate R20m in revenues per annum in order to be 
self-sufficient and not become a burden on local tax payers (Herald, 2009b). Cognisant of 
the risk in sustaining stadia, the LOC (2008: 20) rather optimistically assured the public 
that “(i)ntensive planning has gone into ensuring that the stadiums will be versatile, 
multipurpose facilities that will not only serve a variety of sports codes, but will also be 
suitable for entertainment and other community uses following the FIFA World Cup.” 
 
With regards to football, there has been a growing trend of hosting tournaments in 
countries that are not traditional footballing powers in an effort to spread the game 
around the world. The practice can result in the new developments directly related to 
hosting being unsustainable post the event. Football‟s European Championships for the 
continent‟s top sixteen nations was held in Portugal in 2004, jointly held by Austria and 
Switzerland in 2008, and will be hosted by both Ukraine and Poland in 2012 (Union of 
European Football Associations, 2009). As emerging football forces the host nation‟s 
domestic leagues are not popular, commercial or competitive enough to sustain a variety 
of new stadia built solely for the European Championships. For example, a new stadium 
with a capacity of 30 000, was built in the Portuguese town of Braga, which was 
completely inappropriate to be the home stadium of a team, which at the time of 
                                                          
13
 The phrase „white elephant‟ is alleged to have derived from the practice of the King of Siam (modern 
Thailand) whereby he would give elephants to his rivals. Since the elephants fulfilled only symbolic 
purposes, the cost of maintaining the animal was more than they were worth (Horne, 2007: 94). 
70 
 
construction drew an average attendance of 5 000 in the Portuguese League (Economist, 
2004: 28). The maintenance costs of such a stadium are beyond the means of its 
incumbent. The problem is not specific to the European Championships; Japanese stadia 
built for the 2002 World Cup have become redundant. Horne and Manzenreiter (2004: 
190) maintained that a full account of the cost of hosting the World Cup “must include 
the US$ 4.6 billion investment Japan spent on ten state-of-the-art stadia, as well as the 
huge costs of maintaining the prestigious yet mainly useless „white elephants‟ with 
capacities exceeding average J League
14
 spectator demand by more than 100 percent.” 
Actually, some stadia in Japan and South Korea had to be demolished due to under-
utilisation (Bohlmann, 2006: 20). The existence of „white elephant‟ stadia is not however 
a uniform consequence of hosting.  The construction of the Allianz Arena in Munich for 
the 2006 World Cup in Germany is an example that investment in stadia can be 
productive if the broader footballing infrastructure exists in the nation. The €340m 
investment, which has a capacity of 69 900 is now the home venue of Bayern Munich 
(Allianz-Arena, 2009), one of the world‟s largest and most successful club teams, which 
plays in the Bundesliga.
15
 However, if the domestic football scene cannot sustain the new 
venues, the development of multi-purpose facilities that can be used for a variety of 
sporting occasions is also an option.  
 
The issue of sustainability is certainly a concern with regards to the stadia constructed for 
2010. The Premier Soccer League (PSL), South Africa‟s highest professional football 
league, is similar to the smaller European leagues such as the Portuguese League in that 
attendances at games are not proportionate to the stadia within which the games will be 
played. The problem of sustainability is an issue that should be expected in a developing 
nation without a strong commercial football culture. Without reference to the populace‟s 
passion for football, there is simply not as much money involved in the domestic game as 
opposed to the larger European Leagues where expensive stadia can be maintained by the 
national leagues. As an example, in 2006 the average salary for a player in the English 
Premier League was £676 000 per year (Independent, 2006). In contrast, the average 
                                                          
14
 The J-League is the top tier of Japanese league football. 
15
 The Bundesliga is the top tier of German league football. 
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annual wage in 2008 in the PSL was £12 840 (BBC, 2008a). Therefore, it is naive to 
make such large investments into stadia in a nation where the domestic competition 
cannot support the infrastructure. 
 
The Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban has a capacity of 70 000 (Government 
Communication and Information System, 2008: 3)
 16
 and was constructed specifically for 
the World Cup, but its function after the event is ambiguous. There are two Durban based 
teams that currently participate in the PSL, AmaZulu and Golden Arrows, whose average 
attendances at homes games during 2008 were 6 000 and 10 250 respectively (PSL, 
2008). It is thus quite patent that neither of these two franchises could possibly be the 
resident team in the stadium. Alternatively, the Durban-based rugby team, the Natal 
Sharks, may move across the road from their current home venue, the 52 000-seater Absa 
Stadium to the Moses Mabhida Stadium (eThekwini Online, 2009). However, the 
potential change in home for The Sharks has been a contentious issue. Jordaan has stated 
that the decision to “demolish the Boet Erasmus stadium in Port Elizabeth had already 
been taken and that both Newlands
17
 and the Absa stadium in Durban would share the 
same fate in time” (Cape Times, 2009a). Jordaan went on to say that had South Africa 
won the bid to host the Rugby World Cup in 2015, fixtures would be held at the new 
stadiums. Unfortunately, the bid has subsequently been awarded to England (Mail and 
Guardian, 2009a). Jordaan has also declared that stadiums “have a life cycle of between 
50 and 70 years... Some of the rugby stadiums are coming to the end of their cycles” 
(BBC, 2009a). Sharks Rugby CEO Brian van Zyl responded to suggestions that the 
Sharks would move out of the Absa Stadium by declaring that the “first section of our 
stadium was built in 1995 and since then there have been major renovations. Jordaan's 
opinion of Absa (Stadium) is subjective” and that it was an emotive issue because the 
stadium is a part of the culture and heritage of Sharks Rugby (Cape Times, 2009a). 
Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000: 95) suggested that “sports facilities seem to exhibit a 
useful economic life of around 30 years,” in which case the Absa Stadium is yet to reach 
the half way point in its life cycle. Hence, the identity of the future resident sporting 
                                                          
16
 The Government Communication and Information System will be referred to as the „GCIS‟ for the 
remainder of the paper. 
17
 Newlands Stadium, in Cape Town, is the home of the Western Province Rugby Union. 
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franchise in the Moses Mabhida Stadium is very uncertain, a situation which prompts 
some to believe that in “South Africa the scope for post-tournament usage of the new 
large stadia seems modest” (Du Plessis and Maennig, 2007: 12).  
 
Irrespective of the uncertainty regarding regular sporting events at the Moses Mabhida 
Stadium, it is not the objective of project organisers for the venue to be a single code 
sporting facility, but rather a multi-function events facility that can attract visitors all year 
round. According to Julie-May Ellingson who is in charge of the eThekwini 
Municipality's Strategic Projects Unit and 2010 Programme, the complex has over 7 200 
square meters of retail space, a conference centre, 160 hospitality boxes, and is “intended 
to serve a multitude of functions including rugby and football matches, motor-cross 
events, athletics competitions, as well as serve as a concert and special events venue” 
(BuaNews, 2008a). In addition, there is a cable car which will rise to a viewing platform 
at the top of the 350m arch from where visitors can experience panoramic views of the 
stadium, Durban city and the Indian Ocean (FIFA, 2009c). 
 
Cornelissen et al. (2008: 37) warned that the “use and refurbishment of existing facilities 
is perhaps a more guaranteed way of avoiding white elephants.” Such a policy may have 
been more prudent with regards to the construction of the Moses Mabhida Stadium. 
Similarly, the upgrades could have been made to Newlands Stadium in Cape Town, as 
opposed to the newly developed Green Point Stadium. In trying to comprehend why the 
decision was made to build new, as opposed to re-develop current stadia to meet FIFA 
requirements, economists Du Plessis and Maennig (2007: 19) formulated an interesting, 
yet speculative argument that irrespective of the economic sustainability of a stadium 
itself, it can offer far more significant long-term effects. By creating “an architectural 
legacy with lasting positive impact... Iconic buildings provide an aesthetic focal point for 
a city and could become a springboard for other urban developments and recreational 
facilities.” Hence, the stadia may stimulate urban regeneration in the areas in which they 
are built and do not necessarily need to be self-sufficient if they can uplift the greater 
environment that surrounds them. Du Plessis and Maennig (2007: 19) quite curiously 
posited that the striking architecture of the Moses Mabhida Stadium may aid Durban in 
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“getting (it‟s) name on the world map” in a similar manner that the Sydney Opera House 
aided the Australian city.  
 
While there are opportunities for the Moses Mabhida Stadium to be used post-2010, 
Jordaan has admitted that he has concerns regarding the sustainability of two of the new 
stadiums, specifically the Peter Mokaba Stadium in Polokwane and the Mbombela 
Stadium in Nelspruit (BBC, 2009a), since for the 2009/10 PSL season there are no teams 
based in either of the cities (PSL, 2009). Each of the stadia will only host four group 
stage games during the World Cup (FIFA, 2009d: 7), and according to the National 
Treasury, in 2006 the Mbombela and the Peter Mokaba had budgets of R885m and 
R679m respectively (Mabugu and Mohamed, 2008: 8). Hence, the long-term fates of the 
stadia are rather uncertain. The LOC may be criticised for making such developments in 
areas where long-term sustainability may be problematic. However, it could be argued 
that investment in smaller cities in rural districts may be made with the intention that 
“economic spill-over from activities associated with the tournament and its preparation” 
(Du Plessis and Maennig, 2007: 22) will stimulate economic growth in traditionally 
under-developed parts of the country. While the intention of such an economic policy is 
good, the expectation that the requisite spill-over effects will occur to the extent that the 
stadium does not become a burden on the local economy is rather ambitious and 
theoretically unfounded.  
 
The present value of the cost of sustaining the new stadia can be approximated. The 
Discounted Cash Flow Model was employed, as explained by Pearce et al. (1971: 35):  
V = Σ C / (1 + r)ᴺ 
 Where, V = present value 
     C = benefit the period 
      r = discount rate 
     N = time period 
Given the information gathered in the discussion thus far, the following assumptions can 
be made: 
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1. The 5 new stadia will each be required to generate an average of R22m per 
year in revenues, in order to be self-sufficient. 
2. Maintenance costs increase at 5% per year due to inflation. 
3. The average life span of a stadium is around 60 years. 
4. On average, each stadium is assumed to generate 50% of their required 
revenues. 
5. Assume a discount rate equal to the yield on the 10-year South African 
Government Bond Prime Rate of 10.5%. 
 
Therefore, the yearly cost of maintaining stadia is equal to R55m,
18
 and when summed 
over a 60 year period, discounted at the 10.5% rate, the present value of sustaining stadia 
is estimated at R953m.
19
 The figure will be included in the final summation of the total 
costs of hosting the 2010 World Cup. 
 
Despite efforts to make the stadia useful for other than sporting purposes, a stadium will 
need a regular and substantial flow of income if it is not to become a burden on all levels 
of government and ultimately on taxpayers. A yearly athletics meet, and the occasional 
conference at an otherwise dormant stadium will not cultivate the essential positive 
legacy that it is hoped 2010 will deliver. Bohlmann (2006: 17) agreed that when “large 
expenditures on capital items such as stadiums are undertaken, owners must be sure that 
the stadiums can be used in a profitable manner in future. This entails being able to use 
the stadium at close to or at full capacity on a regular basis.” There have to be 
professional sporting franchises that occupy the new stadia throughout the year, though, 
Coates and Humphreys (2003: 2) maintained that a “growing body of evidence indicates 
that professional sports facilities, and the franchises they are home to, may not be engines 
of economic growth in urban neighbourhoods,” which is especially concerning for the 
2010 context as the new stadia do not even have franchises to house. 
 
 
                                                          
18
 (R22m x 5)(0.5) = R55m 
19
 See Appendix B for full calculations. 
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5.4. Inflationary Effects 
 
Dwyer et al. (2006), Kim et al., (2006) and Syzmanski (2002) have explained that 
inflationary effects can be expected to accompany the hosting of mega-events. That the 
exogenous increases in demand are short-term, localised and intense means that the 
inflation will not be uniform throughout the host region and across different goods and 
services. The temporary demand increase, which is disproportionate to capacity, forces an 
excessively high price increase. Short demand shocks as provided by the staging of 
events will more than likely prompt a smaller impact on output, but a far more significant 
impact on price, than if comparably sized shocks occurred for a longer duration (Dwyer 
et al., 2006: 64).  
 
In the 2010 context, Bohlmann and van Heerden (2008: 393) predicted an increase in 
consumer prices of between 1.21% and 1.24%. Mabugu and Mohamed (2008: 11) argued 
that whether the exogenous demand injection will cause sustained real effects on 
economic activity depends on the shape of the aggregate supply function. If the function 
was assumed to be vertical “then there would be no lasting real impact and all that would 
be observed is higher levels of inflation.” However, the time period over which 
preparations for the World Cup have been undertaken cannot be regarded as the short-run 
which implies that a perfectly inelastic aggregate supply function is improbable. Firms 
and individuals can adjust their supply to meet enhanced demand. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the impact will not be entirely inflationary. However, the abrupt increase in 
aggregate demand will have inflationary short-run consequences. The long-run impact on 
inflation will depend on whether demand recedes, there is a reactionary increase in wage 
rates or there is an increase in potential GDP (Parkin, 2007). As has been seen in the 
labour market, construction industry wages have risen which may lead to “complete 
crowding-out, (where) the demand injection would simply lead to an increase in inflation 
and cause the composition of output to change, without any impact on output” (Mabugu 
and Mohamed, 2008: 10).  
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A negative reaction by local consumers to higher prices may reduce endogenous demand. 
Since spending by foreigners is an exogenous injection which works to enhance 
economic activity, the net effect is ambiguous. The final result depends on whether prices 
will be sticky after the World Cup, or if they return to pre-event levels. Sticky prices 
occur when “the population continues to set prices based on old plans and outdated 
information” (Mankiw and Reis, 2002: 1296), and do not adjust the prices and supply 
according to prevailing conditions. 
 
During the event, if domestic firms and individuals substitute away from World Cup 
related expenditure due to inflated prices, their reactionary spending in other sectors of 
the economy will cause no net change in total output. Similarly, locals may simply opt to 
postpone expenditures until prices subside. In the instance that prices are sticky, locals 
may indefinitely forgo their planned expenditure, to the detriment of domestic economic 
activity, which is an example of displaced spending. In either case, the spending by 
foreigners would need to be great enough to offset the decreased expenditure by locals. 
According to Jordaan, 350 000 to 450 000 spectators are expected to visit South Africa 
for the World Cup (BBC, 2007), and thus there is a risk that the artificially high prices 
during the event may alienate local consumers in host regions. Since locals should far 
outnumber visitors it is possible that across-the-board inflation may result in little or no 
change in output despite demand from foreigners. Given the composition of the 
Consumer Price Index, universal inflation on all goods and services cannot be expected. 
Intuitively, those commodities that are explicitly related to the World Cup will 
experience significant changes, while consumer staples should remain constant. Under 
such an assumption, the hypothesis that a decreased demand from locals will completely 
undermine increased tourist demand can be rejected.  
 
Tourist activities and accommodation should experience country-wide inflation, as in-
between World Cup fixtures, foreigners are likely to travel throughout the country. The 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Marthinus van Schalkwyk has warned 
that price-hiking during the tournament could damage the reputation of the South African 
tourism industry post-2010 (Sunday Times, 2009b). The analysis of the tourism effects of 
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2010 will be expanded later in the chapter. However, it can be expected that concessions, 
bars, restaurants and fast food outlets will endure larger increases in prices in host regions 
as opposed to non-host areas. For example, retailers in towns on the periphery of the 
World Cup such as Pietermaritzburg and East London would probably not raise prices to 
the extent that those in Cape Town would due to the expected influx of visitors. 
Bohlmann and van Heerden‟s (2008: 393) inflation estimates refer to national averages, 
critically though there will be significantly divergent price levels in different regions of 
the country. Inflation can be regarded as an inherent cost of hosting, causing uneven 
distribution of inflationary consequences around the country. Non-hosting regions are 
likely to remain largely unaffected by inflation.  
 
The occurrence of sticky prices needs to be considered as if suppliers of services, such as 
resorts and game reserves, do not revert to pre-World Cup price levels after demand has 
receded; there are two possible implications for the tourism industry: first, domestic 
tourists may substitute away from travelling domestically and do so abroad, reducing net 
economic activity locally. Alternatively, international visitors who were willing to pay 
higher prices during the World Cup may not be willing to pay higher prices to visit South 
Africa when the draw of the World Cup does not exist. While revenue per visitor is 
higher, some demand will be displaced, and the net economic impact is dependent on the 
elasticity of demand for South Africa tourist services. The greatest benefit to South 
Africa would occur if prices are not sticky, allowing demand and supply to interact post-
event in order to derive appropriate prices that develop in the market and not artificially.  
 
A more sustained and gradual change in demand for services will result in smaller, more 
appropriate changes in prices and capacity in the affected sector of the economy (Dwyer 
et al., 2006: 64), which is an argument against hosting mega-event. Ideally, prices will 
see brief, sharp volatility as they rise and then fall as the event passes through a region; 
and then carry on their initial trajectory. However, such an eventuality is by no means a 
certainty, as it is dependent on the behaviour of individual vendors and business owners, 
and as such modelling the ex ante economic impact is dependent on assumed behaviour 
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patterns. The greater the number of assumptions present in the study compounds the 
likelihood that predictions and reality will be divergent.  
 
5.5. Foreign Exchange Impact  
 
Dwyer et al. (2006) previously hypothesised that hosting a mega-event could stimulate an 
appreciation of the domestic currency in the foreign exchange market. Bohlmann and van 
Heerden (2008: 392) predicted a decrease in exports as a result, while Mabugu and 
Mohamed (2008: 18) predicted that increased imports would result due to higher income 
domestically; together the two factors would lead to a balance of trade deterioration. 
Fluctuations in the foreign exchange market could also negatively impact upon GDP 
leading up to and during the event. The event is expected to draw up to 450 000 
foreigners (BBC, 2007), all of whom will have foreign exchange requirements, which 
could potentially cause an appreciation the rand. Hence, a decreased demand for South 
African exports priced in rands can be expected as they would have become more 
expensive internationally (Bohlmann and van Heerden, 2008: 392). Similarly, domestic 
demand for imports will increase as South African consumers substitute away from 
locally produced goods towards cheaper imports. The net result of the appreciation of the 
rand, is a leak of resources from the domestic economy, which would be accentuated in 
an export-biased economy such as South Africa. 
 
Although the changes in the exchange rate would be expected to be negligible, the effects 
of the change have the potential to be a prominent factor in determining the final net 
economic impact of the event. While the argument is theoretically sound, to determine 
whether the rand could be expected to appreciate, the requirements of foreigners, needs to 
be understood in terms of the broader foreign exchange market in South Africa. The 
analysis offers useful insight into the scale of the World Cup in the context of the entire 
South African economy.  
 
To model 2010 related demand for the rand, assumptions need to be made regarding the 
expected foreign exchange requirements of tourists while in South Africa; demand was 
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modelled based on three different sets of assumptions. Event-related demand for the rand 
was analysed in the context of the daily trading volume of the rand. The proportion of the 
daily volume that is due to the event should give an indication of events potential to 
affect total demand for the currency and hence its ability to appreciate the rand. As is 
evident in Figure 3, since 2000 there has been a clearly inverse relationship between the 
rand-dollar exchange rate and the trading volume. Short-term fluctuations in volume 
appear not to affect the value of the rand directly. It is rather the long-term trend in 
volume, which is inversely tracked by the currency‟s value. As trading volumes decrease 
so the rand depreciates against the dollar. The relationship explains that increased trading 
volumes would appreciate the rand. So, increased demand for the rand in 2010 could 
cause an appreciation if it constitutes enough of a percentage of the daily trading volume.  
 
 
Figure 3. The average monthly rand-dollar exchange rate and average monthly daily 
trading volume of the rand measured in billions of US dollars, plotted against time since 
01/2001. 
Sources: South African Reserve Bank (2009b and 2009c) 
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The first set of assumptions includes probable expenditure patterns of tourists in 2010: 
 
Table 5a. Set One: Minimal Expenditure. 
Expenditure: Cost (R): Assumption that each tourist will: 
Accommodation/night 12 000 
Visit for half (15 nights) of the tournament spending 
R800 per night on accommodation. 
Internal Travel 6 200 
Make 4 domestic flights at R1300 each and hire a 
rental car for 8 days
20
. 
Food & Drink 3 750 Spend R250 a day on food and drinks. 
Tickets 4 800 
Attend 4 World Cup fixtures at an average cost of 
R1200.
21
 
Miscellaneous 2 250 
Spend R150 a day on curios, tips and unforeseen 
expenses. 
Tourist Activities 3 750 Spend R250 a day on tourist activities. 
Demand for rands per 
visitor 
32 750 
 
Demand for rands per 
visitor in US$ 
4 094 Assuming a fixed exchange rate of R8 per $. 
Source: Based on assumptions made for the purposes of estimation. 
 
From the above data, the daily demand for the rand due to World Cup related spending 
can be derived: 
 
Table 5b. Estimated demand for rands from 2010 World Cup tourists, in U.S. Dollars 
under realistic assumptions. 
World Cup Visitors 400 000 
Spending per visitor 4 094 
Total spending 1 637 500 000 
Rand demand per day in US$ 21 833 333 
 
An estimate of 400 000 visitors‟ accounts for displacement of normal tourists. The total 
demand was averaged over a 75 day period to determine demand per day; including the 
one month of the event and one and a half months before-hand where individuals will 
satisfy their foreign exchange demand before travelling, as well as pay deposits for 
accommodation and other activities prior to departure for South Africa. The months 
                                                          
20
 See Appendix C for an explanation of flight and car hire costs. 
21
 Tickets for matches during the World Cup are available for between R140 and R6300. 
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during which demand should be heightened are May, June and July, and it is assumed 
that the daily trading volumes in 2010 will be similar to those of 2008 during the same 
three month period. The amount of rands demanded (US$21.8bn) seems at first sight to 
be a considerable addition to total demand, however, when analysed in the context of the 
rand‟s average daily trading volume, it becomes rather insignificant, namely 0.13%. 
Hence, the event‟s ability to cause an appreciation of the rand is doubtful and, in reality, 
is quite implausible. 
 
Table 5c. Predicted percentage of average daily trading volume for the rand during May, 
June and July 2010 due to World Cup related demand under realistic assumptions. 
Date 
Average Daily Rand 
Trading Volume (US$bn) 
World Cup Demand as % of 
Average Daily Volume 
2008/05 16.04 0.13610 
2008/06 18.53 0.11782 
2008/07 17.05 0.12806 
Average 17.21 0.12733 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2009b) 
 
On the basis of the first scenario, Bohlmann and van Heerden‟s (2008: 392) predicted 
decline of 3.03% in exports due to an appreciated rand seems improbable. Therefore, it is 
expected that the the impact on balance of trade will remain ambiguous.  
 
The second set of assumptions relaxes the parameters set out in the first scenario:
22
 
 Visitors were assumed to visit for 5 further nights, and R200 more per 
night of accommodation was budgeted for. 
 1 further flight was assumed to be taken, with 2 more days worth of car 
hire. 
 2 additional fixtures were attended. 
 R250 extra per day was set aside for tourist activities. 
 450 000 tourists were expected. 
                                                          
22
 See Appendix D1 for full calculations. 
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 further days worth of expenditure onto accommodation, food and drinks, 
miscellaneous and tourism activities. 
 The total demand for rands was spread of over 60 days, and an appreciated 
R7.50 per dollar exchange rate was used. 
The cumulative effect was that rands demanded per day, measured in US dollars, rose by 
$20.5m to $42.4m. In terms of the daily trading volume, the impact was still found to be 
negligible, at 0.25%. 
 
Table 5d. Predicted percentage of average daily trading volume for the rand during May, 
June and July 2010 due to World Cup related demand under relaxed assumptions. 
Date 
Average Daily Rand 
Trading Volume (US$bn) 
World Cup Demand as % of 
Average Daily Volume 
2008/05 16.04 0.26406 
2008/06 18.53 0.22859 
2008/07 17.05 0.24846 
Average 17.21 0.24704 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2009b) 
 
A final set of parameters
23
 were tested in order to demonstrate with greater certainty as to 
whether higher demand during the World Cup would appreciate the currency. The very 
liberal assumptions expanded upon the relaxed assumptions: 
 It was assumed that the average length of a tourist trip would be the entire 
duration of the event, 30 nights, which added 10 days worth of expenditure 
onto accommodation, food and drinks, miscellaneous and tourism 
activities. 
 2 further flights and 5 more days of car hire were accounted for. 
 R250 extra was added to tourist activities per day, giving R750 per day in 
total. 
 The miscellaneous expenses were increased to R500 per day. 
 A total of 8 match tickets at an average cost of R2000 were purchased. 
 500 000 tourists were expected. 
                                                          
23
 See Appendix D2 for full calculations. 
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 The total demand for the rand was averaged over 45 days, using an 
exchange rate of R7 to the US dollar. 
The daily demand for rands was calculated to rise by R161.7bn under the most liberal 
assumptions, approximately 7.5 times the demand estimated under the most likely 
conditions. While the demand is far higher, its impact on total trading volume remains 
largely inconsequential at less than 1% as seen in Table 5e.  
 
Table 5e. Predicted percentage of average daily trading volume for the rand during May, 
June and July 2010 due to World Cup related demand under very liberal assumptions. 
Date 
Average Daily Rand 
Trading Volume (US$bn) 
World Cup Demand as % of 
Average Daily Volume 
2008/05 16.04 1.00901 
2008/06 18.53 0.87348 
2008/07 17.05 0.94941 
Average 17.21 0.94397 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2009b) 
 
The event would have to stimulate a long-term trend of increased volume in order to 
impact the value of the rand. Since the effects of the World Cup are so minimal when 
looked at in the broader context of the South African foreign exchange market, no 
appreciable effect on the value of the rand can be expected; hence the event should have 
no significant impact on exports.  
 
Despite the conclusion that demand for the rand from tourists will have an insignificant 
effect on its strength, nevertheless, a change in value during and before the World Cup 
should rather be associated with the impact that South Africa‟s staging of the event has 
on international investor sentiment, which is a contradiction of the argument advanced by 
Dwyer et al. (2006). (The implications of changing investor sentiment will be addressed 
later in the chapter in the section discussing Foreign Direct Investment).  
 
To conclude, the demand for currency by tourists may have the capacity to influence 
exchange rates in economies without the sophisticated financial markets in South Africa; 
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however, the sheer volume of day-to-day trading undermines the impact that such a 
demand influx could have on the South African currency. 
 
5.6. Tax Revenues  
 
Supporters of hosting mega-events regularly “claim that tax revenues will increase as a 
result of the construction of new sports facilities” (Coates and Humphreys, 2003: 18). 
The situation is no different for 2010, as Grant Thornton (2003: 2) cited additional tax 
revenues as a reason why South Africa should bid to host the World Cup. That increased 
taxes are regarded as a bonus secondary effect of the event seems to be misguided. 
Enhanced tax collection should not be seen as a benefit, but rather as a necessity. Since, 
the World Cup is a largely government funded event, government needs to be 
compensated for their capital investment. Increased tax revenues can be a means of 
funding for the tournament.  
 
The view that hosting mega-events will augment tax collection in the region is contested 
by the majority of scholars. Dwyer et al. (2006: 62) claimed that being a host of an event 
will impact negatively upon national tax revenues. Crompton (2006: 76) argued that 
taking taxes from residents on event related expenditure is irrelevant “because it is likely 
that those funds would have been spent in the community if the government had not 
taken them.” While there is no net change on domestic output, it does aid the 
governments funding of the event. Preuss (2002: 11) has conversely offered an 
unsubstantiated view that mega-events have increase tax revenues. Keating (1999: 18) 
maintained that everybody who pays “taxes to support the facility (or event) must reduce 
his or her spending. The diminished spending goes around and round just like the positive 
multiplier effect,” causing a negative multiplier. Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000: 108) 
stated that sports facilities cannot be expected to generate additional amounts of output in 
a city following construction, and so they should not be expected to augment tax 
collection once in operation. It is an example of the displacement effects that accompany 
hosting mega-events.  Coates and Humphreys (2003: 9) agreed that “(n)o evidence exists 
that professional sports have a detectable impact on ... tax revenues.” Further, since the 
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local population have changed their consumption patterns during the event, there will be 
greater variation in the tax that is collected because different sectors of the economy are 
taxed differently, causing a degree of unpredictability of tax revenues (Dwyer et al., 
2005: 357). For example, increased prices on alcohol products (that are subject to high 
„sin taxes‟) could see consumers substitute away from them towards other goods which 
are not taxed as heavily. 
 
As detailed in the analysis of inflation, domestic individual‟s demand responses to 
inflated prices may further undermine the tax collection process, placing greater 
importance on strong demand from tourists. Hence, increased collection depends on 
increased taxes received as a result of purchases of domestic goods and services by 
foreigners. Unfortunately for the 2010 context, FIFA has imposed similar restrictions on 
the collection of tax revenue as it has with concessions, merchandising and sponsorship. 
The 2010 FIFA World Cup Special Measures Act includes guarantees by the South 
African government to FIFA defining special allowances with regard to taxation of FIFA 
and its affiliates, in that there have been “amendments to the Value Added Tax Act, 
Income Tax Act and the Customs and Excise Act” (GCIS, 2008a: 4). The legal 
adjustments essentially create “a „tax-free bubble‟ around FIFA-designated sites24 so that 
profits on consumable and semi-durable goods sold within these areas will not be subject 
to income tax” (GCIS, 2008b). VAT will not be applied in the areas either as goods and 
services are set to be zero-rated. The bubble will apply to concession stands that sell 
food, beverages or merchandise; some services will also receive these exemptions if they 
are deemed necessary for staging the tournament. Certain event-related individuals will 
also qualify for import-tax relief on certain items if the goods are set to be re-exported 
after the event. The exemptions apply to both South African residents and international 
individuals. In addition, the FIFA shop, which sells World Cup related merchandise, 
“will be considered a tax-free bubble for six months before the 2009 Confederations Cup 
until one month after the closing ceremony of the 2010 tournament” (GCIS, 2008b).  
 
                                                          
24
 The sites include the World Cup stadia,  FIFA-designated exclusion zones, official tournament parking 
areas, press and television centres, training sites, official host city public viewing venues (also known as 
fan parks), VIP areas and any other area or facility utilised for official 2010 events (GCIS, 2008b). 
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The regulations imposed are another example of the stringent control which FIFA exerts 
over the World Cup. While the regulations improve the profitability for FIFA, they act to 
reduce tax revenues that the event generates for the South African government. 
Nonetheless, tournament “ticket sales will be subject to VAT at the standard rate of 14% 
and FIFA, its subsidiary or any participating national association will be liable to SARS 
for the payment of VAT on the sale of tickets” (GCIS, 2008b). In addition, the tax 
protection does not extend to include the actual football players, who are “exposed to the 
ordinary application of South Africa‟s tax system” (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009). 
Hence, the South African Revenue Services are not completely excluded from benefitting 
from the World Cup, however the extent of their reach is comprehensively undermined 
by FIFA restrictions, therefore, the hope for amplified tax revenues during 2010 should 
be considerably tempered.  
 
5.7. Escalating Financial Costs   
 
One of the most prominent obstacles to overcome in calculating the net economic impact 
of the 2010 World Cup is determining exactly how much the event costs at all levels of 
government. The many different estimates published in the popular press, government 
press releases and academic papers, have only one common feature, namely that since the 
bid process began, the estimated cost has risen continually. The following section will 
attempt to detail the chronological change in estimated financial costs of stadia for the 
World Cup. Secondary costs that are at times intangible and less easily quantified will be 
addressed in the section thereafter.  
 
As a prelude to an analysis of total costs, the increases that have occurred for specific 
World Cup venues will be detailed. The initial cost of renovations to Vodacom Park in 
Bloemfontein were estimated at R33m (BBC, 2009a), the 2006 valuation of the upgrade 
was predicted at approximately R220m (Mabugu and Mohamed, 2008: 8) and by 2009 
the expected cost was R305m (BBC, 2009a). With a 2006 budget of R1.6bn (Daily News, 
2006) the Moses Mabhida stadium has seen a significant rise in cost, which by 2008 had 
reached R2.6bn with R300m being funded by KwaZulu-Natal provincial government, 
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and R1.8bn from national government (BuaNews, 2008). The increase led to a R500m 
shortfall of funding, with both provincial and national governments not willing to finance 
the remaining cost (BBC, 2009a). It can be expected that the final deficits will have to be 
financed by local municipalities (Times, 2009f). The Green Point Stadium has had 
similar budgetary problems in terms of who should fund the difference between predicted 
and actual cost, with the banking group, Investec, providing a loan to finance the deficit 
(SAPA, 2007). The stadium saw a sharp rise in cost since the tender was awarded in 
2007, where the budget rose from an initial R2.5bn (Cape Argus, 2007a) to R2.9bn 
(SAPA, 2007). SAPA (2008) reported later that according to a mayoral committee 
member for finance, Ian Neilson, the final cost would be R4bn. Finally, in 2009 the 
figure was estimated at R4.4bn (Sunday Times, 2009c). 
 
In terms of total stadia costs, since 2003 cumulative estimations have understandably 
followed a similar incremental trend as the individual stadia. An appropriate starting 
point is the estimate used by Grant Thornton (2003), which cited expected expenditure on 
stadia of R1.8bn. With the approximated benefit of R21.3bn (Grant Thornton, 2003), the 
World Cup as a government expenditure was predicted to derive a payoff of almost ten 
times that of the initial investment. With such impressive prospects, few would have been 
able to contest the decision to host the event. By 2005, the estimated costs of stadia had 
doubled to R3.6bn (City Press, 2005). The Financial Mail (2006a: 23) put the total cost at 
approximately R7.2bn, double the previous year‟s estimate. The figures can be compared 
to the R8.4bn that had been set aside by the National Treasury for stadiums in 2007 
(South Africa.info, 2007b). According to the then Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, 
government, by the end of fiscal year 2009, will have spent “a total of R11.5bn on 
building the stadiums” (Fin24, 2009a). Therefore, from 2003 to 2009 the cumulative 
expenditure on stadia by government increased more than six-fold.     
 
According to Jordaan, the total cost of hosting the World Cup, including the development 
of stadia, infrastructure and operating costs is predicted to be R30bn (Fin24, 2009a); 
double the R14.9bn estimate from 2006 (South Africa.info, 2006c), and more than 13 
times the figure of R2.3bn that was supplied by the South Africa 2010 Soccer World Cup 
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Bid Company, for use in the Grant Thornton (2003: 3) study. In contrast, Financial Mail 
Campus (2009: 6) reported that the total cost be around R28bn, with R9.8bn spent on 
stadia. 
 
Table 6. Summary of stadia costs and total costs in billions of rands. 
Year  
Stadia 
Cost 
Total 
Cost 
Stadia Cost as % of 
Total Costs 
Source 
2003 1.8 2.3 78 Grant Thornton (2003) 
2005 3.6 n/a n/a City Press (2005) 
2006 7.2 14.9 48 
Financial Mail (2006); 
South Africa.info (2006c) 
2007 8.4 n/a n/a South Africa.info (2007b) 
2009 9.8 - 11.5 28 - 30 35 - 38 
Fin24 (2009a); Financial 
Mail Campus (2009) 
 
Using the information from Table 6, the sharp trajectory of cost increases is evident in 
Figure 4: 
 
 
 Figure 4. Estimates of total and stadia costs in billions of rands between 2003 and 2009. 
 
Given the steady rise in costs, the relevance of forward-looking studies that seek to 
calculate a specific net economic impact figure is comprehensively undermined. Inputs to 
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an analysis are likely to be significantly different from actual values which are only 
available closer to the event, or perhaps only after it has taken place. Bohlmann and van 
Heerden (2008: 387) for example used data from the 2006 National Treasury Budget 
Review in their study; therefore, given that stadia costs alone have increased from R7.2bn 
to R11.5bn between 2006 and 2009, the conclusions which were derived in the study 
have been rendered largely irrelevant in 2009. However, having plotted the course of 
estimated expenditures on the event, it is pertinent to identify which possible economic or 
political factors have caused costs to rise so sharply, and resulted in such a disparity 
between estimates and actual figures.  
 
Four factors have been identified whose existence and interaction may account for the 
ever increasing estimates: 
1. The increased cost of inputs in the construction industry. 
2. Depreciation of the rand against major foreign currencies. 
3. Naive estimates of actual costs and poor planning. 
4. Purposeful underestimation of costs as a means to winning over public 
opinion for staging the event.  
 
A frequently cited cause of the disparity between estimates and actual figures is that of 
“rising input costs, especially steel and cement” (Business Day, 2007: 1). It should be 
acknowledged that between 2005 and 2008 steel prices escalated by 80 percent 
(BuaNews, 2008). In addition, cement prices have escalated steadily in South Africa as 
the industry‟s capacity could not be expanded appropriately in the short-term to meet 
enhanced demand (Financial Mail, 2006b); prices rose some 25% during 2008 fiscal year 
due to higher diesel, electricity and coal prices (Engineering News, 2009). The increased 
cost of labour in the construction industry has already been well documented in the 
previous section on Labour and Capital Markets, and would have contributed to higher 
total costs. Given that prices have risen significantly during the construction period for 
the event, the inflated costs of stadia are partly due to higher than expected input costs. 
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The eThekwini Municipality's Strategic Projects Unit that oversees the construction of 
the Moses Mabhida Stadium have blamed the depreciation of the rand as a foundation for 
budget over-runs, having claimed that “(n)obody could ever have foreseen that”  
(BuaNews, 2008a). Through analysis of Figure 5, estimates of stadia costs produced 
before 2006 cannot cite the exchange rate for higher costs as the rand appreciated during 
2003 and then remained moderately constant against major currencies throughout 2004 
and 2005. While the rand depreciated during 2006, it was relatively stable in 2007 and 
appreciated towards the end of the year against the US Dollar and Pound Sterling. Since 
2008 the currency has been volatile and depreciated significantly in the fourth quarter of 
2008. Thus, the valuation of the currency may have played a role in escalating stadia 
costs. However the sharp depreciation against all three currencies at the end of 2008 were 
quite brief and by half way through 2009, the rates were similar to their levels at the 
beginning of 2008.  
 
 
Figure 5. The rand exchange rate against the US Dollar, Euro and Pound Sterling 
between 2003 and the end of the second quarter of 2009.  
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2009d). 
 
The strong currency depreciation occurred for only around two quarters, hence holding 
the rand culpable for of the dramatically escalated costs of stadia is inaccurate. That the 
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the primary causes of budget over-runs suggests poor risk management, and naive 
planning of expenditures. The use of financial instruments and derivatives can minimise 
the risk that the depreciated currency could have on overall cost, so as organisers offer 
these factors as being to blame, they seek to deflect attention from their own 
shortcomings. To fail to make provisions in a budget for the potential depreciation of the 
rand, which is renowned for its volatility, is a remarkable oversight. Further, an 
interesting observation is that the cost of stadia, as a percentage of total cost, has fallen 
significantly since 2003; which shows a gross underestimation of the infrastructural 
requirements for staging 2010. 
 
The estimate of costs by Grant Thornton (2003), provided by the Bid Company, 
estimated an all inclusive tangible cost to the government that appears to be an 
occurrence of the either the third or fourth factor listed above, the assumption is totally 
unrealistic. It is difficult to believe that organisers of the World Cup estimated that the 
cumulative cost of hosting would be only R2.3bn. The eventuality would be an incidence 
of the third factor, extraordinarily naive and inept budgeting for the event. Alternatively, 
organisers may have deliberately supplied inaccurate data during the bidding process, 
factor four. Scholars have warned that such deceptive behaviour may be employed by 
organisers of mega-events in order to win over opinion on the issue (Baade and 
Matheson, 2004a; 1090). If, in 2003 the Bid Company had declared that the event would 
cost R30bn in total or the stadia would cost R11.5bn, public sentiment towards hosting 
the event would likely have been significantly different.  
 
There have been a variety of factors which have caused the cost of hosting the World Cup 
to follow a constant and sharp upward trajectory. However, critically for this study, that 
the costs have risen so drastically offers weight to the argument against the production of 
definitive, one-number ex ante economic impact studies. The net benefit of a project 
cannot be reliably considered given that the costs are either unknown or regularly 
changing. The result of an economic impact study that is conducted with erroneous inputs 
to the model, specifically government expenditure, is rendered null, as was the case with 
the Grant Thornton (2003) study. While using incorrect inputs gives inaccurate results, it 
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should not be regarded as a shortcoming of the authors of the study, if the data used was 
both correct at the time of publication and supplied by the organisers. That data is 
continually changing explains that conducting forward-looking economic impact analyses 
of mega-events is a futile endeavour. It would, nonetheless, be possible to develop 
scenarios of potential outcomes and perform sensitivity analyses. A truly accurate 
economic impact assessment can only be conducted once the event has taken place and a 
definitive cost is published by government. 
 
5.8. Secondary Costs 
 
While mega-events are widely associated with intangible benefits such as improved 
international image of the host and enhanced national unity, there are equally relevant 
intangible costs and negative externalities that are frequently neglected. Crompton (2006: 
75) explained that translating such impacts into economic value may in some instances be 
relatively straightforward but are generally quite complex, and thus the costs are usually 
ignored. However, even if they cannot be translated they should nonetheless be 
described, qualitatively assessed, and included in a broader CBA. The existence of 
secondary costs suggests that a CBA which can include intangibles is preferable to a 
purely quantitatively based study. Secondary costs can be described as parallel linkages 
that while related to the event, are not explicitly “under the control of event organisers. 
Therefore, they are seldom part of any official final report and their outcomes, if 
controversial, are largely minimised or ignored” (Hiller, 1998: 50). It is thus the objective 
of the following section to highlight those secondary costs that can be expected to 
accompany the staging of 2010. The effect of secondary costs is that they ultimately lead 
to a disruption of host residents‟ lifestyles (Crompton, 2006: 72) and the ordinary 
functioning of the country.  
 
5.8.1.  Prostitution 
 
In the build up to 2010, a debate emerged regarding the potential legalisation of 
prostitution in South Africa. The idea was first introduced by the then South African 
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Chief of Police, Jackie Selebi, who urged that a “special temporary concession be 
implemented to make prostitution and public drinking legal, within parameters, for the 
duration of the 2010 Soccer World Cup” (Bird and Donaldson, 2009: 34). The suggestion 
was made on the grounds that legalising prostitution would allow greater regulation of 
the industry and allow police to focus on more serious crime (Mail and Guardian, 2009b). 
Further, demarcated red-light districts were argued to provide safe environments for 
women to work in, however those in opposition claimed that such legislation would be 
immoral and against family values (BBC, 2008b). The legalisation of prostitution is an 
emotive issue that has caused public protest. For example, in Durban some 200 women 
and men from different churches in KwaZulu-Natal marched to the premier‟s office and 
handed over a memorandum urging legislators not to proceed with the legalisation. The 
group explained: it is a “shame that South Africa is prepared to sacrifice [its] own 
daughters to earn foreign money” (Witness, 2009). Hence, the concern exists that in 
legalising prostitution to meet the demands of foreigners, South Africa does so at the cost 
of its moral autonomy. Further, it would mean that domestic government policy would be 
dictated by the demands of foreigners, which acts to erode the nation‟s sovereignty. In 
that sense, the legalising of prostitution can be regarded as a secondary cost of hosting the 
World Cup. Whether prostitution should be legalised or not is beyond the scope of this 
study, however, analysis of the issues which add to the cumulative cost or benefit of the 
World Cup is applicable. 
 
The issue has come to the fore based on economic grounds; prostitution during the World 
Cup could be financially profitable. Increased demand for prostitutes from tourists can be 
regarded as a benefit of the World Cup as the services rendered may contribute to 
economic activity, and as such prostitution is not a secondary cost. However, due to its 
association with human trafficking, and moral concerns it is included here. While 
prostitution is illegal in South Africa, the sex industry is known to thrive during mega-
events and can “cause an influx of prostitutes to host cities” (Bird and Donaldson, 2009: 
33). It is thought that South Africa can expect an influx of sex tourists for 2010 (Richter, 
2008). In 2006, “Germany had many adult entertainment centres during the World Cup in 
2006, which were very popular with visitors” (BBC, 2008b). It is therefore clear that sex 
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tourism is an industry, and is not just present in some countries; it is a central facet of 
tourism industries in countries such as Cuba, Thailand and the Philippines (Clancy, 2002: 
65). Sex tourism can be defined as residents of one country that travel abroad and 
exchange something of material value in return for sexual services from individuals in the 
host country, and “ranges from those travellers who go abroad for the explicit purpose of 
purchasing sexual services, to sexual predators who target children, to those who might 
be considered situational sex tourists” (Clancy, 2002: 72). 
 
Sex tourism leads onto the serious problem of human trafficking. Prior to the 2006 World 
Cup there was a widely publicised claim that some 40 000 women and children would be 
trafficked into Germany to satisfy increased demand from tourists (Bensinger, 2006; 
Tavella, 2007). The concerns raised issues of “potential linkages between large 
international events and increased human trafficking” (Tavella, 2007). According to Bird 
and Donaldson (2009: 35) there are similar concerns relating to 2010 as child and human 
rights organisations have “warned that human trafficking could worsen in the country 
ahead of the World Cup, with trafficked women and children being forced into the sex 
industry.” The International Organisation for Migration (2007: 5) has since discredited 
the German estimate; maintaining that it “was unfounded and unrealistic,” and that an 
increase in human trafficking did not occur during or after the event. It does not however 
mean that trafficking will not take place in 2010; traffickers operate in South Africa and 
its neighbouring nations as borders are porous and often passports are not needed to move 
between countries (BBC, 2009b). It is thus anticipated that there could be a surge in 
human trafficking during the 2010 (Times, 2009a). Therefore, the issue of human 
trafficking may be a prominent secondary social cost of hosting 2010. It should be 
acknowledge however that trafficking requires prior logistics and investment by 
traffickers, and that a short-term event may not be perceived as sufficiently profitable 
enough given the necessary preparations (International Organisation for Migration, 2007: 
6).  
 
According to Clancy (2002: 75) sex tourism has „flourished‟ in South Africa. The claim 
is surprising as South Africa has one of the world‟s largest prevalence of AIDS with an 
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estimated 5.2 million people infected (Statistics South Africa, 2009b). Nonetheless, 
legalisation in 2010 could be financially beneficial for sex workers as well as government 
who should theoretically receive increased tax revenues. Failure to legalise the industry 
could leave a segment of demand from tourists unsatisfied such that the cumulative 
economic impact of the event may be restricted to below its potential. However, 
legalisation could actually be irrelevant; a prostitute interviewed commented that whether 
prostitution is legal or not, she would continue to work (Witness, 2009).  
 
5.8.2.  Congestion 
 
The issue of congestion is commonly cited as an indirect cost of hosting a mega-event 
(Dwyer et al., 2006; Gursoy and Kendall, 2006; Matheson, 2003), where both traffic 
congestion and overcrowding in public places are relevant concerns. The primary issue is 
that it can be expected to disturb the everyday activities of local individuals and 
businesses (Bob et al., 2003: 227) who may have to adjust their daily routines in order to 
cope with overcrowding, leading to efficiency losses. Expectations of congestion should 
also have an impact on tourists to the host; however the issue will be discussed later in 
the chapter. In addition, Crompton (2006: 72) explained that local residents may leave 
their “host community if it is inundated with tourists and spend money elsewhere rather 
than in their hometown to avoid congestion.” Therefore, the perception that host cities 
will be overcrowded leads to a displacement of locals, and causes them to change their 
spending patterns. Failure to include such changes in an economic impact study will 
cause inflated estimates (Baade and Matheson, 2003: 9).  
 
In a survey by German research firm „Sport and Market‟ it was established that 53 per 
cent of South Africans expect increased congestion over 2010 (FIFA, 2009f). That locals 
are aware of the impending overcrowding indicated that they may take measures to avoid 
host regions. For example, a Johannesburg resident was quoted by the BBC (2009c) as 
already “planning to spend the first three weeks of the competition out of the country, just 
to get away from the crowds & the hysteria.” Anecdotally, the South African National 
Arts Festival CEO, Tony Lankester (2009), commented that early bookings for the 2010 
96 
 
Festival in Grahamstown, by Johannesburg locals, have been far higher than the previous 
years. The festival‟s dates coincide with those of the World Cup. The observation 
revealed the benefits for non-hosting cities, as locals in host cities may vacate them in 
favour of quieter regions around the country. So, while non-hosts may not enjoy the full 
benefits of greater numbers of foreign tourists, they could be compensated by influxes of 
domestic tourists.  
 
Kim et al. (2006: 93) in a survey of South Korean locals in host cities for the 2002 FIFA 
World Cup found that traffic congestion was the most prominent secondary cost during 
the tournament. In the 2010 context FIFA have requested that the fast lane on national 
highways to be reserved for official FIFA vehicles (Arendse, 2009). At the 2006 event in 
Germany specific lanes on highways were set aside for exclusive use of FIFA officials 
and teams (du Plessis and Maennig, 2007: 3). Therefore, it seems likely that similar 
conditions will prevail in 2010, which will amplify the already likely traffic congestion 
troubles. Increased congestion can also lead to a greater number of road accidents 
(Crompton, 2006: 75). Even though the effects of congestion cannot be easily quantified, 
it is a factor that must be included in the final summation of costs and benefits when 
analysing the net impact of an event. 
 
5.8.3.  Hooliganism 
 
Hooliganism is one of the most prominent negative externalities of hosting (Barget and 
Gouguet, 2007: 166). Mega-events in general are an ideal platform for terrorist attacks 
and organisers thus have to the deal with that security threat (Essex and Chalkley, 1998: 
203), but for football events, public safety concerns are amplified by the additional 
problem of hooliganism (Brenke and Wagner, 2006: 27). South Africa‟s geographical 
remoteness from the perceived high-risk terrorism regions has aided growth in tourism 
due to a tourist substitution effect to South Africa away from those region (Cornelissen, 
2004: 94), and as such terrorism is less of a security concern for 2010 than for other 
mega-events held elsewhere. South Africa has almost no history of terrorism since the 
end of Apartheid. The need to prepare for the risk of hooliganism is not as prevalent in 
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the organisation of other sporting events, as it is for football events, as the sport is 
strongly associated with poorly behaved fans. Therefore, the opponents of hosting mega-
events frequently use the risk of hooliganism as a reason why the tournament should not 
be hosted in the region (Oldenboom, 2006: 18). In a survey by Cornelissen et al. (2008: 
59), 70% of respondents in Cape Town “strongly agreed” that hooliganism would be a 
problem during 2010. 
 
Failure to cope with football hooligans can have negative effects on the image of the host 
(Brenke and Wagner, 2006: 31). In addition Crompton (2006: 75) and Matheson (2003: 
13) have both indicated that vandalism could accompany a mega-event, where vandalism 
is linked to the behaviour of hooligans. Aware of the problems posed by hooligans the 
LOC (2008: 28) has worked with foreign governments to identify and then prevent 
convicted football hooligans from abroad from visiting South Africa for the World Cup. 
South Africa has had its own struggles with football hooligans as was evident in the 
August 2009 fixture between Kaizer Chiefs and Ajax Cape Town where Chiefs fans 
reacted indignantly to a penalty decision against their team by throwing plastic bottles 
and vuvuzelas onto the field, as well as by damaging approximately 500 seats with the 
intention of throwing them too (Cape Times, 2009b). The fixture was stopped for several 
minutes and was later abandoned before full time. Spectators then tried to prevent the 
referee and linesmen from leaving the field (Times, 2009b). Such behaviour cultivates the 
negative perception that ordinary tourists have of football fans “in terms of their drinking, 
violence and hooliganism, (which) may (be) a further deterrent for non-football tourists” 
(Lee and Taylor, 2005: 601). Syzmanski (2002: 6) agreed that “many potential visitors 
may stay away, particularly from cities where teams noted for their hooligan following, 
such as England, are playing.” Hooliganism can therefore have negative impact on total 
tourist numbers.  
 
Increased petty crime has also been cited as a social problem related with events 
(Bohlmann and van Heerden, 2008: 393). The costs of hooliganism, vandalism and petty 
crime can initially be easily quantified in terms of cost of extra policing, and the 
replacement and repairs to damaged property. The costs become more problematic to 
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calculate if organisers fail to control the three issues and the international image of the 
host is damaged. 
 
5.8.4.  Other Secondary Costs 
 
Hosting mega-events can be associated with increased risk of communicable diseases 
(Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2005: 14). The increased tourist numbers from many 
different countries around the world may facilitate the spread of infectious diseases 
throughout South Africa, which may be especially prevalent in the spread of H1NI (swine 
flu) virus during 2010. South African Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi has also warned 
that there could be an accelerated rate of HIV infections in South Africa as a result of the 
World Cup due to the influx of tourists (Reuters, 2009). Perhaps a more founded concern 
should be the infection of foreigners whilst in South Africa who then repatriate the virus, 
however, that should only be considered a cost to South Africa if foreigners start to 
regard South Africa as being a high health risk destination and the association negatively 
affects future tourism. 
 
Higher real estate prices in host regions can be regarded as a legacy of hosting mega-
events (Hall, 2006: 1). The situation is more relevant to the Olympic Games as opposed 
to the FIFA World Cup, as the development of an area of a city for the Olympics is a far 
more concentrated investment that should have a greater impact on local property prices. 
While a newly developed area for a World Cup stadium uplifts its surroundings, it does 
not have the equivalent scope of an Olympics to effect prices. Analysis of previous 
World Cups suggest that higher real estate prices may not transpire as the expected 
increases before the event in South Korea did not materialise (Kim et al., 2006: 93). 
 
Another non-economic cost could be that of environmental degradation due to hosting 
(Matheson, 2003: 13). Both Barget and Gouguet (2007: 168), and Gursoy and Kendall 
(2006: 609) have maintained that construction of major facilities may have negative 
impacts on the “physical and natural environment, including pollution and the destruction 
or deterioration of natural, cultural or historical resources.” Horne and Manzenreiter 
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(2006: 10) however argued that the predicted environmental impacts of the construction 
of event facilities are usually comparable in their inaccuracy to general economic impact 
studies, as both that systematically overstate the predicted impacts. Nevertheless, the 
potential environmental impact of 2010 should not be neglected.  
 
Roche (2006: 32) argued that the Olympics can be blamed for the cultural degradation of 
spectators and hosts, as the event promotes universalistic values, cultural standardisation 
and consumer culture. Kim et al. (2006: 89) concurred that events have societal costs that 
result in a negative influence on traditional family values and encourage cultural 
commercialisation. Domestic exposure to foreign brands and culture can have the ability 
to erode national cultural identity as well as leading locals to substitute to foreign 
products away from domestically produced goods. Conversely, hosting events can be 
seen as a means to close cultural divides between hosts and the rest of the World (Ap and 
Zhou, 2009: 3). However, in an increasingly globalised world, events which accelerate 
the process may be considered as a cost to the host.  
 
5.9. Nation Building 
 
The notion that mega-events stimulate nation building is a prominent facet of the broader 
argument for their hosting; the foundation for the belief was set out in Chapter 1. In 
Chapter 2, through analysis of the 1995 Rugby World Cup, and the 2003 Cricket World 
Cup, it was observed that the 1995 event was universally considered to have contributed 
significantly to the development of nationalism, while the 2003 event did not have the 
same efficacy. The following section seeks to define nation building, and through 
analysis of the pre-requisites for occurrence of nation building, assess the likelihood that 
the 2010 World Cup will promote positive nationalism in South Africa. 
 
The objective of nation building is to “create an overarching supra-national identity that 
should replace and/or subsume sub-national identities and cultures” (Bornman, 2006: 
385) with the intention of uniting a heterogeneous society. Efforts at nation building are 
thus equivalent to attempts at developing a common national identity. The terms 
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nationalism, national pride, and patriotism can be used as synonyms for the concept of 
national identity (Kersting, 2007: 279), and will be used interchangeably. 
 
Political philosophers have argued that nation building is essential in a country because a 
“shared sense of nationhood (is) a pre-requisite for the democratic and successful 
functioning of the state” (Eaton, 2002: 46). Kersting (2007: 291) observed that there are 
several methods that the South African government has used to foster nationalism, 
including “national symbols like national flags, national anthems, sporting events, as well 
as public holidays to strengthen national unity and to develop the idea of community in a 
highly diverse society.” Ordinarily it is difficult to promote unity and encourage a 
universal national identity, but it is made even more so when the national focal point has 
to “appeal to all racial, ethnic, cultural and language groupings” (Bornman, 2006: 396), 
which is particularly appropriate to the South African context where the population is so 
varied. That the World Cup has been tasked with generating patriotism, is particularly 
challenging since football is regarded as a traditionally black African sport in South 
Africa (van der Merwe, 2006: 4), and thus some white sections of the population may not 
be able to identify with the event. Baade and Matheson (2004a), Black (2007), 
Cornelissen and Swart (2006), Eaton (2002), Grundlingh (1998) and van der Merwe 
(2006) have all argued that the 1995 Rugby World Cup served to foster nationalism in 
South Africa. However, the opinion in academic literature may not accurately reflect the 
true perception that black South Africans hold regarding the 1995 World Cup. 
Nonetheless, the consensus opinion is that hosting mega-events enhances social cohesion 
(Brunet, 2002; Barget and Gouguet, 2007; Maennig and Porsche, 2008) and in doing so 
stimulates growth of a collective national identity.  
 
Waitt (2003: 212) doubted the general capacity of a mega-event to have a lasting impact 
on national unity, and commented that the 2000 Sydney Olympics “only revived a flag-
waving form of nationalism rather than claims of a new spirit of „Australianness‟ that 
breaks with a racist legacy;” which was a warning that mega-events may only provide 
short-term, superficial effects on nation building. The specific reasons why the 1995 
World Cup is associated with nation building are complex. The extent to which the 
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purported nation building effects can be attributed to the actual hosting of the event is 
dubious. Other salient factors may explain the impact that the event had on South Africa. 
Given the social and political climate in South Africa in 1995, the circumstances were 
primed for an event or occurrence to act as a catalyst for the growth of nationalism and a 
country-wide feeling of unity. In addition, the Cup was characterised by symbols of the 
post-Apartheid South Africa, the concept of the „Rainbow Nation,‟ the new flag and the 
new national anthem were intricate aspects of the event which assisted in promoting 
national unity (Dickow and Moller, 2002: 183). 
  
Perhaps the nation building implications should rather be credited to the success of the 
national rugby team, who won the final in the most dramatic of circumstances, and not to 
the circumstance that the tournament was hosted in South Africa. However, there was no 
such exclamation of nationalism after South Africa‟s 2007 Rugby World Cup victory, 
importantly though the event was held in France. So, it is initially unclear as to whether it 
was the 1995 political climate or that the tournament was held in South Africa which was 
the primary cause of enhanced nationalism. That South Africa won the World Cup in 
1995 and 2007 with differing effects on nationalism suggests that it is not solely the 
winning which is the most relevant. Notably, as alluded to in Chapter 2, there were no 
such social effects associated with the 2003 Cricket World Cup where, incidentally, the 
South African cricket team‟s performances were very poor and the team failed to 
progress beyond the first group stage. If South Africa had lost in the earlier stages of the 
Rugby World Cup, the event would most almost certainly not have been regarded as the 
nation building catalyst that it currently is, as the populace would not have shared the 
common celebrations and feelings of adulation. The line of reasoning suggests that the 
benefits of nation building through mega-events might show a stronger relationship with 
success of the national team at home, than with the actual hosting of the event in the 
country. 
  
It may be concluded that there was not one prominent factor that can be accredited for the 
aftermath of the 1995 World Cup; it was rather a collection of factors. That the event was 
hosted in South Africa, that the South African team was successful and given the nature 
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of South African society at the time, the event acted to aid the process of nation building. 
Van der Merwe (2006: 71) claimed that in the instance that a home nation performs well 
at their event, then there will be positive implications on the collective national psyche; 
“(t)he Rugby World Cup was one of those classic textbook cases suggestive of the 
liberating nature of sports events.” Given that national pride is a pre-requisite of 
nationalism (Kersting, 2007: 281), a team‟s victories or the successful hosting of an 
international event such as the World Cup can initiate an individual‟s nation pride, and 
cultivate nationalistic sentiments.  
 
The 1998 FIFA World Cup has been regarded as an event that had similar effects on the 
national unity as the 1995 Rugby World Cup has. The circumstances which led to the 
increased patriotism in France closely resembled those which occurred in South Africa in 
1995. France hosted the event, the French national team won the tournament in a 
dramatic final, and at the time the French social environment was characterised by tense 
race and class relations between naturalised French immigrants and French-born citizens. 
The event was seen as a success for race relations, and the formation of a multicultural 
France (Kersting, 2007; Black, 2007). It instigated an upsurge of national self-
confidence, self-belief, unity and pride in a multiracial team. Dauncey and Hare (2000: 
19) asserted that the effects would not have occurred had the French team lost at an 
earlier stage in the tournament. The observation may be especially relevant to the 2010 
context as, despite an encouraging performance in the Confederations Cup in 2009, there 
is much concern regarding the performance of the South African national football team, 
also known as the Bafana Bafana, in the World Cup. As of August 2009, South Africa 
was ranked by FIFA as the 72
nd
 best team in the world (FIFA, 2009e), and are 80 to 1 
outsiders to win the tournament (Sportsbet, 2009). Therefore the team‟s prospects are not 
promising, which reduces the likelihood of prominent nation building repercussions from 
hosting 2010. 
 
The following propositions can be drawn: 
1. Success of a national team at an international event does not necessarily 
stimulate nationalism. 
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2.  Hosting a mega-event does not necessarily stimulate nationalism. 
3. Success of a national team at a home tournament does stimulate 
nationalism.  
 
That the benefits of enhanced nationalism cannot be explicitly quantified poses a 
conundrum for those who seek to calculate the economic impact of mega-events. 
Irrespective of improved patriotism‟s intangibility, it is an effect of events that should be 
included in an analysis of 2010 as a public policy. The inclusion is especially problematic 
since there is a great deal of uncertainty as to whether it will actually transpire or not. 
And then, if it does happen, the degree to which it may occur is also an unknown. 
Feelings of nationalism might be intense as in 1995 and 1998, or may only extend to flag 
waving at tournament matches. It should not be expected as a given that hosting 2010 
will aid the growth of national unity in South Africa. However, the impact on nationalism 
will be, to a degree, offset of the cultural standardisation as discussed in the previous 
section. In that light, van der Merwe (2006: 12) offered a final caveat for 2010, and 
posited that it is improbable that the event would emulate the successes of 1995 because 
nationalist “sentiments are likely to be diluted in the face of a more consumerist global 
football milieu and the powerful role of FIFA in deciding who gets what, where and 
when.”  
 
5.10. Image Implications 
 
Chapter 1 explained the potential benefits that hosting mega-events can have for the 
international perception of the host, and Chapter 2 offered case studies of previous mega-
events and the image effects that accompanied them. It was observed that a positive 
image implication for the host was not a necessary consequence of hosting an event. 
Administrative problems, congestion, security breaches, inadequate infrastructure and 
poor facilities can contribute to a negative image effect, where the international 
reputation of the host is worsened due to the event (Chalkley and Essex, 1998; Gursoy 
and Kendall, 2006; Kim et al., 2006). The following section attempts to detail the factors 
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which could occur during 2010 that may cultivate both positive and negative image 
effects for South Africa.  
 
With 53% of South Africans concerned about crime levels during 2010 (FIFA, 2009f), it 
has the capacity to derail efforts of using the World Cup as a medium for improving 
South Africa‟s image abroad. Crime is recognised as a serious, endemic problem in South 
Africa with murder, aggravated robbery and high jacking victims per 100 000 of the 
population predicted to be approximately 38.6, 247 and 30 respectively during 2010. To 
put the figures in context, the murder rate in England, between 2005 and 2007, was 
around 1.4 deaths per 100 000 (BBC, 2009a). Crime can negatively affect tourism, and 
damage investor confidence (Black, 2007: 271). Generally, foreign “visitors approach 
developing nations with trepidation due to worries about crime” (Baade and Matheson, 
2004a: 1093), a situation compounded for 2010 due to South Africa‟s poor reputation 
regarding crime (Cornelissen et al., 2008: 63). If the event is characterised by incidents of 
crime there is the risk that the 2010 World Cup in South Africa becomes primarily 
associated with crime in the international community, which would be a considerable 
challenge for the country to overcome and reform the international perception. However, 
the downside risk cannot be allowed overshadow the potential positive effects, and 
dictate whether South Africa decides to host international events or not. 
 
Despite the concerns, it is noteworthy that South Africa‟s previous hosting of 
international events has been largely crime free: “The ability of the South African 
security forces to safeguard major events has been internationally recognised with 141 
international events having taken place in South Africa since 1994 without any serious 
incident” (South Africa.info, 2009c). The observation can be explained by the 
distribution of violent crime in South Africa, in that it is significantly more prevalent in 
non-tourist areas. The 2009 Confederations Cup was staged with only minor occurrences 
of crime, with the most publicised incidents being thefts from the rooms of the Egyptian 
and Brazilian teams. These were isolated cases (SAPA, 2006h) and did not detract from 
the overall successful staging of the Cup. There was no violent crime related to the event. 
The South African government is however aware of the risk that staging the event could 
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negatively impact on the nation‟s international image and has thus “invested R1.3bn in 
security, providing an additional 41,000 police and 45,000 stewards” (BBC, 2009a). 
Irrespective of comprehensive planning for the prevention of crime during the World 
Cup, there can never be absolute certainty that the event will be violent crime free. That 
there will be petty crime and theft is to be expected but it should not tarnish the nation‟s 
reputation, although a single instance of violent crime could detrimentally affect the 
nation‟s image and to a large degree is dependent on the international media‟s treatment 
of crime.  
 
A second factor which may lead to a deterioration of the South African image would be 
the perception of inadequate infrastructure and poor event stadia. Baade and Matheson 
(2004a: 1091) warned that necessary expenditure on infrastructure should be higher in 
developing nations. In South Africa, there is the risk that infrastructure will not be 
sufficient. Hosting mega-events “are often used by governments ... to encourage 
infrastructural developments and improvements” (Cornelissen, 2004: 41). The World 
Cup is no different and a concerted effort has been made to use the event as a catalyst for 
infrastructural projects (Bob and Swart, 2007: 381).  
 
With all stadia meeting FIFA requirements, the quality of stadia is not a justified concern. 
Failure to complete construction of stadia before the tournament begins could be have 
negative effects on the nation‟s image; however, the stadia are set to be fully constructed 
well before the event, with the Moses Mabhida Stadium to be completed by October 
2009 (BuaNews, 2008) and the Green Point Stadium on course to be finished by mid-
December (Cape Times, 2009c).  
 
A more founded concern relates to the inefficiency and inadequacy of infrastructural 
networks, specifically public transport. By 2008, it was estimated that the Department of 
Transport would spend R11.7bn on the improvement of the South African public 
transport system in line with the 2010 Transport Action Plan; with spending on the 
national highways, the railways, the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems, inner-city, 
airport-city links and freight services. Further, an additional R19.5bn was set to be spent 
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by the Airports Company of South Africa on an airport infrastructure expansion 
programme (GCIS, 2008c). By late 2009, the estimated cost of improvements on 
transport infrastructure was R13.6bn (Financial Mail Campus, 2009: 6). With so many 
different projects underway it is difficult to determine whether or not the whole system 
will be completed before the event and be able to satisfy the increased demand for public 
transport during 2010.  
 
The R25bn Gautrain that will link Johannesburg and Pretoria is unlikely to be fully 
operational in time for the World Cup (SAPA, 2009i); however the line was never 
expressly constructed with the objective of servicing World Cup tourists. The BRT 
system was launched in Johannesburg in September 2009 amidst threats of violence from 
taxi operators who were concerned that the BRT would reduce demand for their services 
(Mail and Guardian, 2009c). The success of the BRT remains to be seen as networks are 
yet to be operational in other cities and the risk of attacks by taxi operators may deter 
users. In terms of airports, the King Shaka International Airport outside Durban has been 
predicted to be operational before the end of 2009 (GCIS, 2009a). The three examples of 
infrastructural projects offer a cross-section of investments related to 2010 and their 
readiness for the event. It is expected of South Africa, as hosts of the World Cup, that the 
nation can provide visitors with adequate and efficient public transport; however it is 
uncertain whether the public transport system will be entirely sufficient for the event.  
 
In summing the total costs of staging the World Cup, costs of improving transport 
infrastructure will not be included in full. The reasoning is that these projects were 
necessary for the development of the country, and important in improving efficiency. The 
expenditures would have occurred irrespective of the event. Treasury spokesperson 
Lindani Mbunyuza explained that total cost figures should “be seen in the proper context. 
In effect, 2010 has been a catalyst for government to tackle large-scale infrastructure 
projects. Various projects that had been considered for the future were brought forward" 
(Fin24, 2009a). It is difficult to discern which expenditures are explicit results of the 
World Cup and which are not. Only stadia, football training facilities and developments 
in the area‟s directly surrounding stadia should be regarded as explicit 2010 costs. For, 
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example, the R900 000 re-development of Kempston Road in Port Elizabeth (Soccer 
World Cup 2010, 2009) would arguably not have been undertaken had the event not 
necessitated the building of the Nelson Mandela Stadium, which in turn, required that the 
road was improved. The cost of such event-specific projects should be included in the 
total costs of staging. Thus, given that the spending on infrastructure is estimated to be 
between R11.7bn and R13.6bn, and assuming that between 10% and 25% of total 
expenditure was on event-specific developments, then the cost of infrastructure for 2010 
can be approximated to be within the R1.27bn to R3.16bn
25
 range.  
 
So far the analysis of the image implications of 2010 has focussed on the potential 
negative effects that the event can have on South Africa. However, successful hosting can 
aid in eroding negative international impressions that might exist. A crime free and 
efficient hosting can dispel ideas that the country is riddled with crime and 
infrastructurally inept. The reception that World Cup tourists receive from locals is a 
crucial factor in determining how the event impacts upon the nation‟s image. Kim et al. 
(2006: 89) maintained that the support of the host population is essential for the success 
of mega-events, where not only the success of the event heavily depends upon the 
goodwill of the locals, “but also the longevity of these positive impacts is likely to be 
determined by the level of local residents‟ support for the event.” Gursoy and Kendall 
(2006: 617) agreed that successful hosting “requires increased support and hospitality 
from locals.” Hence, the disposition of locals towards visitors is one of the most 
important factors that determine the impact of the host‟s image (Ap and Zhou, 2009: 1). 
South Africa‟s image was regarded to be at its lowest ebb, since the end of Apartheid, 
during the May 2008 xenophobic violence (International Marketing Council, 2009); the 
event can aid in repairing the tarnished reputation. 
 
One of the keys to the improved German image after 2006 was their welcoming nature 
towards visitors (Kersting, 2007; Florek and Breitbrath, 2007; Maennig and Porsche, 
                                                          
25
 Using an average spending figure of R12.65bn, (R11.7bn + R13.6bn)/2, and applying the proportions of 
event-specific spending, the range is calculated. 
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2008). After the 2009 Confederations Cup in South Africa, the USA national team‟s 
coach Bob Bradley commented that:  
"We have had an amazing time in South Africa. The way people have treated us like friends, their 
passion for the game, the security personnel who actually smile, the organisation - in all those 
ways it's been a great experience and every man in our squad would say they can't wait to 
complete the task of qualifying and get back here next year" (Goal, 2009).  
It is worth noting though, that the USA team exceeded expectations at the tournament, 
having performed well, but the side eventually lost in the final to Brazil. With that in 
mind, it is appropriate to reflect on an observation by Oldenboom (2008) who suggested 
that the post-event image of the host in different countries may depend on the 
performance of the country‟s national football team, where the image of the host 
improves in successful countries and deteriorates in unsuccessful countries. Therefore, 
the image of South Africa post-2010 is likely to differ around the world. Kim and 
Morrison (2005: 245) agreed that international tourists are not homogenous and will 
likely leave South Africa with differing perceptions. 
 
The crime, infrastructure and resident behaviour implications on South Africa‟s image 
can only be assessed after the event has been staged, hence reducing the applicability of 
purely economic impact studies. As with nation building, while the direction of the effect 
is unidentified, the extent to which the image effects will occur is also an unknown. 
Taking all factors into account, the net effect of 2010 on the South African image is 
thought to be most relevant to growth of tourism and FDI. The two factors have the 
potential to increase long-term growth rates of the domestic economy. While the World 
Cup is a catalyst for a new image, Ritchie and Smith (1991: 3) warned that mega-event 
hosts
 “
must anticipate a significant rate of awareness and image decay,
 
and take steps to 
counter it, if they wish to remain visible
 
and competitive in the international 
marketplace.”  
 
5.11. Tourism 
 
Increased short and long-term tourist numbers are regarded as a primary tangible benefit 
of hosting a mega-event. It has thus far been established that while there would be 
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increased tourists to South Africa during 2010, that number would be offset by a 
crowding out effect whereby regular tourists are displaced by event tourists (Baade and 
Matheson, 2004a; Crompton, 2006; Humphreys and Prokopowicz, 2007; Preuss, 2002). 
In addition, it was suggested that event tourists may not consume traditional sightseeing 
opportunities in the same way that ordinary tourists might (ETOA, 2005; Kurtzman, 
2005).  
 
South Africa is the 2
nd
 most popular tourist destination in Africa, behind Egypt, and 25
th
 
in the world, measured by tourist arrivals (World Tourism Organisation, 2008: 10). 
Hence, South Africa is, without the effects of the World Cup, a popular destination. For 
the 2010 context it is important to distinguish between short and long-term benefits of 
tourism. In the short-term, it has been predicted that between 350 000 (BBC, 2007) and 
500 000 (SAPA, 2009j) foreigners could travel to South Africa for the 2010 World Cup. 
The figure of 400 000 visitors will be assumed in this section. With the impact of the 
crowding out effect, the net number of tourists to visit for the event is unsure. Japan and 
South Korea for the 2002 FIFA World Cup saw almost complete crowding out (Horne 
and Manzenreiter, 2004; Baade and Matheson, 2004a). Naturally, if a similar situation 
occurs for 2010, there would be no net impact on short-term tourism. Allmers and 
Maennig (2008: 19) have posited that the expected negative crowding out effect of 
regular tourism might not have its usual magnitude during 2010 because the World Cup 
is set to take place during the low season (winter) for tourism in South Africa. When the 
World Cup is hosted in northern hemisphere countries, it takes place during the summer, 
which is the peak tourist season. However, having plotted the average 2007 and 2008 
monthly “total number of foreign travellers who visited South Africa from Africa, 
overseas and unspecified countries, arriving through all ports of entry” (Statistics South 
Africa, 2008), Allmers and Maennig‟s (2008: 19) argument loses validity. As is evident 
in Figure 6, tourist numbers are predictably peaked during the summer months, 
December and January. June has the lowest monthly visitors, however in July numbers 
rise by approximately 21%, offsetting the lull in the previous month. South Africa‟s 
moderate climate may explain why there is no winter-long decline in tourist visitors, as 
winter can be warmer than summer in some European countries. 
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Figure 6. Mean monthly tourist arrivals to South Africa (averaged over 2007 and 2008 
monthly arrivals).   
Source: Statistics South Africa (2008). 
 
Increased prices will stimulate a crowding out effect of ordinary local and foreign tourists 
during World Cup. Higher accommodation prices are a certainty, for example: „Match 
Event Services‟ will be charging R5 382 a night for a four person tent at the Skukuza 
Camp in the Kruger Park, which ordinarily costs R550 (Sunday Times, 2009b). 
Crowding out of local tourists would not reduce domestic economic activity unless those 
individuals decide to travel abroad instead of either postponing their domestic trip or they 
decide to spend their travelling funds elsewhere in the domestic economy. Since there is a 
consensus academic opinion that predicts a crowding out from hosting mega-events 
(Baade and Matheson, 2004a; Crompton, 2006; Humphreys and Prokopowicz, 2007; 
Preuss, 2002), and that there is empirical evidence to support the effect, it should be 
expected that it will accompany 2010. The degree to which it occurs is a matter of 
guesswork; through application of a sensitivity analysis using differing percentages of 
crowding out of regular tourists; however the net impact on tourist expenditure can be 
analysed.   
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In order to apply crowding out percentages to the regular tourists, the number of tourists 
to visit South Africa during June and July of 2010 need to be predicted under the non-
World Cup circumstances. Approximately 1 536 000 tourists visited South Africa during 
June and July of 2008. The tournament is staged over a month, but is assumed that the 
effects of crowding out will also occur for 2 weeks before and 2 weeks after the event. 
The year-on-year compounded growth rate of tourist arrivals to South Africa between 
2002 and 2008 was 6.9% (South African Tourism, 2009: 10). However, the figure cannot 
be treated simply with the compounded growth rate to calculate the 2010 figures as 
global growth in tourist numbers slowed to 1.3% during 2008, and South African arrivals 
decreased to 5.5% from 8.3% in 2007. It should be expected that with the global 
recession of 2009, the growth rates will decline even further. It is assumed that the 2009 
growth rate slows to 2.6%, double the global average, and obtains the 2008 level in 2010 
due to the recovery of the global economy, on which basis the following table can be 
derived: 
 
Table 7a. Estimated average monthly tourist arrivals in South Africa over June and July. 
Year 
Average monthly tourists  
during June and July 
% Growth on previous year  
2008 actual 1 536 000 5.5 
2009 est. 1 575 000 2.6 
2010 est. 1 660 000 5.5 
Source: Statistics South Africa (2008). 
 
Given that an estimated 1.66 million tourists would ordinarily be expected to visit South 
Africa during the 2 month period around the World Cup and using the estimate of 
400 000 visitors, 24%, or only 1 in 4, of ordinary visitors would need to be put off 
travelling to South Africa during the Cup in order for complete crowding out to occur.
26
 
There are however, significant differences between the characteristics of the „ordinary‟ 
and the World Cup visitor to South Africa, such as the average length of a visit and the 
amount of spending during their stay in the country. Table 7b calculates the average 
spending by an „ordinary‟ tourist to South Africa. 
                                                          
26
 400 000/1 660 000 = 24.09 % 
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Table 7b. Ordinary tourist expenditure in South Africa.  
Total foreign direct tourist expenditure in South Africa in 2008 
(excluding capital expenditure) in billions of rands 
74.2 
Millions of Tourists to South Africa in 2008 9.6 
Expenditure per ordinary tourist in rands 7 729 
Source: South African Tourism (2009). 
 
Under the minimal „Set One‟ assumptions, used in the calculation of total demand for the 
rand,
27
 it was estimated that expenditure per visitor would be R32 750 spent over a 15 
night period. 
 
Table 7c. Predicted tourist spending during the month of the 2010 tournament (in 
rands).
28
 
 
A B C D = A x C 
Type of Tourist 
Predicted 
tourists 
Average 
spending per 
day (R) 
Average 
spending per 
trip (R) 
Total monthly 
tourist 
spending (Rbn) 
World Cup 400 000 2 185 32 750 13.1 
All Non-World Cup  1 660 000 970 7 750 12.9 
Tourist Spending with 
no crowding out 
    
 
26 
Non-World Cup African 
entering by land 
1 260 000
29
 775 6 200 7.8 
Other Non-World Cup
30
 398 000
31
 1 540
32
 12 300 4.9 
Source: South African Tourism (2009). 
Note: „Total monthly tourist spending‟ in Table 7c was calculated by multiplying „Average spending per trip” by 
„Predicted tourists‟ [Column D = Column A x Column C].  
 
                                                          
27
 See page 52 for 2010 GDP calculation. 
28
 Calculations are subject to rounding. 
29
 The composition of non-World Cup tourists was determined by multiplying the number of all non-World 
Cup tourists by the 2008 proportion of African tourists entering by land against all other tourists.  
7.1m/9.6m = 0.76, hence, 1 660 000 x 0.76 = 1 261 600 (South African Tourism, 2009: 17). 
30
 Refers to all other tourists to South Africa that who are not visiting because of the World Cup and who 
are not entering by land. 
31
 1 660 000 – 1 261 600 = 398 400 
32
 12 300/8 = 1537.5 
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It is striking that even with less than half the number of visitors, spending by World Cup 
tourists is estimated to be more than double that of their non-World Cup counterparts. A 
more careful analysis, however, shows that the figures are plausible. The average 
spending by the ordinary tourist is approximately R7 750, allocated over an average stay 
of 8 nights in the country (South African Tourism, 2009: 33). The total average spend is 
brought down by the average of  African tourists that enter South Africa by land; such 
individuals constitute 74% of all visitors and spend on average R6 200 per trip (South 
African Tourism, 2009); which equates to R775 per day over the average visit of 8 
nights. Excluding visitors from neighbouring countries, the per visitor expenditure 
increases to R1 540 per night. The World Cup tourist is expected to visit South Africa for 
15 days, approximately double the ordinary length, and have an average spend per night 
estimated at R2 185. When the characteristics of the tourists to South Africa is analysed, 
it is evident that the crowding out effect might not have as significant an impact during 
2010 as it has been at other mega-events. It is due to the vastly different spending 
patterns between African tourists entering by land, who make up the majority of total 
tourists, and the World Cup tourist. Given the predicted average spending, one World 
Cup tourist can effectively crowd out 5 African tourists entering by land, but would still 
result in an estimated net tourist spending increase of R1 750. One World Cup tourist is 
equivalent to 5.28 African tourists entering by land, and 2.66 „other‟ non-World Cup 
tourists.  
 
Using the information derived from Table 7c, the net effect on tourist spending of 
crowding out can be calculated: 
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Table 7d. Net effect on tourist spending for assumed levels of crowding out (in billions of 
rands). 
E F = (I – E)R12.87bn G 
Crowding out of 
tourists as a % 
Total non-World Cup tourist 
spending at set crowding out 
level (Rbn) 
World Cup tourist 
spending (Rbn) 
0 12.87 13.1 
25 9.65 13.1 
50 6.43 13.1 
75 3.22 13.1 
100 0 13.1 
 
H = F + G I = R25.97bn - H J = I/G K = G - I 
Total tourist 
spending 
(Rbn) 
Decrease in tourist spending 
due to the crowding out 
effect (Rbn) 
Crowding out effect 
as % of World Cup 
spending 
Net benefit of 
World Cup 
(Rbn) 
25.97 0 0 13.1 
22.75 3.22 25 9.88 
19.53 6.43 49 6.67 
16.32 9.65 74 3.45 
13.1 12.87 98 0.24 
Source: South African Tourism (2009). 
Note: 1) „Total non-World Cup tourist spending at set crowding out level‟ was one minus the crowding out percentage 
multiplied by the „Total tourist spending‟ of non-World Cup visitors figure of R12.87bn. 
2) The „Effect of crowding out‟ was calculated as „Total tourist spending per month‟ subtracted from the assumed 
tourist spending figure, with no crowding out, R25.97bn. 
3) The „Net benefit of the World Cup‟ was attained by subtracting the „Decrease in tourist spending due to the 
crowding out effect,‟ derived under the assumed crowding out percentages, from „World Cup tourist spending.”  
 
As indicated in Table 7c, assuming no crowding out; total foreign spending during the 
World Cup period is estimated at R25.97bn per month. As the assumed crowding out 
levels rise, World Cup spending manages to comfortably offset the losses from those 
tourists that are put off travelling during the event. At 50% crowding out, there is still a 
significant positive net impact of the event on spending, contributing an estimated 
R6.67bn. Even at the 100% level during the tournament, there is still a predicted net 
increase of approximately R235m; it is however only around 1.8% of the total predicted 
spending of World Cup tourists. 
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A more accurate analysis would account for different crowding out effects on various 
segments of the ordinary visitor population. Hence, the economic impact of the crowding 
out depends on the origins of those who are crowded out. Tourists who travel from 
overseas, and not neighbouring nations, are more likely to be displaced over the World 
Cup period as more planning and expenditures are involved; for many such tourists it 
may be a „once in a lifetime‟ trip which they will likely not risk being spoilt by the World 
Cup. Neighbouring African tourists may make the trip many times and hence see the 
World Cup as an extra reason to travel, since the vacation is easier to organise, hence 
minimal crowding out can be expected. The same process as used above was applied in 
Table 7e, however, African tourists entering by land and other non-World Cup (Ordinary) 
tourists were treated with different expected levels of crowding out.  
 
Table 7e. Total effect on tourist spending, under the assumption that 10% of African 
tourists entering by land are crowded out (in billions of rands). 
L M = D x L N = D(1 – 0.1) O 
Crowding out of non-
World Cup other 
tourists (%) 
Total other tourist 
spending at 
crowding out level 
(Rbn) 
Total spending by 
African visitors, 
entering by land 
(Rbn) 
World Cup 
tourist Spending 
(Rbn) 
0 4.9 7.03 13.1 
25 3.67 7.03 13.1 
50 2.45 7.03 13.1 
75 1.22 7.03 13.1 
100 0 7.03 13.1 
 
P = M + N +  O Q R S 
Total spending 
per month (Rbn) 
Decrease in tourist 
spending due to the 
crowding out effect 
(Rbn) 
Crowding out effect as 
% of World Cup 
Spending 
Net Benefit of 
World Cup (Rbn) 
25.02 0.94 7 12.16 
23.8 2.16 17 10.94 
22.58 3.39 26 9.71 
21.35 4.61 35 8.49 
20.13 5.84 45 7.03 
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Note: There are a few differences to the calculations in Table 7e compared to those in Table 7d: 
1) Non-World Cup tourists were separated into „Total other tourist spending‟ and „Total spending by African visitors, 
entering by land,‟ where the former was the function of the variable crowding out level and the later was the result of 
the fixed 10%. 
2) „Total spending per month‟ is the sum of all three spending categories. 
 
Despite that the „other‟ tourists only contribute towards 26% of total visitors, the segment 
makes 38% of all tourist expenditures in South Africa.
33
 Therefore, when they are 
crowded out, the net impact on total spending is more prominent than when African 
tourists are. Nonetheless, that there are far more African tourists means that even when 
there is 100% crowding out of „other‟ tourists, it equates to only 45% of total World Cup 
spending being offset. The African tourists offset the losses from „other‟ tourists. The 
results are mimicked when the higher levels are applied to African tourists. 
 
Table 7f. Summarised effects of different assumed levels of crowding out of African 
tourists entering by land.
34
 
Crowding out of non-World 
Cup ‘other’ tourists (%) 
Total crowding out effect as % of World Cup spending 
at assumed level of African crowding out 
10% 20% 30% 
0 7 13 19 
25 17 22 28 
50 26 32 38 
75 35 41 47 
100 45 51 56 
 
There is a linear 6% increase in total crowded out spending, as a result in a 10% increase 
in crowded out Africans.
35
 Similarly, there is a fixed 9.34% increase in total crowded out 
spending from a 25% increase in the level applied to „other‟ tourists. The worst case 
scenario of 100% crowding out of non-World Cup „other‟ tourists and 30% of African 
tourists entering by land, leads to only 56% of the World Cup spending being negated; 
                                                          
33
 4.985bn / 12.865bn  x 100 = 38%  
34
 See Appendix E for full calculations.  
35
 The existence of 5% and 6% increases in total crowding out in Table 7f are due to rounding. 
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and the event is still estimated to positively contribute R5.47bn
36
 once it makes up the 
losses from crowded out regulars. A realistic scenario to expect is 75% crowding out of 
non-World Cup „other‟ tourists and 20% of African tourists entering by land, which 
equates to 41%, or R5.39bn, of the World Cup spending being crowded out, leaving a net 
gain of R7.71bn.
37
 After applying different crowding levels to different visitors, it is 
evident that the impact of displaced tourists should not completely overwhelm the short-
term economic benefits of the event. That the predicted average spending from the World 
Cup is greater than the ordinary average means that spending lost from one displaced 
ordinary tourist does not cancel out the expenditure of one World Cup tourist; there is a 
remainder which still contributes to total event spending.  
 
In the long-term there is no reason to think that regular tourists who are put off visiting 
the region during the event will decide to never visit. That an individual does not want to 
visit a region during a specific period does not mean that the opportunity for the region to 
benefit from that individual‟s interest has been forgone. Regular tourists should rationally 
re-schedule a trip to a time when the region is not focussed on an event that it is hosting. 
It is equivalent to a re-distribution of tourist revenues over time. Hence, the crowding out 
effects should have little long-term effect. Therefore, only visitors that travel in South 
Africa for the World Cup, who would not have ordinarily done so, should be regarded as 
contributing to enhanced economic activity (Crompton, 2006). However, to determine 
how many tourists to which the condition would apply, a survey would need to be 
conducted during the tournament asking tourists which statement described their decision 
to visit South Africa: 
 Statement 1: Whether they visited South Africa only because of the World 
Cup and would probably never have travelled there had it not been hosted. 
 Statement 2: Whether they travelled to South Africa during the World Cup 
because they had always wanted to or were planning to visit at some stage, 
and as such decided to do so during the World Cup as an added incentive. 
                                                          
36
 See Appendix E2. 
37
 See Appendix E1. 
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Those who identify with statement 1 can be regarded as having contributed to causing 
increased long-term tourist revenue to increase above levels that would have occurred 
had the World Cup not been hosted in South Africa. However, individuals that are 
described by statement 2 represent the re-distribution of revenues over time, and as such 
do not cause cumulatively greater revenues even though 2010 tourist spending may be 
higher. Hence, the reliability of studies that calculate predicted economic impacts is 
undermined.   
 
Grant Thornton (2003: 3) cited an “increased demand for tourism facilities” over the 
World Cup period. However, some studies have argued that visitors to an event are “not 
interested in tourism, they are interested in sport” (ETOA, 2005; 9), and hence significant 
increased consumption of usual tourism-related goods and services should not be 
expected. However, for the 2010 context, the issue is not as likely to be relevant. Given 
South Africa‟s geographic location it should be expected that once a visitor is in the 
country for the World Cup they would visit for a while. In Germany, for example, it was 
possible for individuals to fly into a host city, watch a fixture then leave without 
frequenting any tourist sites. While it is also possible in South Africa, it is less likely to 
occur to any great extent. Between World Cup fixtures, visitors have to fill their time and 
sightseeing opportunities would be expected to be patronised. Further, due to South 
Africa‟s distance from Europe, Asia and the Americas visitors may not anticipate re-
visiting in the future and thus would use the chance to undertake tourist activities while 
they are in the country, and not put them off until a future visit.  
 
Using the previous assumptions regarding growth of tourists to South Africa, 
approximately 10.4 million visitors are expected to travel to the country in 2010.
38
 The 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Marthinus van Schalkwyk has 
maintained that South Africa should reach its target of 10 million visitors in 2010 (GCIS, 
2009b). The assumed growth rates appear to be in line with government predictions. 
Nonetheless, using the more conservative estimate of 10 million total visitors in 2010, 
and the upper end of predicted visitors for the World Cup of 450 000, World Cup-specific 
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 (9.591)(1.026)(1.055) = 10.38 
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visitors compromise only approximately 4.5% of total visitors. It thus seems ill advised to 
expect significant increases in tourist revenues from the World Cup when it adds such a 
small proportion of the total, especially since that does not account for displaced tourists 
and those travellers characterised by „Statement 2‟ above (as they should cause decreased 
numbers in the future). Therefore, it is argued that in 2010, World Cup tourists can be 
expected to make up considerably less than 4.5% of total tourists to South Africa. Using 
the higher estimate of 10.4 million tourists, and the lower end 350 000 World Cup 
visitors, the figure drops to 3.4% before adjustments.  
 
When neglecting visitors from Africa in the calculation, the effects of the World Cup 
improve, but remain unimpressive. All African tourists account for 77% of the total,
39
 
and then assuming a stable relationship between the number of African and European 
tourists between 2008 and 2010, of the predicted 10 million in 2010, around 2.3 million 
arrivals from regions other than Africa can be expected. It has been estimated that total 
visitors to the World Cup from the continents other than Africa will be approximately 
220 000 (Herald, 2009a). Hence, World Cup tourists only account for less that 10% of 
total visitors from these regions during 2010, without making any adjustments. 
Furthermore, there is the risk that organiser‟s predictions of visitors have been 
overestimated, which would not be surprising given the inaccuracies prevalent in 
economic impact studies. For example, the Korean World Cup Organizing Committee 
predicted 640 000 international visitors for the World Cup. “However, only 403,466 
foreign tourists (including non-World Cup tourists) arrived for the period of the 2002 
World Cup” (Lee and Taylor, 2002: 601). Therefore, it is quite possible that the short-
term impact on tourism could be even less significant than suggested.  
 
It is thus important to be careful of overinvesting in facilities that are only required for a 
30 day tournament and then become redundant post-event. Former South African 
Football team goalkeeper and television pundit Andre Arendse (2009) took up a contrary 
stance, and confidently announced that: “We cannot over-invest for four weeks.” It is a 
proclamation that must be approached with caution. For example, in Cape Town, 8 new 
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 (306 961 + 7 087 452)/9 591 828 = 77% (South African Tourism, 2009: 17). 
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hotels have been built in the city centre for the World Cup, creating 16 000 new rooms 
within 45 minutes of the Green Point Stadium (Cape Times, 2009c). In Klerksdorp, in the 
North West, 2 new hotels and several guest houses have been built as the town has been 
identified as a „base camp city‟ (Times, 2009d). A team will be based there then travel to 
its fixtures. The post-event uses of the developments are dubious. Preuss (2002: 9) has 
warned that events can lead to an oversupply of hotel rooms in the future. Hence, 
investments in tourism facilities, similarly to investment in stadia, require careful 
planning to ensure that they are sustainable beyond the event. 
 
While there may be a noticeable increase in GDP from World Cup related tourism, the 
long-term benefits of marketing South Africa as an international tourist destination are 
expected to be the most lucrative benefits of hosting the event. Unfortunately, 
determining the long-term effects is problematic, as there is no rule to be inferred from 
previous events as to the post-event trajectory of tourism growth, and it is so dependent 
on the nature of the host‟s image after the event. Identifying the effect of an event on 
tourism is very subjective; it is rather difficult to discern between which factors have 
affected growth in the industry or caused it to decline, as was observed in Chapters 1 and 
2. Post-2010 would be similarly complicated since the tourist numbers to South Africa 
have followed a strong upward trend since 2002, as seen in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Millions of tourist arrivals to South Africa between 2002 and 2010 (2009 and 
2010 are estimated values). 
Source: South African Tourism (2009:13). 
 
Chapter 1 explained the potential benefits of increased international exposure; in short, 
the event‟s “media coverage increases brand awareness and recognition of the host as a 
tourism destination” (Ritchie and Smith, 3: 1991). Events are used by destination 
marketers as a means to change or enhance their destination's brand (Chalip and Xing, 
2006: 72). Through improving the global image of South Africa during 2010, the nation 
can come to be regarded as an internationally popular and viable tourist destination. Such 
a change of perception would make amends for any disappointments regarding tourism 
during the actual event. Therefore, the economic impact of tourism from the event itself 
may actually be irrelevant, in that the long-term implications, while not feasible to 
quantify accurately, are the most imperative outcome of hosting 2010. Ritchie and Smith 
(1991) conducted a rare study which attempted to quantify the intangible impacts of 
hosting mega-events; however, the focus was on increased „awareness‟ of host cities. 
However, the international community may be more aware of the host after the event, but 
that does not mean that the reputation has been enhanced, it is the nature of the awareness 
that is important. 
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5.12. Foreign Direct Investment 
 
The effect of 2010 on Foreign Direct Investment is similar to that on tourism in that it 
concerns long-term prospective benefits. Potential FDI due to the World Cup could 
provide “another important boost to the economy” (Bohlmann and van Heerden, 2005: 
12). That the World Cup may contribute towards 0.69% of GDP in 2010, or have a net 
economic impact of R21.3bn would be useful short-term gains. However, within the 
broader long-term growth pattern of the South African economy, the impact of the World 
Cup would be largely irrelevant. If it is to have a lasting effect, it is dependent on the 
event‟s capacity to stimulate long-term, sustained growth in FDI, as well as tourism. 
Organisers of mega-events emphasise their ability to attract foreign direct investment 
(Cornelissen and Swart, 2006; Kesenne, 2005). Empirically, it has been found that the 
relationship between economic growth and FDI is positive for South Africa (Fedderke 
and Romm, 2004: 26); therefore the World Cup may cause foreign investment-led 
national economic growth.  
 
FDI is defined by the International Monetary Fund (2009) as the “acquisition of at least 
ten percent of the ordinary shares or voting power in a public or private enterprise by 
non-resident investors.” The benefits lie in the transfer of sophisticated technologies and 
management practices from the investor to the developing economy, which in turn 
improves productivity and efficiency, theoretically causing increased employment and 
economic growth (Lim, 2001: 3). Hence, it can aid in bridging the divide in knowledge 
and human capital between developing and more advanced nations (Fedderke and Romm, 
2004: 5). There are multiple determinants of FDI, which include, but are not restricted to: 
real GDP per capita, infrastructural quality, labour cost, openness of markets, taxes and 
tariffs, and political instability (Asiedu, 2002: 110). Other factors include the size of the 
domestic market, existence of natural resources, well defined property rights and the 
nation‟s broader economic policies and stability (Cho, 2004). 
 
For the World Cup to promote growth in FDI, it would need to have an effect on the 
determinants. However, the only determinant which the World Cup can be associated 
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with improving is that of infrastructural quality, but the expenditure on infrastructure was 
made for the event and not as a consequence of the event. Nonetheless, a reliable and 
comprehensive infrastructural network “increases the productivity of investment and 
therefore stimulates FDI flows” (Asiedu, 2002: 111). De Mendonca and Nonnemberg 
(2004: 16) have found, through a causality test, that there is “evidence of the existence of 
causality in GDP leading to FDI,” and not vice versa. So, if GDP per capita is enhanced 
by 2010, FDI flows should theoretically increase. Using an approximate GDP estimate 
for 2010 of R2 364.01bn
40
, and given that the estimated population as of June 2009 was 
49.32 million (Statistics South Africa, 2009b: 3), and is assumed to grow at the current 
population growth rate of 1.07% (Statistics South Africa, 2009b: 8), GDP per capita may 
be estimated for 2010 as follows: 
 
Table 8a. Estimated GDP per capita in 2010 (in rands.) 
 
2010 Estimate (R) 
GDP (Rbn) 2 364 
Population 49 847 724 
GDP per capita 47 425
41
 
 
Using various estimates of economic impact of 2010, the potential impact on GDP per 
capita can be modelled as ranging between about R3 and R1 117, visible in Table 8b. 
 
Given the comprehensively documented shortcomings of the Grant Thornton (2003) 
study, it is more realistic to suggest the addition to GDP per capita should fall within the 
R3 to R327 bracket. Such a marginal addition should not warrant greater interest in South 
Africa as a FDI opportunity from the international community. Hence, improved 
infrastructure is likely to be the only legacy of the World Cup that could foster increased 
FDI, and unless this is the primary driver of increased FDI in South Africa, the events 
reputation as a catalyst for FDI growth is thoroughly undermined.  
 
                                                          
40
 See page 52 for 2010 GDP calculation. 
41
 The estimate is quite accurate, as the World Bank (2009a) estimated 2008 South African GDP at 
$276.764 billion, and the population to be 48.687 million (2009b); hence a GDP per capita estimate of 
$5685. Assuming a Rand-US dollar exchange rate of 8 Rand per 1 Dollar, there is a per capita GDP of 
R45 480. 
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Table 8b. The effect of estimated economic impacts of the World Cup on GDP per capita. 
Study 
Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal 
Predicted Economic Impact (Rbn) GDP with World Cup (Rbn) 
Mabugu and 
Mohamed (2008) 
n/a 0.16 n/a 2 364.17 
Bohlmann & van 
Heerden (2008) 
1.89
42
 16.30
43
 2 365.90 2 380.31 
Grant  
Thornton  
(2003, 2009) 
21.30 55.70 2 385.31 2 419.71 
 
GDP per capita  
with World Cup (R) 
World Cup related change  
in GDP per capita (R) 
Mabugu and 
Mohamed (2008) 
n/a 47 427.90 n/a 3.27 
Bohlmann & van 
Heerden (2003) 
47 462.55 47 751.63 37.92 327.00 
Grant  
Thornton  
(2003, 2008) 
47 851.93 48 542.04 427.30 1 117.40 
 
Ritchie and Smith‟s (1991) hypothesis that mega-events create awareness of the hosts 
may be relevant with regards to FDI. With South Africa set to receive significant 
international exposure, it may position the country so as to bring it to the attention of 
those looking to invest in emerging markets. However, South Africa is not neglected in 
terms of the FDI that it receives. In 2007 the country was ranked as the 18
th
 most 
attractive destination by global management consulting firm AT Kearney (South 
Africa.info, 2008c). Further, South Africa received the 29
th
 most FDI worldwide during 
2008 with R900bn
44
 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009). It is apparent that South Africa 
is not actually on the periphery of the FDI market; it is regarded as a viable investment 
destination and foreigners are aware of the opportunities available. Furthermore, it could 
also be argued that the four week period for the tournament is too brief to cause a change 
in perceptions and is thus not sufficient to have lasting macroeconomic effects (Dohmen 
et al., 2006: 9). However, it does give a chance for South Africa to disprove the negative 
opinions, and so-called “Afro-pessimism” that some foreign individuals may have 
towards the country, showing that it is as capable as a developed nation (International 
                                                          
42
 0.08% x 2364.01 = 1.89 
43
 0.69% x 2364.01 = 16.3 
44
 The source quoted the FDI flow in US Dollars; thus the figure was converted to Rands through 
application of a R7.50 per $ exchange rate. $120bn x 7.5 = R900bn. 
125 
 
Marketing Council, 2009). But given the World Cup‟s inability to have an impact on the 
determinants of FDI, it means that the probability of increased flows due to the event 
appears to be minimal. 
 
5.13. Opportunity Costs – 2010 as a Public Policy 
 
To host a mega-event is a public policy decision, and the necessary expenditures are 
largely financed by government. In the same way that an expansion of the public 
healthcare system is a government policy, so is the staging of a mega-event; as such it 
should be regarded as a worthy use of public revenues. In essence, the event was given 
priority over an alternative policy. Hence, the merits of hosting events versus other forms 
of government spending should be addressed, since policy makers have opted to host the 
event at the expense of other policies. The opportunity costs of hosting 2010 are the 
forgone policies that might have taken place had South Africa not been successful with 
their 2010 bid.  
 
The popular view proposed by event organisers posits that “investment in infrastructure, 
a boost in current consumption and an increase in consumer confidence lead to extra 
growth opportunities” (Sterken, 2006: 388). The primary argument against hosting a 
mega-event as policy is that the purely economic gains are not significant enough to 
justify the expenditures. However, the “literature published in peer-reviewed academic 
journals differs strikingly from the predictions in „economic impact studies.‟ No 
retrospective econometric study found any evidence of positive economic impact from 
professional sports facilities or franchises on urban economies” (Coates and Humphries, 
2003: 6). The opinion is widely held amongst scholars; Syzmanski (2002: 8) has 
maintained that “there is a substantial literature in economics explaining why the 
economic impact of major events is likely to be quite small;” while Horne (2004: 1241) 
agreed that the “almost unanimous conclusion” is that public investment in sports 
facilities only yields minimal economic benefits. Finally, Andranovich et al. (2002: 186) 
posited that “(m)ost economic analyses conclude that professional sports teams and 
sports facilities add little to a city‟s economic base.” Kesenne (2005: 13) simply claimed 
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that a “sports event has an overall negative economic effect on the host because the costs 
are larger than the benefits.” The position is founded in the argument that government 
expenditure on sporting infrastructure causes reductions in government services and 
increases government borrowing or taxation in order to generate the capital required, all 
of which produce a drag on the local economy (Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000: 100 - 
101). Following the same line of argument, Bohlmann and van Heerden (2008: 394) 
claimed that the 2010 World Cup would have a negligible short-term economic impact. It 
has become evident that the long-term implications of hosting are more significant, than 
the short-term economic gains.  
 
If government is determined to pursue an economic growth policy that is centred on 
tourism, Crompton (2006: 76) has posited that since investments in sporting 
infrastructure attract primarily local residents throughout the year and only occasionally 
foreigners, the construction of a convention centre would be preferable as it should attract 
non-residents throughout the year. The nature of employment in the tourism industry, 
which hosting mega-events tend to foster, needs to be considered. Horne and Whitson 
(2006: 80) argued that employment in the tourism industry is generally characterised by 
low earnings and poor productivity. Hence, investment in tourism is not the most 
effective strategy for improving the quality of local employment. Further, “as sports 
entertainment is a luxury good, the demand for specialized sports infrastructure in the 
wake of the World Cup or the Olympics will likely be lower in developing nations than in 
developed countries” (Baade and Matheson, 2004a: 1092).  
 
The argument against hosting is supported empirically; Sterken (2006: 388) used a “post-
war growth model” to show that generally, a positive impact might hold for the Olympic 
Games, but not for the FIFA World Cup. Chang Se-Moon (2002) in a comparison of pre-
World Cup and the post-World Cup GDP growth rates of the World Cup host countries 
between 1954 and 1998 found that of the 12 events, post-World Cup year growth rate 
was higher than the pre-World Cup year growth rate eight times and lower four times. 
“The average growth rate for post-World Cup years was 3.083 per cent, while the average 
growth rate for pre-World Cup years was 2.233 per cent” (Horne and Manzenreiter, 
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2004: 192).
45
 While the study showed that there could be economic merit in hosting the 
event, it implies that higher GDP growth rates will not necessarily follow the event. 
Furthermore, identifying a causal link between the GDP growth rates and the World Cup 
is problematic. The growth rates should be looked at within the context of the global and 
national economic cycles that prevailed during the 3 year period. 
 
Given the common position of academics, the reasoning behind a government‟s decision 
to host a mega-event is curious. Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000: 110) explained that 
substantial benefits can accrue to a few individuals, which motivates them to become 
politically active in supporting the use of tax revenue on sporting events and 
infrastructure. Kesenne (2005: 13) agreed that “while some industries and institutions 
profit, the average tax payer turns out to be the dupe.” Horne and Whitson (2006: 84) 
identified the following sectors and individuals as having the most to gain from hosting 
an Olympic Games: construction companies and suppliers, engineers, architects, local 
security firms, media outlets, advertising and marketing firms, and real estate developers. 
However, there are those low income individuals who constitute the majority of the 
population, and are unlikely to benefit directly from the event and “whose quality of life 
depends upon well-functioning public services, and is diminished when these services are 
cut back in order to pay for Olympic infrastructure.” It can be assumed that similar 
consequences should accompany 2010 given the similarities between the Olympics and 
the FIFA World Cup. Hence, in bidding for a mega-event, there are few who stand to 
receive significant gains, and thus have the incentives to influence policy-makers.  
 
The effect of hosting may be more detrimental to those that are dependent on the state in 
a developing nation, such as South Africa, because expenditures on the World Cup may 
be more efficiently spent elsewhere in the economy. The „Bread, not Circus‟ argument 
claimed that “public money spent for the Games would be taken from other more 
important sectors (e.g. education and health)” (Kasimati, 2003: 339). In an analysis of the 
Cape Town Bid for the 2004 Olympic Games, Hiller (2000: 455) argued that when “local 
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 See Appendix F for full list of GDP growth rates of World Cup hosts in the years before and after their 
event. 
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people in the millions lack adequate housing, food and subsistence needs, preparing for a 
„circus‟ when people need „bread‟ will always appear inappropriate.”  
 
Waitt (2003: 204) noted that proponents of the „Bread and Circus‟ argument 
hypothesised that the “most socioeconomically disadvantaged will be those most 
absorbed by an event‟s „party‟ syndrome,” and as such benefit from hosting. However, 
Waitt (2003: 212) contested the view in a study of the utility that different individuals 
derive from an event: “No statistical difference in levels of enthusiasm could be found 
when the sample was differentiated by surrogate measures of class.” Furthermore, the 
fleeting enjoyment of the event cannot compare to a sustained improvement in the 
education or healthcare systems. Hall (2006: 68) maintained that “investment in 
accessible and affordable education, health and communications technology, along with a 
diversified job creation strategy is far more likely to have more long-term benefits for 
urban economic and social well-being than investment in elite mega-sports events and 
infrastructure.” Bass and Pillay (2008: 334) claimed that inequality “may even be 
exacerbated by the hosting of the World Cup.” In terms of distribution of wealth, Mabugu 
and Mohamed (2008: 20) found that the event would be regressive. Therefore, the World 
Cup as a public policy fails to meet the criteria for being Pareto Efficient, as some 
individuals are made worse off by the policy. In deciding to host mega-events, 
governments place great faith in the hypothetical economic and image implications, 
which this study has shown to be anything but a certainty, and are promoted at the 
expense of more assured policies. Mabugu and Mohamed (2008: 3) stated that the 2010 
World Cup spending came from a budget surplus. Hence, some may argue that since 
2010 was funded by a budget surplus then no alternate policy was forgone, even if funds 
were not taken away from other projects, 2010 funds could nonetheless have been used to 
augment current policies‟ budgets. However, by October 2009 the South African budget 
deficit had grown to 7.6% of GDP (Mail and Guardian, 2009d); it then follows that 
spending on the World Cup occurred at the expense of other public policies. According to 
Trevor Manuel (2005: 22), those infrastructural projects that were specifically related to 
hosting 2010, received priority funding over other projects. As an example of policy 
alternatives, given that the Green Point Stadium‟s final cost was estimated to be R4.4bn 
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(Sunday Times, 2009c), and that one Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) 
house of between 18m² and 23m² that has one bedroom and a combined lounge, 
kitchenette and toilet costs approximately R53 000 (Times, 2009c), then some 83 000 
such houses could be built at the same expense as only one new World Cup stadium. 
 
Baade and Matheson (2004a: 1092) further explained that “the cost of building a new 
stadium is not best described by the amount of money needed to build the facility but 
rather the value to society from the same amount of capital spent on the next best public 
project.” Hence, if the event is not the most productive use of government spending, 
“then it is plausible to suppose that it will undermine national productivity by reducing 
economic potential” (Syzmanski, 2002: 3). In this regard, Bohlmann (2006: 17) pointed 
out that the costs spent on mega-events should be kept down in terms of investment in 
capital that is specific to the event and will have a low net value after the event. Rather, 
the focus of investment should be on infrastructure such as telecommunications, transport 
and urban regeneration that “contribute significantly to the longer term development of 
the region.” The problem with using an event as a catalyst for infrastructural 
improvements is two-fold: first, the investment is happening in a relatively short space of 
time building up to the event as opposed to a more gradual process, and second, 
investment in infrastructure is not a nation-wide policy, but rather is centred on the cities 
that are host venues. The short period of accelerated government spending should cause a 
rise in interest rates, which would “render unprofitable some investment projects that 
would otherwise have taken place. Crowding out private sector investment in this way is 
likely to undermine long term growth prospects” (Syzmanski, 2002: 3). Further, the brief 
and intense spending can place unnecessary strain on the national budget, compounding 
the effects that hosting the event can have on other government projects (The described 
scenario is in contrast to the gradual development that preceded the Barcelona Games, 
which is alleged to have caused long-term growth in the region). That investment in 
infrastructure is not performed nation-wide, accentuates inequality issues. The host 
venues were chosen based on their current levels of development, they were the wealthier 
cities in the country initially, thus the event-induced infrastructural investments widen the 
gap between hosts and other cities.  
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Irrespective of the compelling arguments against pursuing mega-events as a public 
policy, they are a rare commodity that gives opportunities to developing nations that are 
not available elsewhere. In discussing developing nations Black (2007: 274) suggested 
events are a critical opportunity “among a declining array of legitimate policy alternatives 
for addressing these vulnerabilities and needs,” which relate to concerns regarding their 
position and importance in the global community. The issue is especially pertinent to 
South Africa, which is physically, culturally and economically distant from the majority 
of first world nations. The “globalization of the media along with space-time 
compression associated with technological developments in transport and communication 
which have provided increased commercial impact for sports events” (Hall, 2006: 60) 
allows South Africa to take itself to the rest of the world, bridging the divides that 
ordinarily exists. While the World Cup is driven by globalisation, it also works to 
promote globalisation (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 200). Mega-events are unique as a 
policy, and as such offer extraordinary opportunities that can potentially resolve the 
conundrum of how to integrate South Africa more comprehensively into the global 
community. Hence, 2010 as a public policy is not only appropriate, but possibly the only 
policy that could be pursued in order to achieve the required objective. However, it is 
debatable as to whether it is actually necessary for South Africa to become more 
integrated.  
 
A limited survey was conducted in order to ascertain whether the World Cup as a public 
policy was Pareto Efficient. Fifty respondents were interviewed, taken from the Rhodes 
University student community. The survey did not attempt to interview an accurate 
demographic cross-section of the South African population, and the results do not claim 
to be fully representative of the opinions of the „average‟ South African citizen. As the 
survey was an ancillary feature of the broader CBA study it was not deemed necessary it 
expand the sample; a more diverse set of respondents would not have added to the 
explanatory power of the results. The respondents were asked their opinion regarding 
government spending on the World Cup, and the role that the World Cup plays in 
integrating South Africa into the global community. Each interviewee was asked to 
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respond to 3 comments, where there were 5 possible responses to each: strongly agree, 
agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree. The statements were as follows: 
1) As a public policy, the World Cup is a worthy use of government funds. 
2) South Africa needs to be more integrated into the global community. 
3) The World Cup is a good way of helping South Africa become more 
integrated into the global community. 
The table below details the results of the survey: 
 
Table 9. Survey results. 
Statement 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Total Average 
1 7 21 13 7 2 24 0.48 
2 14 28 5 3 0 53 1.06 
3 16 23 7 4 0 51 1.02 
Source: Survey conducted at Rhodes University during September, 2009. 
 
If a respondent had chosen to „strongly agree‟ with the statement, their response was 
given a weighting of 2, conversely, a „strongly disagree‟ was weighted as -2. „Agree‟ and 
„disagree‟ were weighted as 1 and -1 respectively, while neutral was given a 0 weighting. 
Thus, summing the value of each response multiplied by its weighting gave a total, which 
when divided by the number of respondents gave the average opinion.
46
 
 
Hence, having looked at a segment of the population, the average respondent would then 
tend to believe that the World Cup is a worthy expenditure of public funds, but was not 
adamant about that position. They lie between „neutral‟ and „agree;‟ however the mode 
was „agree.‟ The results indicate that the criterion for Pareto Efficiency are further 
violated, as eight respondents either strongly disagreed or disagreed that the World Cup 
was worthy of government funds; it is not a policy that everyone prefers above all other 
alternatives.
47
 Nonetheless, a small majority (56%) of respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed that the World Cup was a worthy expenditure of government funds. Hence, the 
                                                          
46
 The survey technique was influenced by a similar method used by Cornelissen et al. (2008). 
47
 It is more difficult to determine if the Kaldor-Hicks parameters are satisfied. Only after the event, once 
the full benefits are known, can it be speculated as to whether the winners from 2010 could compensate the 
losers. 
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event could be justified as a public policy based purely on a popular vote. However, the 
respondents were naturally not informed about all the issues that have been identified so 
far in this study, and hence their opinion is biased by organiser rhetoric and mega-event 
fallacies. Aware of the sample‟s uninformed opinion, the survey was designed to negate 
any preconceived ideas that respondents might hold regarding the economic impact of 
2010. It allowed the ability of the event as a means of integrating South Africa into the 
international community to be determined. 
 
The second and third statements addressed the same issue. There was an overwhelming 
majority who agreed that South Africa needs to be become more integrated into the 
global community, with only 6% of respondents disagreeing. The average of 1.06 implies 
that the average respondent would agree with the statement. Therefore, the question that 
was posed earlier as to whether South Africa needed a policy to aid integration is 
answered, the popular opinion in the sample was that it is necessary. Hence, a policy 
could be justified if it pursued that objective. 
 
Given the responses to the second statement, the third statement sought to determine if 
the World Cup could aid in achieving the objective of statement two. There was 
approximately the same support for the statement that the integration could be fostered by 
hosting the World Cup as there was that there was a need for such as policy; 78% agreed 
or strongly agreed that 2010 would do so. That the respondents agreed that the World 
Cup can lead to integration, the event as a public policy appears to be justified as there 
are very few, if any, alternatives that can provide the exposure and increased awareness 
as the World Cup. However, whether the broader population would agree to the World 
Cup as a public policy or not, based on the integration argument alone, irrespective of 
negligible short-term economic gains, is debatable, and is an area for further research 
using a larger, more representative sample. 
 
To become more integrated is essentially just an alteration of the national image abroad, 
where other nation‟s perceptions of South Africa have changed; and hence South Africa 
can become more included in the international community. However, the question 
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remains as to whether the World Cup will make South Africa more integrated or not. If it 
does achieve the goal, then expenditure was acceptable; if not, it should be argued that 
the policy was a poor use of government funds. Either way, the final judgement on 2010 
as a public policy can only be made in the years following the World Cup. 
 
5.14. Determination of Net Benefits 
 
Having analysed the factors which can be regarded as being costs and benefits of hosting 
the 2010 World Cup, they need to be contrasted against each other in order to determine 
the cumulative net impact on South Africa, and hence ascertain whether expenditures on 
the event can be justified.  
 
The costs and benefits of hosting the event were identified in Chapter 5, and are 
categorised in the following tables according to the nature of their expected effects. Costs 
and benefits were grouped in one of three factor categories: monetary, intangible and 
potential. „Monetary‟ factors were quantified during the study; the cost was subtracted 
from its related benefit to calculate the net monetised value of the factor. The net values 
were then summed, to determine the total short-term financial impact of the event. 
Analytical judgments were made regarding the expected impact of „intangible‟ factors, 
which could not be assigned monetary values but should still be incorporated into an 
analysis of the total impact of the event. The net cost or benefit was determined 
subjectively, and given a rating between -3 and 3 to signify the expected weight that the 
factor will have on the total impact of the event. Negative values implied costs, and 
positive values represent factors which are benefits. The method allows an assessment of 
the likely net impact of intangible factors. Finally, „potential‟ factors were listed, and 
categorised as such for two reasons: first, there is no certainty that they will occur during 
or after 2010, and second, if they do occur, their extent is unknown. Some factors can 
only be counted as costs should they happen, and do not have any corresponding benefits. 
The direct cost of some of the benefits is the actual cost of staging the World Cup, 
without which, the benefit would not be possible. The factors were ranked as either costs 
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or benefits on the basis of expectations developed during the CBA. Again, the net effects 
of the potential factors were qualitatively summed. 
 
The contents of Tables 10a, 10b and 10c are based on the data collected and conclusions 
drawn during analysis in Chapter 5. 
 
5.14.1. Monetary Factors 
 
Table 10a. Monetary Costs and Benefits of hosting the 2010 World Cup. 
Factors Costs Benefits 
Benefit – Costs = 
(Rbn) 
Monetary 
Stadia Construction: 
R11.5bn 
Ability to stage 2010 and future 
events 
-11.5 
Stadia Maintenance: 
R950m 
Ability to stage 2010 and future 
events 
-0.950 
Transport Infrastructure: 
R1.27bn – R3.16bn 
Ability to stage 2010 and future 
events 
-2.215
48
 
Hosting*: R6.543bn Ability to stage 2010. -6.543 
Concessions and 
Merchandising: R550m 
Enjoyment of purchase -0.550 
Sponsorship: R1.6bn 
International exposure for South 
African companies 
-1.6 
Displacement effects: 
R5.39bn  
Short-term World Cup tourist 
spending: R13.1bn 
7.71 
Higher costs of collection 
and disruption of regular 
tax patterns 
Increased tax revenues 7.2 
Total 
 
Net Monetary Cost 
of R8.898bn  
Note: * „Hosting‟ costs include spending on broadcasting and telecommunications (R300m), event 
operations (R684m), safety and security (R1.3bn), event volunteer training (R25m), immigration support 
(R630m) (Financial Mail Campus, 2009: 6), payments to FIFA (R3.1bn), community mobilisation (R17m) 
and culture and legacy projects (R487m) (Mabugu and Mohamed, 2008: 7). 
 
The dominant cost is spending on stadia development. The implicit operational costs of 
staging 2010 are significant and act to reduce the net gains. The most significant benefit 
                                                          
48
Calculated as the average of the upper and lower limits of the estimated range. 
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of increased short-term tourist expenditure is offset by the crowding out effect of 
ordinary tourists. The summation of all the monetised costs and benefits results in the 
event deriving a net cost of approximately R8.9bn. 
 
The decision to host 2010 cannot be based solely on quantified factors as they do not 
reflect the full implications of hosting.  
 
5.14.2.  Intangible Factors 
 
Table 10b. Intangible Costs and Benefits of hosting the 2010 World Cup. 
Factors Costs Benefits 
Benefit – Costs = 
(Rbn) 
Intangible 
Wages paid 
Short-term employment in 
construction of stadia: 
between 12 000 and 20 000 
1 
Short-term inflation 
Higher profits for some 
providers of goods and 
services 
-2 
Congestion** - -2 
Lost local advertising - -1 
Petty crime** - -1 
Cultural standardisation 
Integration into the global 
community 
2 
Higher real estate prices for 
buyers 
Higher real estate prices for 
sellers 
0 
Erosion of governmental 
autonomy 
Opportunity to stage 2010 3 
- 
Human capital gains 
through transfer of expertise 
and volunteering 
2 
Total 
 
(+ 2) Marginal Net 
Benefit 
Note: ** The monetary cost of „Safety and Security‟ estimated at R1.3bn, is reflected in the „Infrastructural 
and Hosting‟ costs. The figure does not reflect the total cost, it is a minimum; widespread hooliganism, for 
example, would raise the total cost above the monetary cost. 
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Collectively, the intangible factors were adjudged to sum to a marginal net benefit. As 
financial costs significantly exceed benefits, and intangible benefits are only marginally 
greater than intangible costs, the event still is expected to be hosted at a net cost. This is 
however, not a definitive conclusion on the net impact of 2010, as the potential impacts 
have the capacity to comprehensively overshadow any short-term losses caused by the 
factors thus far identified. 
 
5.14.3.  Potential Factors 
 
Table 10c. Potential Costs and Benefits of hosting the 2010 World Cup. 
Factors Costs Benefits 
Benefit – Costs = 
(Rbn) 
 
 
 
Potential 
Long-term inflation - Cost 
Appreciation of the rand for 
importers 
Depreciation of the rand for 
exporters 
Uncertain 
Prostitution and human 
trafficking** 
- Cost 
Hooliganism and 
vandalism** 
- Cost 
Terrorism** - Cost 
Risk of spreading disease - Cost 
Environmental degradation - Cost 
Displaced Locals - Cost 
- „Feel-good‟ effect Benefit 
-  Growth of national unity  Benefit 
- Improved South African image Benefit 
- 
Increased long-term 
 tourism revenues 
Benefit 
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- 
Increased long-term foreign 
direct investment 
Benefit 
- Long-term employment Benefit 
Sub-Total 
 
 
Benefit, but the 
extent is uncertain 
Note: ** The monetary cost of „Safety and Security‟ estimated at R1.3bn, is reflected in the „Infrastructural 
and Hosting‟ costs. The figure does not reflect the total cost, it is a minimum; widespread hooliganism, for 
example, would raise the total cost above the monetary cost. 
 
It is the extent to which the potential factors occur that is the key determinant in 
calculating the net impact of the event. Their cost could be inconsequential or significant; 
in either instance, the extent will only be known after the event. It was concluded that the 
potential factors would derive a net benefit, but of an unknown scale.  
 
The World Cup was found to have the capacity to cultivate an improved image of South 
Africa in the international community. The image-dependent factors, long-term tourism 
and FDI, were observed to have the most significant bearing on the final economic 
impact of 2010; and require a long-term time frame over which they are analysed. That 
the most significant costs, being stadia, hosting and infrastructural, are quantifiable but 
the factors that offer the greatest potential benefits are indeterminate or intangible, 
renders the results derived from calculating the short-term impact not a true reflection of 
the economic impact. 
 
In an effort to quantify the effects of an improved international image, the Gordon 
Growth Model can be used to calculate the intrinsic value of a project or asset which is 
expected to derive benefits in perpetuity at a constant growth rate. The cash flow that is 
expected to be derived in the first year after the investment can be discounted by the 
discount rate minus the expected growth rate (McLeavey et al., 2008: 295): 
V = CF / (r – g) 
  Where, V =  present value 
   CF = cash flow in the period 
     r = discount rate 
     g = growth rate 
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The South African Reserve Bank (2009e) Prime Rate (10.5%), as the discount rate and 
the 2008 South Africa FDI flow (R900bn) were used as constant inputs into the model. 
Through application of different assumed growth rates, from 5% down to -2.5%, the 
intrinsic value of the World Cup in terms of increased FDI growth was calculated. The 
application shows the implications of a tarnished South African image post-2010, which 
reduces FDI in the future. 
 
Table 10d. Intrinsic Value of World Cup in terms of FDI.  
Increase in FDI in 2011 (Rbn) 45.0 22.5 9. 4.5 -4.5 -9 -22.5 
Growth Rate (%) 5 2.5 1 0.5 -0.5 -1 -2.5 
Discount Rate (%) 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Intrinsic Value (Rbn) 818.2 281.3 94.7 45 -40.9 -78.3 -173.1 
Note: The increase in FDI is calculated as the assumed growth rate multiplied by the proxy FDI flow of 
R900bn per year. 
 
An increase in FDI growth rate by 5% due to World Cup exposure for South Africa 
would completely eclipse the short-term monetised cost as identified previously. A 
change in investor sentiment can possibly affect FDI flows; however, apart from the 
improved infrastructure, which is a by-product of the event, 2010 is set to have little 
impact upon the determinants of FDI, and thus should not be expected to have a 
prominent impact on FDI growth. Should the World Cup only stimulate increased growth 
of between 0.5% and 1%, benefits between R45bn and R94.7bn would be derived. Thus, 
a seemingly insignificant effect on the nation‟s image abroad can have significant long-
term implications. A reduced rate would increase the cost staging far beyond the 
estimated R8.9bn.  
 
The same application can be used to model the long-term impact of tourism. Estimated 
tourist spending in 2010 was calculated as a function of the previously used assumed 
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growth rates in tourist visitors, and 2008 spending of R74.2bn was inflated to R80.32bn 
in 2010.
49
 Different assumed growth rates, between 10% and -10%, were applied. 
    
Table 10e. Intrinsic Value of World Cup in terms of tourist spending under positive 
growth rates.  
Increase in Tourist Spending in 2011 (Rbn) 8.032 6.024 4.016 2.008 0.803 
Growth Rate (%) 10 7.5 5 2.5 1 
Discount Rate (%) 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Intrinsic Value (Rbn) 1 606.3 200.8 73 25.1 8.5 
Note: The increase in tourist spending is calculated as the growth rate multiplied by the estimated tourist 
revenue for 2010 of R80.32bn. 
 
While, the respective values in Table 10e are appreciably lower than those in Table 10d, 
a higher growth rate can be assumed. Only a 1% increase in the growth rate of tourist 
revenues in perpetuity will overcome the net financial cost of the event, and result in a 
net benefit. Higher growth rates will result in even greater gains, and the net benefit of 
staging 2010 could not be doubted, especially when tourism growth is combined with 
increased FDI flows.  Tourism revenues may however be negatively affected by hosting 
2010. 
 
Table 10f. Intrinsic Value of World Cup in terms of tourist spending under negative 
growth rates.  
Decrease in Tourist Spending in 
2011(Rbn) 
-0.803 -2.008 -4.016 -6.024 -8.032 
Growth Rate (%) -1 -2.5 -5 -7.5 -10 
Discount Rate (%) 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Intrinsic Value (Rbn) -7.0 -15.4 -25.9 -33.5 -39.2 
 
                                                          
49
 74.2(1.026)(1.055) = 80.316 
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It is evident that South Africa has proportionately more to gain from the World Cup in 
the long-term than is at risk. While, a 5% increase in the tourist revenue growth has a 
present value of R73bn, a 5% decline leads to a R26bn loss of revenues. 
 
The model employed is however extremely sensitive to the inputs used; a marginally 
higher or lower discount rate has significant impacts on the intrinsic value. If the model is 
altered to determine the present value of the event over a fixed time period of benefits 
and not in perpetuity, the economic gains are still significant. 
 
Projected tourists revenues into the future, with growth compounding year on year, can 
be reduced to present values through application of the discount rate. A 20 year time 
horizon was assumed and the Prime Rate of 10.5% was applied as the discount rate. As 
before, 2010 tourist spending was estimated at R80.32bn. The Discounted Cash Flow 
Model was employed, as explained by Pearce et al. (1971: 35):  
V = Σ B / (1 + r)ᴺ 
 Where, V = present value 
     B = benefit the period 
      r = discount rate 
     N = time period 
 
Table 10g. Present Value of World Cup in terms of increased tourist spending. 
50
 
Growth  
Rate (%) 
10 7.5 5 2.5 1 -1 -2.5 -5 -7.5 -10 
Present  
Value (Rbn) 
140.1 85.6 47.1 19.7 7.1 -6.3 -14.4 -25 -33.1 -39.3 
 
The more realistic application derives similar results, although of a lower magnitude, to 
those assuming growth in perpetuity. Irrespective of FDI growth, a 2.5% increase in 
growth in tourist revenues, for 20 years, will cause the net economic impact of the event 
to be positive, when considering the R8.9bn net financial cost. Ignoring all other potential 
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 See Appendix G for full calculations. 
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benefits and intangibles, by expanding Table 9g to include the net financial costs, the net 
impact of the 2010 can be framed as follows: 
 
Table 10h. Net Economic Impact of 2010, accounting for only net financial costs and the 
present value of increased tourist spending over 20 years.  
Tourist Spending 
Growth Rate (%) 
10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 1.0 -1.0 -2.5 -5.0 -7.5 -10.0 
Present Value of 
Tourist Spending 
(Rbn) 
140.1 85.6 47.1 19.7 7.1 -6.3 -14.4 -25.0 -33.1 -39.3 
Net Financial Costs 
(Rbn) 
-8.9 -8.9 -8.9 -8.9 -8.9 -8.9 -8.9 -8.9 -8.9 -8.9 
Economic Impact of 
2010 (Rbn) 
131.2 76.7 38.2 10.8 -1.8 -15.2 -23.3 -33.9 -42 -45.2 
Economic Impact of 
2010 (% of GDP)
51
 
5.6 3.3 1.6 0.5 -0.06 -0.6 -1.0 -1.4 -1.8 -2.0 
 
The exercise displays the significance of the potential long-term benefits of staging 2010, 
and indicates that they comfortably overcome the net financial cost. It is evident that 
small changes in growth rate have prominent long-term implications. 
 
A final analysis of the long-term effects of the World Cup on tourist revenues, involves 
the use of differing growth rates during different periods over the 20 year time span. It is 
probable that the event‟s effects on growth will gradually dissipate over time. As 
described in Chapter 2, previous events, such as the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, saw 
declines in tourists in the years immediately following the event, with rates increasing 
again in later years. The assumed growth rates in the following table look to replicate that 
effect. The maximum growth rate is assumed to be maintained for 5 years, after which it 
linearly declines for 9 years to 1%, which is then reduced to zero by the end of 20 years. 
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 See page 52 for 2010 GDP calculation. 
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The projections result in a significant present value of World Cup induced tourist 
spending of R62.6bn. 
 
Table 10i. Present Value of World Cup induced tourist revenues, with changing tourist 
revenue growth rates 
Year 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
Total tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
Value of World Cup 
induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
Present Value of World 
Cup induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
2010 10 88.3 8.0 8.0 
2011 -10 79.5 -8.8 -8.0 
2012 5 83.5 4.0 3.3 
2013 7.5 89.8 6.3 4.6 
2014 10 98.7 9.0 6.0 
2015 10 108.6 9.9 6.0 
2016 10 119.5 10.9 6.0 
2017 10 131.4 11.9 5.9 
2018 10 144.5 13.1 5.9 
2019 9 157.6 13.0 5.3 
2020 8 170.2 12.6 4.6 
2021 7 182.1 11.9 4.0 
2022 6 193.0 10.9 3.3 
2023 5 202.6 9.6 2.6 
2024 4 210.7 8.1 2.0 
2025 3 217.1 6.3 1.4 
2026 2 221.4 4.3 0.9 
2027 1 223.6 2.2 0.4 
2028 0.5 224.7 1.1 0.2 
2029 0.25 225.3 0.6 0.1 
Total 
 
62.6 
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Only once an assessment of the World Cup‟s actual effect on FDI, tourism and South 
Africa‟s integration into the international community is possible, can economists and 
politicians reflect upon the event‟s merits as a public project.  Hindsight will reveal 
whether expenditure on the World Cup was in the best interests of the public and whether 
the event was a decisive driver of domestic economic growth. Only in the long-term can 
judgements be made as to whether spending on stadia was preferable to, for example, 
greater funding for nationwide HIV/AIDS treatment, and the actual opportunity costs 
assessed. Nonetheless, the following conclusions may be drawn from a forward-looking 
analysis of 2010: 
 
Table 10j. Summation of Costs, Benefits and Potential factors of hosting the 2010 World 
Cup. 
Factors Net Effect 
Monetary Cost of R8.9bn 
Intangible Marginal benefit 
Potential Benefit, but the extent is uncertain 
Summation 
Cumulative impact is dependent on the extent to which 
„Potential‟ factors are realised. 
 
In the 2010 context it can be expected that the potential positive factors do materialise 
and will have the substance to ensure that staging 2010 in South Africa confers a positive 
net economic impact upon the country. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
Mega-events are associated, by the public and politicians, with significant positive 
implications such as enhanced international exposure of the host (Chalkley and Essex, 
1998; Gursoy and Kendall, 2006; Kim et al., 2006), improved infrastructure, increased 
tourist numbers, higher employment levels and tax revenues (Kurtzman, 2005), greater 
feelings of patriotism among host region residents (Cornelissen and Swart, 2006) and 
integration of the host into the international community. Supporters of events have 
claimed that the occasions stimulate prominent economic gains for the host region (Baade 
and Matheson, 2004b; De Groote, 2005; Dwyer et al., 2005). The economic and tourism 
growth that occurred in Barcelona following the 1992 Olympic Games is cited by 
proponents of hosting as an example of the potential benefits that an event can derive on 
the host (Economist, 2004). However, the claim that the Games was the sole driver of 
growth in the region was subsequently shown to have been a misconception and the 
growth the result of a broader infrastructural development programme (Chapter 1) 
(Marshall, 2004).  
 
An analysis of previous mega-events, demonstrated that net benefits were not a necessary 
consequence of hosting, as was the case of the 1992 Atlanta Olympic Games. 
Comparison of pre-event estimates of the economic impact and their actual effects are 
universally divergent (Chapter 2). The observation was validated by the consensus 
academic opinion that economic impact studies systematically overstate the benefits and 
underestimate the costs of hosting (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004; Kasimati, 2003; 
Owen, 2006). Further, different forward-looking studies of the same event, calculate 
vastly different predictions. There is a distinct void in the study of mega-events, as ex 
post studies are rarely undertaken to determine the actual economic impact.  The tools for 
calculating the economic impact, specifically Input-Output Analysis and Computable 
General Equilibrium, are inadequate given their dependence on the data inputs. With 
reference to 2010, cost data has continually increased since 2003; thus determining the 
appropriate inputs to an I-O or CGE is problematic, which reduces the applicability of 
their results. It was identified that the weight given to the multiplier effect was also a 
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factor in the amplification of the expected benefits, as the multipliers do not sufficiently 
account for the leaks of resources from the domestic economy (Chapter 3) (Dwyer et al., 
2006; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000) .  
 
Given their inability to produce meaningful results, I-O and CGE models were rejected as 
a means of providing a significant understanding of the potential economic impact of 
2010. This study therefore concentrated on conducting a comprehensive analysis of the 
determinants of the economic impact of the 2010 World Cup based on the premise that 
the identification of the relative costs and benefits of staging the event was regarded as a 
greater contribution to body of knowledge on the topic. For this purpose a Cost-Benefit 
Analysis was considered as appropriate for the analysis as it provides the framework for 
systematic dissection of the problem and comparison of the pros and cons (Gillroy and 
Wade, 1992; Gramlich, 1981). A further motivation for the CBA approach was its ability 
to include intangible factors into the final summation (Bellas and Zerbe, 2006: 3-5). 
Where feasible, costs and benefits were quantified in monetary terms. Analysis of 
determinants indicated the great extent of unquantifiable factors, discussion of which 
made for a much more complete understanding of the issue (Chapter 3). 
 
Factors that were included in the CBA were identified from issues in previous mega-
events (Chapter 2), from the relevant theory for conducting economic impact studies 
(Chapter 3) and recent studies on the anticipated economic impact of 2010 (Chapter 4). 
The results drawn from Chapter 5 are outlined below. 
 
That FIFA impose tight restrictions with regards the regulation of merchandising, sale of 
concessions and sponsorship, the ability of South Africa firms to gain from the event is 
undermined, and also leads to a loss of resources from the domestic economy. Similarly, 
the tax collecting opportunities of the South African Revenue Services are reduced. 
Resource constraints in labour and capital markets necessitate the use of foreign firms in 
hosting 2010, stimulating only minimal increased employment in the short-term. In 
contrast, significant short-term inflation can be expected, with the long-term effect on 
prices dependent on decisions of suppliers of goods and services. Further, the claim that 
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demand for the rand by World Cup tourists would appreciate the currency was refuted on 
the basis that their demand would not constitute a high enough proportion (0.13%) of the 
rand‟s daily trading volume.  
 
The sustainability of stadia was acknowledged as a significant long-term concern given 
their maintenance costs, estimated at a present value of approximately R900m. In 
addition, the possible secondary costs of hosting 2010 were identified, specifically human 
trafficking, prostitution, hooliganism and congestion.  
 
It was found that for events to enhance national unity, several conditions have to prevail 
simultaneously, and that increased patriotism was doubtful during 2010 due to the 
weakness of the South African national football team. The performance of the Bafana 
Bafana during the tournament is only likely to have direct implications on nation 
building. Poor results from the team may however cause the public to become 
disinterested in the event. The image implication of hosting 2010 is the most salient 
factor in considering the economic impact, as an alteration in the national image can have 
long-term effects on foreign direct investment and tourism. It is however not a certainty 
that the international exposure that South Africa receives will be beneficial. The greatest 
risk to South Africa in hosting the World Cup is that the nation emerges from the event 
with a tarnished international image. A poorly held tournament would negatively affect 
international opinions of the nation, and negatively impact upon both investment and 
tourism in the long-run. The event would then be held at a significant net cost.  
 
The impact on FDI is however expected to be negligible given the inability of the event 
to affect the determinants of FDI flows. In terms of tourism, the crowding out effect was 
shown to reduce the short-term tourism gains. Increased tourists will also act to displace 
locals who leave the host region during the event. As was shown in the „Determination of 
Net Benefits,‟ the short-term economic consequences of staging 2010 are expected to be 
overshadowed by the long-term effects on revenues within the tourism industry. It can be 
expected that there will not be significant short-term economic gains due to 2010; this 
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study predicted a net cost of approximately R8.9bn offset by a marginal intangible net 
benefit. 
 
It is South Africa and its populace‟s performance as hosts which will define the role that 
2010 plays in stimulating a net economic benefit in the country. An efficiently run 
tournament will make a strong statement about South Africa‟s capabilities. There is a 
great weight of expectation upon South Africa, and given the preparations and investment 
in infrastructure, it is evident that organisers are aware of the perils of a failed World 
Cup. It is not expected that the event will be characterised by inferior facilities and 
inadequate organisational measures. The physical staging of the event is not the 
prominent cause for apprehension, it is instead whether that the expected economic 
impacts associated with successful hosting are not realised, and the event comes at a net 
cost.  
 
The most that can be expected of South Africa in staging the event is to create the 
conditions and environment in which economic benefits are able to be generated; an 
objective that is predicted to be achieved. The final impact is then dependent upon the 
capacity of the World Cup in itself, as an instrument of policy, to stimulate long-term 
economic growth. It was however observed that the consensus academic opinion is that 
mega-events do not have the capacity to instigate long-term economic growth in the 
region (Horne, 2004; Kesenne, 2005; Syzmanski, 2002).  Therefore, four conclusions 
regarding the economic impact of 2010 were drawn: 
1) The total net impact is far more complex to calculate than a simple 
summation of the tangible financial expenditures. 
2) The economic impact of the event will be total short-term net cost; 
constituted of a net financial cost, marginally offset by net intangible 
benefits. 
3) The eventual long-term impact will be a function of the potential benefits, 
which can be expected to exceed the short-terms costs, and derive a 
cumulative net benefit. 
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4)  The World Cup is unlikely to stimulate the economic growth rate above 
levels that would have occurred had the event not been held in South 
Africa. 
 
This study does not propose an alternate public project that should have been pursued in 
lieu of World Cup spending, but rather sought to describe and bring to light the issues 
involved in an event-led economic growth policy. While 2010 is a platform for South 
Africa to exhibit the nation‟s infrastructural development, organisational ability and 
growing economic potential, it conceals the issues that government are failing to manage 
such as poverty alleviation, service delivery and healthcare. Staging 2010 is high risk 
since it is uncertain whether the greatest anticipated benefits will be realised. In either 
eventuality, only the passing of time will reveal whether the 2010 World Cup was a 
prudent public project given South Africa‟s current social and economic landscape. 
Further research on the topic would be best conducted in the years following the event. 
Other factors affecting the total costs and benefits may be revealed as the event is staged 
and then passes by. In addition, the extent to which the potential factors occur will 
become apparent. A purely economic impact study can be then be conducted, based on 
more accurate estimates of inputs.   
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Total number of tickets available for 2010 fixtures. 
Stadium Tickets No. of Matches Total Tickets Available 
Soccer City 88 000 8 704 000 
Ellis Park 61 000 7 427 000 
Loftus Versfeld 49 000 5 245 000 
Peter Mokaba 45 000 4 180 000 
Mbombela 43 000 4 172 000 
Moses Mabhida 70 000 8 560 000 
Nelson Mandela 45 000 8 360 000 
Green Point 64 000 9 576 000 
Free State 45 000 6 270 000 
Royal Bafokeng 44 000 5 220 000 
    
Total 554 000 64 3 714 000 
Source: FIFA (2009d: 8) 
 
B. Present Value of maintaining new World Cup stadia 
Year 
Cost to maintain per year 
(Rm) 
Discount 
factor 
Present value of cost to maintain 
(Rm) 
1 55 000 000 1.11 49 773 756 
2 57 750 000 1.22 47 296 329 
3 60 637 500 1.35 44 942 213 
4 63 669 375 1.49 42 705 270 
5 66 852 844 1.65 40 579 669 
6 70 195 486 1.82 38 559 866 
7 73 705 260 2.01 36 640 597 
8 77 390 523 2.22 34 816 857 
9 81 260 049 2.46 33 083 891 
10 85 323 052 2.71 31 437 181 
11 89 589 204 3.00 29 872 435 
12 94 068 665 3.31 28 385 572 
13 98 772 098 3.66 26 972 715 
14 103 710 703 4.05 25 630 182 
15 108 896 238 4.47 24 354 471 
16 114 341 050 4.94 23 142 258 
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17 120 058 102 5.46 21 990 381 
18 126 061 007 6.03 20 895 837 
19 132 364 058 6.67 19 855 773 
20 138 982 261 7.37 18 867 476 
21 145 931 374 8.14 17 928 371 
22 153 227 942 8.99 17 036 009 
23 160 889 340 9.94 16 188 063 
24 168 933 807 10.98 15 382 322 
25 177 380 497 12.14 14 616 686 
26 186 249 522 13.41 13 889 159 
27 195 561 998 14.82 13 197 843 
28 205 340 098 16.37 12 540 937 
29 215 607 103 18.09 11 916 727 
30 226 387 458 19.99 11 323 587 
31 237 706 831 22.09 10 759 970 
32 249 592 172 24.41 10 224 405 
33 262 071 781 26.98 9 715 498 
34 275 175 370 29.81 9 231 922 
35 288 934 138 32.94 8 772 414 
36 303 380 845 36.40 8 335 778 
37 318 549 887 40.22 7 920 875 
38 334 477 382 44.44 7 526 623 
39 351 201 251 49.11 7 151 995 
40 368 761 313 54.26 6 796 013 
41 387 199 379 59.96 6 457 750 
42 406 559 348 66.26 6 136 324 
43 426 887 316 73.21 5 830 896 
44 448 231 681 80.90 5 540 670 
45 470 643 265 89.39 5 264 890 
46 494 175 428 98.78 5 002 826 
47 518 884 200 109.15 4 753 816 
48 544 828 410 120.61 4 517 201 
49 572 069 830 133.28 4 292 363 
50 600 673 322 147.27 4 078 716 
51 630 706 988 162.73 3 875 703 
52 662 242 337 179.82 3 682 794 
53 695 354 454 198.70 3 499 488 
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54 730 122 177 219.57 3 325 305 
55 766 628 285 242.62 3 159 792 
56 804 959 700 268.09 3 002 518 
57 845 207 685 296.24 2 853 071 
58 887 468 069 327.35 2 711 063 
59 931 841 472 361.72 2 576 123 
60 978 433 546 399.70 2 447 900 
Total     953 267 135 
 
C1. Cost of Car Hire in Rands: 
Cost per day 323 
2010 Prediction 371 
Cost split between 3 people 124 
Rounded 125 
 
A Toyota Corolla was used as an average booked vehicle at Avis Car Rentals. The 
booking was made 4 and a half months in advance, and was made in Cape Town for 10 
days between 19 and 29 December, 2009. A 15% price increase was applied to the 
quoted rates.  
 
C2. Cost of Domestic Flights in Rands: 
Airline Cost 
Mango 942 
SAA 1 167 
1Time 1 295 
Average 1 135 
2010 Prediction 1 305 
Rounded 1 300 
 
The booking was made 4 and a half months in advance, and was for a flight between 
Johannesburg and Cape Town. Three domestic airlines were surveyed and the average 
cost was applied with a 15% price increase to simulate World Cup prices.  
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C3. Total Cost of Internal Travel in Rands: 
Air travel 1300 x 4 = 5 200 
Car Hire 125 x 8 = 1000 
Total 6 200 
 
D1. Set Two: Relaxed Assumptions: 
Expenditure: Cost (R): Assumption that each tourist will: 
Accommodation/night 20 000 
Visit for two thirds (20 nights) of the tournament 
spending R1000 per night on accommodation 
Internal travel 7 750 
Make 5 domestic flights at R1300 each and hire a 
rental car for 10 days 
Food & Drink 5 000 Spend R250 a day on food and drinks 
Tickets 7 200 
Attend 6 World Cup fixtures at an average cost of 
R1200 
Miscellaneous 3 000 
Spend R150 a day on curios, tips and unforeseen 
expenses 
Tourist Activities 10 000 Spend R500 a day on tourist activities 
Per Visitor Demand 
for Rands 
52 950 
 
Per Visitor Demand 
for Rand in US$ 
7 060 Assuming a fixed exchange rate of R7.50 per $. 
Visitors 450 000 
 
Total Spending in US$ 3 177 000 000 
 
Rand demand per day 
in US$ 
42 360 000 
Assuming an increased demand for  
rand over 60 days 
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D2. Set Three: Liberal Assumptions: 
Expenditure: Cost (R): Assumption that each tourist will: 
Accommodation/night 30 000 
Visit for the duration of the tournament (30 
nights) spending R1000 per night on 
accommodation 
Internal travel 10 975 
Make 7 domestic flights at R1300 each and hire a 
rental car for 15 days 
Food & Drink 7 500 Spend R250 a day on food and drinks 
Tickets 16 000 
Attend 8 World Cup fixtures at an average cost of 
R2000 
Miscellaneous 15 000 
Spend R500 a day on public transport, curios, car 
hire, tips and unforeseen expenses 
Tourist Activities 22 500 Spend R750 a day on tourist activities 
Per Visitor Demand for 
Rands 
101 975 
 
Per Visitor Demand for 
Rands in US$ 
14 568 Assuming a fixed exchange rate of R7 per $. 
Visitors 500 000 
 
Total Spending in US$ 7 283 928 571 
 
Rand demand per day 
in US$ 
161 865 079 
Assuming an increased demand for  
rand over 45 days 
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E1. Total effect on tourist spending, under the assumption that 20% of African tourists 
entering by land are crowded out (in billions of rands).  
Crowding out 
of non-World 
Cup ordinary 
tourists 
Total Ordinary Tourist 
Spending at Crowding 
out level (Rbn) 
Total spending by 
African visitors, 
entering by land 
(Rbn) 
World Cup 
Tourist Spending 
(Rbn) 
0 4.9 6.25 13.1 
25 3.67 6.25 13.1 
50 2.45 6.25 13.1 
75 1.22 6.25 13.1 
100 0 6.25 13.1 
    
Total spending 
per month 
(Rbn) 
Decrease in tourist 
spending due to the 
crowding out effect (Rbn) 
Net Benefit of 
World Cup 
(Rbn) 
Crowding Out Effect 
as % of World  
Cup Spending 
24.24 1.72 11.38 0.13 
23.02 2.95 10.15 0.22 
21.8 4.17 8.93 0.32 
20.57 5.39 7.71 0.41 
19.35 6.62 6.25 0.51 
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E2. Total effect on tourist spending, under the assumption that 30% of African tourists 
entering by land are crowded out (in billions of rands). 
Crowding out 
of non-World 
Cup ordinary 
tourists 
Total Ordinary Tourist 
Spending at Crowding 
out level (Rbn) 
Total spending by 
African visitors, 
entering by land 
(Rbn) 
World Cup 
Tourist Spending 
(Rbn) 
0 4.9 5.47 13.1 
25 3.67 5.47 13.1 
50 2.45 5.47 13.1 
75 1.22 5.47 13.1 
100 0 5.47 13.1 
 
 
 
  Total spending 
per month 
(Rbn) 
Decrease in tourist 
spending due to the 
crowding out effect (Rbn) 
Net Benefit of  
World Cup 
(Rbn) 
Crowding Out Effect 
as % of World  
Cup Spending 
23.46 2.5 10.6 0.19 
22.24 3.73 9.37 0.28 
21.01 4.95 8.15 0.38 
19.79 6.17 6.93 0.47 
18.57 7.4 5.47 0.56 
 
F. World Cup host countries, with the economic growth rates for pre and post-World Cup 
years:  
1954: Switzerland (4.0 and 5.5%); 
1958: Sweden (1.9 and 4.0%);  
1962: Chile (3.2 and 1.8%);  
1966: Great Britain (1.4 and 3.0%); 
1970: Mexico (2.9 and 5.2%); 
1974: Germany (9.5 and 4.7%);  
1978: Argentina (0 and 5.6%);  
1982: Spain (–0.6 and 0.5%);  
1986: Mexico (–2.2 and 0.6%);  
1990: Italy (2.4 and 0.9%);  
1994: United States (2.4 and 2.3%);  
1998: France (1.9 and 2.9%). (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 201).   
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G1. Present Value of World Cup in terms of increased tourist spending at 10% growth.  
Year 
Total tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Value of World Cup 
induced tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Present Value of World 
Cup induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
1 88.35 8.03 8.03 
2 97.18 8.83 7.24 
3 106.90 9.72 7.20 
4 117.59 10.69 7.17 
5 129.35 11.76 7.14 
6 142.28 12.93 7.11 
7 156.51 14.23 7.07 
8 172.16 15.65 7.04 
9 189.38 17.22 7.01 
10 208.32 18.94 6.98 
11 229.15 20.83 6.95 
12 252.07 22.92 6.91 
13 277.27 25.21 6.88 
14 305.00 27.73 6.85 
15 335.50 30.50 6.82 
16 369.05 33.55 6.79 
17 405.95 36.90 6.76 
18 446.55 40.60 6.73 
19 491.21 44.66 6.70 
20 540.33 49.12 6.67 
Total     140.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
157 
 
G2. Present Value of World Cup in terms of increased tourist spending at 7.5% growth. 
Year 
Total tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Value of World Cup 
induced tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Present Value of World 
Cup induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
1 86.34 6.02 6.02 
2 92.82 6.48 5.30 
3 99.78 6.96 5.16 
4 107.26 7.48 5.02 
5 115.30 8.04 4.88 
6 123.95 8.65 4.75 
7 133.25 9.30 4.62 
8 143.24 9.99 4.50 
9 153.98 10.74 4.37 
10 165.53 11.55 4.26 
11 177.95 12.42 4.14 
12 191.30 13.35 4.03 
13 205.64 14.35 3.92 
14 221.07 15.42 3.81 
15 237.65 16.58 3.71 
16 255.47 17.82 3.61 
17 274.63 19.16 3.51 
18 295.23 20.60 3.41 
19 317.37 22.14 3.32 
20 341.17 23.80 3.23 
Total     85.57 
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G3. Present Value of World Cup in terms of increased tourist spending at 5% growth. 
Year 
Total tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Value of World Cup 
induced tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Present Value of World 
Cup induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
1 84.33 4.02 4.02 
2 88.55 4.22 3.45 
3 92.98 4.43 3.28 
4 97.62 4.65 3.12 
5 102.51 4.88 2.96 
6 107.63 5.13 2.82 
7 113.01 5.38 2.68 
8 118.66 5.65 2.54 
9 124.60 5.93 2.42 
10 130.83 6.23 2.30 
11 137.37 6.54 2.18 
12 144.24 6.87 2.07 
13 151.45 7.21 1.97 
14 159.02 7.57 1.87 
15 166.97 7.95 1.78 
16 175.32 8.35 1.69 
17 184.09 8.77 1.61 
18 193.29 9.20 1.53 
19 202.95 9.66 1.45 
20 213.10 10.15 1.38 
Total     47.10 
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G4. Present Value of World Cup in terms of increased tourist spending at 2.5% growth. 
Year 
Total tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Value of World Cup 
induced tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Present Value of World 
Cup induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
1 82.32 2.01 2.01 
2 84.38 2.06 1.69 
3 86.49 2.11 1.56 
4 88.65 2.16 1.45 
5 90.87 2.22 1.35 
6 93.14 2.27 1.25 
7 95.47 2.33 1.16 
8 97.86 2.39 1.07 
9 100.30 2.45 1.00 
10 102.81 2.51 0.92 
11 105.38 2.57 0.86 
12 108.02 2.63 0.79 
13 110.72 2.70 0.74 
14 113.48 2.77 0.68 
15 116.32 2.84 0.63 
16 119.23 2.91 0.59 
17 122.21 2.98 0.55 
18 125.27 3.06 0.51 
19 128.40 3.13 0.47 
20 131.61 3.21 0.44 
Total     19.71 
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G5. Present Value of World Cup in terms of increased tourist spending at 1% growth. 
Year 
Total tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Value of World Cup 
induced tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Present Value of World 
Cup induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
1 81.12 0.80 0.80 
2 81.93 0.81 0.66 
3 82.75 0.82 0.61 
4 83.58 0.83 0.56 
5 84.41 0.84 0.51 
6 85.26 0.84 0.46 
7 86.11 0.85 0.42 
8 86.97 0.86 0.39 
9 87.84 0.87 0.35 
10 88.72 0.88 0.32 
11 89.61 0.89 0.30 
12 90.50 0.90 0.27 
13 91.41 0.91 0.25 
14 92.32 0.91 0.23 
15 93.24 0.92 0.21 
16 94.18 0.93 0.19 
17 95.12 0.94 0.17 
18 96.07 0.95 0.16 
19 97.03 0.96 0.14 
20 98.00 0.97 0.13 
Total     7.13 
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G6. Present Value of World Cup in terms of increased tourist spending at -1% growth. 
Year 
Total tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Value of World Cup 
induced tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Present Value of World 
Cup induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
1 79.51 -0.80 -0.80 
2 78.72 -0.80 -0.65 
3 77.93 -0.79 -0.58 
4 77.15 -0.78 -0.52 
5 76.38 -0.77 -0.47 
6 75.62 -0.76 -0.42 
7 74.86 -0.76 -0.38 
8 74.11 -0.75 -0.34 
9 73.37 -0.74 -0.30 
10 72.64 -0.73 -0.27 
11 71.91 -0.73 -0.24 
12 71.19 -0.72 -0.22 
13 70.48 -0.71 -0.19 
14 69.77 -0.70 -0.17 
15 69.08 -0.70 -0.16 
16 68.39 -0.69 -0.14 
17 67.70 -0.68 -0.13 
18 67.02 -0.68 -0.11 
19 66.35 -0.67 -0.10 
20 65.69 -0.66 -0.09 
Total     -6.28 
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G7. Present Value of World Cup in terms of increased tourist spending at -2.5% growth. 
Year 
Total tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Value of World Cup 
induced tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Present Value of World 
Cup induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
1 78.31 -2.01 -2.01 
2 76.35 -1.96 -1.60 
3 74.44 -1.91 -1.41 
4 72.58 -1.86 -1.25 
5 70.77 -1.81 -1.10 
6 69.00 -1.77 -0.97 
7 67.27 -1.72 -0.86 
8 65.59 -1.68 -0.76 
9 63.95 -1.64 -0.67 
10 62.35 -1.60 -0.59 
11 60.79 -1.56 -0.52 
12 59.27 -1.52 -0.46 
13 57.79 -1.48 -0.40 
14 56.35 -1.44 -0.36 
15 54.94 -1.41 -0.32 
16 53.56 -1.37 -0.28 
17 52.23 -1.34 -0.25 
18 50.92 -1.31 -0.22 
19 49.65 -1.27 -0.19 
20 48.41 -1.24 -0.17 
Total     -14.37 
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G8. Present Value of World Cup in terms of increased tourist spending at -5% growth. 
Year 
Total tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Value of World Cup 
induced tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Present Value of World 
Cup induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
1 76.30 -4.02 -4.02 
2 72.49 -3.82 -3.12 
3 68.86 -3.62 -2.69 
4 65.42 -3.44 -2.31 
5 62.15 -3.27 -1.99 
6 59.04 -3.11 -1.71 
7 56.09 -2.95 -1.47 
8 53.28 -2.80 -1.26 
9 50.62 -2.66 -1.08 
10 48.09 -2.53 -0.93 
11 45.68 -2.40 -0.80 
12 43.40 -2.28 -0.69 
13 41.23 -2.17 -0.59 
14 39.17 -2.06 -0.51 
15 37.21 -1.96 -0.44 
16 35.35 -1.86 -0.38 
17 33.58 -1.77 -0.32 
18 31.90 -1.68 -0.28 
19 30.31 -1.60 -0.24 
20 28.79 -1.52 -0.21 
Total     -25.03 
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G9. Present Value of World Cup in terms of increased tourist spending at -7.5% growth. 
Year 
Total tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Value of World Cup 
induced tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Present Value of World 
Cup induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
1 74.29 -6.02 -6.02 
2 68.72 -5.57 -4.56 
3 63.57 -5.15 -3.82 
4 58.80 -4.77 -3.20 
5 54.39 -4.41 -2.68 
6 50.31 -4.08 -2.24 
7 46.54 -3.77 -1.88 
8 43.05 -3.49 -1.57 
9 39.82 -3.23 -1.31 
10 36.83 -2.99 -1.10 
11 34.07 -2.76 -0.92 
12 31.51 -2.56 -0.77 
13 29.15 -2.36 -0.65 
14 26.96 -2.19 -0.54 
15 24.94 -2.02 -0.45 
16 23.07 -1.87 -0.38 
17 21.34 -1.73 -0.32 
18 19.74 -1.60 -0.27 
19 18.26 -1.48 -0.22 
20 16.89 -1.37 -0.19 
Total     -33.08 
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G10. Present Value of World Cup in terms of increased tourist spending at -10% growth. 
Year 
Total tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Value of World Cup 
induced tourist revenues 
(Rbn) 
Present Value of World 
Cup induced tourist 
revenues (Rbn) 
1 72.28 -8.03 -8.03 
2 65.06 -7.23 -5.92 
3 58.55 -6.51 -4.82 
4 52.70 -5.86 -3.93 
5 47.43 -5.27 -3.20 
6 42.68 -4.74 -2.61 
7 38.41 -4.27 -2.12 
8 34.57 -3.84 -1.73 
9 31.12 -3.46 -1.41 
10 28.00 -3.11 -1.15 
11 25.20 -2.80 -0.93 
12 22.68 -2.52 -0.76 
13 20.42 -2.27 -0.62 
14 18.37 -2.04 -0.50 
15 16.54 -1.84 -0.41 
16 14.88 -1.65 -0.33 
17 13.39 -1.49 -0.27 
18 12.06 -1.34 -0.22 
19 10.85 -1.21 -0.18 
20 9.76 -1.08 -0.15 
Total     -39.30 
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